2020 ◽  
pp. 5-29
Author(s):  
Evsey T. Gurvich ◽  
Natalia A. Krasnopeeva

We study the tax-spend nexus for Russian regional budgets. Causal relationship running from taxing to spending is found, thus supporting the concept “tax and spend” suggested by M. Friedman. Next, elasticity of expenditure by revenue is estimated for a panel of 80 regional budgets basing on data for 2000—2017. Estimates are in the range of 0.72 to 0.78 (depending on the econometric technique), which exceeds elasticity for the federal budget more than twice. This evidences that fiscal policy at the sub-federal (as distinct from the federal) level has clear pro-cyclical nature. Besides, the largest sensitivity of expenditure to revenue shocks is found for the item “national economy”, implying marked adverse implications for economic growth. We suggest to mitigate this effect by modifying fiscal rules for sub-federal budgets. They are currently aimed primarily at enhancing fiscal discipline, with less emphasis on countercyclical policy, insulating economy from fiscal shocks.


2016 ◽  
pp. 5-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Gurvich ◽  
I. Sokolov

In-depth analysis of international and Russia’s experiences with implementing fiscal rules is presented. Theoretical and empirical evidences are suggested in favor of retaining the present fiscal rules with some modifications aimed at ensuring: a) a relatively stable level of federal budget expenditure with guaranteed full execution of all commitments; b) countercyclical fiscal policy, based on flexibleand proper reaction to revenue changes; and c) robustness of fiscal rules to internal and external shocks. The main new features suggested include modified calculation of the oil base price, different measurement of cyclical fiscal revenues, lower size of structural fiscal balance, and thorough specification of sources for each item of the balance. The modified rules envisage increased flexibility by relaxing to a pre-set extent and for a pre-set time spending limits in response to extreme shocks. The suggested version of fiscal rules has been tested by application to historical data for 2005-2015, and macro projections for 2015-2025.


Author(s):  
Ashoka Mody

This chapter describes two scenarios, the two possible ways in which the final act of the European project plays out. In the first scenario, European authorities remain confident that they have essentially been on the right track and they continue to make modest course corrections, which they believe will ensure a brighter European future. However, the elusive and frustrating pursuit of deeper economic and financial integration causes more economic and political damage. Setbacks and crises recur to test the euro and its accompanying political vision. In the second scenario, the pro-European vision, European authorities recognize the important truth that “more Europe” will not solve Europe's most pressing economic and social problems. They dismantle the economically counterproductive and politically corrosive system of fiscal rules and rely more on financial markets to enforce fiscal discipline. Paradoxically, the euro survives, not because it adds value but because it becomes largely irrelevant.


2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-41
Author(s):  
Dominik Maltritz ◽  
Sebastian Wüste

AbstractWe search for drivers of fiscal deficits in Europe using a data panel containing annual data of 27 EU countries in the years 1991–2012. Our special focus is on the influence of fiscal rules as well as on fiscal councils, i. e. institutions that may help to reduce deficits and enforce fiscal rules by advising governments. We distinguish between internal fiscal rules and external rules that result from EMU membership. In addition, we consider the impact of “creative accounting”, i. e. measures that help to circumvent fiscal rules, which we approximate by so called stock-flow-adjustments. We especially analyze the interactive influence of the mentioned variables on the budget balance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 254 ◽  
pp. R54-R66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Dullien ◽  
Sabine Stephan ◽  
Thomas Theobald

Under the Trump administration, a transatlantic trade conflict has been escalating step by step. First, it was about tariffs on steel and aluminium, then about retaliation for the French digital tax, which is suspended until the end of the year. Most recently, the US administration threatened the European Union with tariffs on cars and car parts because of Canadian seafood being subject to lower import duties. As simulations with NiGEM show, a further escalation of the transatlantic trade conflict has the potential to slow down economic growth significantly in the countries involved. This is a considerable risk given the fact that the countries have to cope with the enormous negative effects of the pandemic shock. Furthermore, the damage caused by the trade conflict depends on the extent to which the affected countries use fiscal policy to stabilise their economies.


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