The Role of Kim Pyong Ro, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as the Bulwark of Judicial Independence under the first Republic of Korea

2019 ◽  
Vol 58 ◽  
pp. 433-476
Author(s):  
In Sup Han
1918 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Reed Powell

In previous issues of this Review Professor Wambaugh and the late Judge McClain have summarized the decisions of the Supreme Court on constitutional questions from 1909 to 1914. It is the purpose of this and a succeeding paper to deal in like manner with the decisions of the last three years. Owing to the number of cases decided during the triennium, the writer must content himself with the rôle of annalist and refrain from assuming that of analyst. For the benefit of those who desire fuller comment or criticism, references are given to articles and notes in various legal periodicals discussing the more important cases.Since the expiration of the October term of 1913, three changes have occurred in the personnel of the bench. Mr. Justice Lurton died July 12, 1914, and his successor, Mr. Justice McReynolds, took his seat October 12, 1914. Illness prevented Mr. Justice Lamar from participating in any of the decisions of the October term of 1915. He died on January 2, 1916. The commission of Mr. Justice Brandeis, who succeeded him, was not recorded until June 5, 1916, so that during the 1915 term only eight justices participated in the work of the court. Mr. Justice Hughes resigned June 10, 1916, to accept the Republican nomination for the presidency, and his successor, Mr. Justice Clarke, took his seat on October 9, 1916. The bench as at present constituted consists of Chief Justice White, appointed associate justice by President Cleveland and chief justice by President Taft; Mr. Justice McKenna, appointed by President McKinley; Justices Holmes and Day, appointed by President Roosevelt; Justices Van Devanter and Pitney, appointed by President Taft; and the three new justices appointed by President Wilson.


2000 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 705-735 ◽  
Author(s):  
PILAR DOMINGO

This article examines the role of the Supreme Court in the development of the Mexican political system. The judiciary provided an important source of regime legitimation, as it allowed for the consolidation of a state of legality and a claim to constitutional rule of law, at least in discourse. However, the judiciary was in effect politically subordinated to the logic of dominant party rule through both specific constitutional reforms since 1917 that weakened the possibility of judicial independence and a politics of institutional and political co-optation. The constitutional reform of 1994 has significantly altered the nature of the relationship between the executive and the Supreme Court.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1532673X2198901
Author(s):  
Thomas Gray ◽  
Banks Miller

Chief judges stand as visible leaders of their courts. Analyses of the Supreme Court focus on the role of the chief justice as an institution-builder seeking out public-facing consensus to protect Court legitimacy. Studying the powers of chief judges and political leadership in general is difficult. Analyzing all 50 states over 16 years we find no evidence that the identity of chief judges explains consensus behavior any better than random chance. This is true even among the subset of chief judges with additional institutional powers like opinion assignment. We show that court structures explain consensus, while leader features do not. Being chief judge correlates with an elevated likelihood of being in the majority, particularly in cases decided by one vote. These results add to our understanding of leadership on courts and imply that the office of chief judge at the state level is more symbolic than uniquely powerful.


2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Daniel Ura ◽  
Carla M. Flink

In this article, we draw on a prominent model of public management to develop a preliminary theoretical approach to understanding the role of the chief justice in Supreme Court decision-making. In particular, we argue that the Court may seek legitimacy through greater unanimity and discuss how the leadership of the chief justice can facilitate that effort. We assess a hypothesis derived from this theory, showing greater agreement among the justices as the incumbent chief justice’s tenure in office increases. We argue that these results provide support for further attention to and development of a public administration-based approach to the study of Supreme Court decision-making. The application of public administration to judicial politics provides further evidence of management dynamics in American institutions.


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