scholarly journals The Effects of Russia’s Great Power Eminence and Sovereign State Perception on the Balkans

Author(s):  
Murat YORULMAZ
Author(s):  
Alexander Tabachnik ◽  
Benjamin Miller

This chapter explains the process of peaceful change in Central and Eastern Europe following the demise of the Soviet system. It also explains the failure of peaceful change in the Balkans and some post-Soviet countries, such as the Ukrainian conflict in 2014. The chapter accounts for the conditions for peaceful change and for the variation between peaceful and violent change by the state-to-nation theory. The two independent variables suggested by the theory are the level of state capacity and congruence—namely the compatibility between state borders and the national identities of the countries at stake. Moreover, according to the theory, great-power engagement serves as an intervening variable and in some conditions, as explained in the chapter, may help with peaceful change.


Author(s):  
Paul Shore

Interactions between Jesuits and Orthodox believers have been characterized both by meaningful encounters and by conflict and misunderstanding. The gaps between urban, transnational, and book-oriented Jesuit culture and the traditional, rural, and preliterate cultures of many Orthodox populations were underscored by different theological ideas and by great power politics. Ethnic rivalries and a historic suspicion of Catholicism among some Orthodox also contributed to tensions. Jesuits nonetheless worked over a wide portion of Russia, the Balkans, and other locations in Eastern Europe, although their success in converting Orthodox was always very modest. The Soviet era brought severe persecution to Jesuits. Since 1991, the Society has returned to the region, but with a focus now based on education, compassion, outreach, and social justice rather than on proselytizing.


Author(s):  
John Tully

Modern Cambodian history begins with the creation of the French Protectorate in 1863. Until the 15th century, Cambodia was a regional great power, but by the late 18th it faced extinction as a sovereign state. Although the Protectorate ensured the country’s territorial integrity, French ideas of governance and philosophy collided with Cambodia’s ancient traditions. By 1897, the French had prevailed: Cambodia had escaped its predatory neighbors, Siam and Vietnam, but had lost its internal and external sovereignty. After independence in 1953, Cambodia sat on the fault lines of the Cold War. Precariously neutral until 1970, it fell into a new dark age of civil war, foreign invasions, saturation bombing, and mass murder. Liberated from the horrors of Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchea (DK) by the Vietnamese in late 1978, the regime the invaders installed suffered a period of international ostracism that lasted until the end of the Cold War in 1991–1992. Cambodia is at peace today, but hopes that it would develop as a free, democratic, and more equal society have proved illusory. Cambodia is one of Asia’s poorest states; a kleptocracy ruled by the durable autocrat Hun Sen via a façade of democratic institutions. The economy, according to Sebastian Strangio, “is controlled by … [a] new quasi-palace elite: a sprawling network of CPP politicians, military brass, and business families arranged in vertical khsae, or ‘strings,’ of patronage emanating from Hun Sen and his close associates.”


2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-298
Author(s):  
Ellen J. Ravndal

AbstractHow did the transition from a world of empire to a global international system organised around the sovereign state play out? This article traces the transition over the past two centuries through an examination of membership debates in two prominent intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). IGOs are sites of contestation that play a role in the constitution of the international system. Discussions within IGOs reflect and shape broader international norms, and are one mechanism through which the international system determines questions of membership and attendant rights and obligations. The article reveals that IGO membership policies during this period reflected different compromises between the three competing principles of great power privilege, the ‘standard of civilisation’, and universal sovereign equality. The article contributes to Global IR as it confirms that non-Western agency was crucial in bringing about this transition. States in Africa, Asia, and Latin America championed the adoption of the sovereignty criterion. In this, paradoxically, one of the core constitutional norms of the ‘European’ international system – the principle of sovereign equality – was realised at the hands of non-European actors.


2012 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 337-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER HALDÉN

AbstractSocial theory almost invariably equates modernity with the sovereign state. This equation must be nuanced because the modern era and modern strategies of international stability have contained non-sovereign units. In the nineteenth century, the Great Powers tried to create international stability by engineering forms of rule in Europe. These strategies built on distinctively modern ideas: the possibility of radically breaking with the past, redesigning political organisations, and actively controlling political events through rational planning. Throughout the century the Great Powers alternated between creating non-sovereign units and creating sovereign units as instruments in these stabilising strategies. The degree of trust between the Great Powers accounts for the shift between the two strategies: they tended to create non-sovereign units when mutual trust was high and sovereign ones when trust was low. This article analyses Great Power strategies of designing forms of rule in the Balkans between 1820 and 1878. Like in previous centuries, nineteenth-century Europe actually consisted of two parallel but connected systems: the egalitarian system of sovereign states and a system of non-sovereign entities. Non-sovereign units disappeared only late in the century and this process was affected by the increasing rivalry and mistrust between the sovereign states.


1993 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-93
Author(s):  
Dennis P. Hupchick

By the year 1453, when the vestigial remains of the Byzantine Empire were destroyed with the fall of Constantinople, much of the Balkan peninsula was already in the hands of the conquering Ottoman Turks. The overthrow of Byzantium in that year was the capstone in a century-long process that transformed an originally militant Muslim Anatolian border emirate into a powerful Muslim empire that straddled two continents and represented a major contender in contemporary European great power politics. Over half of the population subject to the Ottoman sultan were Christian European inhabitants of the Balkans: Greeks, Serbs, Vlahs, Albanians and Bulgarians. With the conquest of Constantinople, Sultan Mehmed II Fatih, the victorious Turkish ruler, faced the quarrelsome problem of devising a secure means of governing his vast, Muslim-led empire that contained a highly heterogeneous non-Muslim population.


2003 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jim Headley

This article analyses the Russian reaction to the Sarajevo crisis of February 1994 when NATO threatened air strikes in response to the market-place mortar explosion. I argue that Russia's shift to a realist great-power policy led to a crisis with the West as Russia sought to demonstrate its great power credentials, protect what it saw as specific Russian interests in the Balkans, and limit the role of NATO in conflict resolution, while Western leaders aimed to demonstrate NATO credibility and its new post-Cold War role as peace-keeper/peace-maker. This was the first major East-West crisis since the end of the Cold War, and Russian responses and actions foreshadowed its reactions to the Kosovo crisis.


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