Judicial Independence: The Politics of the Supreme Court in Mexico

2000 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 705-735 ◽  
Author(s):  
PILAR DOMINGO

This article examines the role of the Supreme Court in the development of the Mexican political system. The judiciary provided an important source of regime legitimation, as it allowed for the consolidation of a state of legality and a claim to constitutional rule of law, at least in discourse. However, the judiciary was in effect politically subordinated to the logic of dominant party rule through both specific constitutional reforms since 1917 that weakened the possibility of judicial independence and a politics of institutional and political co-optation. The constitutional reform of 1994 has significantly altered the nature of the relationship between the executive and the Supreme Court.

1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Gavison

A discussion of the role of courts in Israel today demands some introductory remarks. The Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Court enjoy great acclaim and respect within Israel and abroad, but have recently come under attack from a variety of sources. These attacks are often confused, and many of them are clearly motivated by narrow partisan interests and an inherent objection to the rule of law and judicial review. But these motives do not necessarily weaken the dangers which the attacks pose to the legitimacy of the courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, in Israel's public life. The fact that in some sectors extremely harsh criticism of the court is seen to be an electoral boost, testifies to the serious and dangerous nature of the threat. This situation creates a dilemma for those who want a strong and independent judiciary, believing it is essential for freedom and democracy, but who also believe that, during the last two decades, the courts have transgressed limits they should respect. The dilemma becomes especially acute when the political echo sounds out in one's criticism, and when one is part of the group that believes that the legal and the judicial systems have made some contribution to the prevalence of these hyperbolic and dangerous attacks, as I am.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 294
Author(s):  
Ibnu Sina Chandranegara

Indonesian constitutional reform after the fall of Soeharto’s New Order brings favorable direction for the judiciary. Constitutional guarantee of judicial independence as regulated in Art 24 (1) of the 1945 Constitution, has closed dark memories in the past. This article decides that the Judiciary is held by the Supreme Court and the judicial bodies below and a Constitutional Court. Such a strict direction of regulation plus the transformation of the political system in a democratic direction should bring about the implementation of the independent and autonomous judiciary. But in reality, even though in a democratic political system and constitutional arrangement affirms the guarantee of independence, but it doesn’t represent the actual situation. There are some problems that remain, such as (i) the absence of a permanent format regarding the institutional relationship between the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the Judicial Commission, and (ii) still many efforts to weaken judiciary through different ways such criminalization of judge. Referring to the problem above, then there are gaps between what "is" and what "ought", among others. First, by changing political configuration that tends to be more democratic, the judiciary should be more autonomous. In this context, various problems arise such as (i) disharmony in regulating the pattern of relations between judicial power actors, (ii) various attempts to criminalize judges over their decisions, and (iii) judicial corruption. Second, by the constitutional guarantee of the independence of the judiciary, there will be no legislation that that may reduce constitutional guarantee. However, there are many legislation or regulations that still not in line with a constitutional guarantee concerning judicial independence. This paper reviews and describes in-depth about how to implement constitutional guarantees of judicial independence after the political transition and conceptualize its order to strengthen rule of law in Indonesia


Author(s):  
Gary Watt

Without assuming prior legal knowledge, books in the Directions series introduce and guide readers through key points of law and legal debate. Questions, diagrams and exercises help readers to engage fully with each subject and check their understanding as they progress. This book explains the key topics covered on equity and trusts courses. The content of the text is designed to emphasise the relationship between equity, trusts, property, contract and restitution to enable students to map out conceptual connections between related legal ideas. There is also a focus on modern cases in the commercial sphere to reflect the constantly changing and socially significant role of trusts and equity. The book starts by introducing equity and trusts. It then includes a chapter on understanding trusts, and moves on to consider capacity and formality requirements, certainty requirements and the constitution of trusts. Various types of trusts are then examined such as purpose, charitable, and variation trusts. The book then describes issues related to trusteeship. Breach of trust is explained, as is informal trusts of land. There is a chapter on tracing, and then the book concludes by looking at equitable liability of strangers to trust and equitable doctrines and remedies. This new edition includes coverage of significant recent cases, including the Supreme Court decision on interest to be paid by tax authorities on monies owed; the Supreme Court decision on the test of dishonesty applicable to civil matters; the Privy Council decision on the division of investment property acquired by cohabitants; the Court of Appeal decisions on Quistclose trusts; fiduciary duties in arms-length contracts; transactions prejudicing creditors; beneficiary anonymity in variation of trust cases; exemption clauses; discretion exercised beyond trustee’s authority; implications of GDPR for trustee disclosures; trustee personal liability; causation and equitable compensation; statutory relief for a professional trustee’s breach of trust; use of proprietary estoppel to reward work undertaken in farming families; costs of seeking court’s directions; injunctions ordered against persons unknown; equitable jurisdiction to rectify agreements.


Author(s):  
Brian Thompson ◽  
Michael Gordon

Extracts have been chosen from a wide range of historical and contemporary cases to illustrate the reasoning processes of the courts and to show how legal principles are developed. This chapter examines the notion of judicial independence. It discusses the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and its provisions reforming the office of the Lord Chancellor, establishing a new Supreme Court, and restructuring judicial appointments. Judicial diversity and discipline, along with further change to the judicial appointments process, are also considered. The chapter also considers the accountability of the judiciary to Parliament and the public, and the relationship between judicial independence and parliamentary privilege.


1984 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter H. Russell

abstractIf the next stage of constitutional renewal is to be the strengthening of national institutions, consideration should be given to the judicial branch of government as well as to the Senate and House of Commons. In assessing reforms in this area it is important to distinguish the symbolic from operational consequences. First priority should be given to constitutional entrenchment of the Supreme Court. Although the significance of such an amendment is largely symbolic, it is needed to remove uncertainties created by references to the Supreme Court in the Constitution Act, 1982. A general guarantee of judicial independence should be abandoned as a misguided exercise in constitutional symbolism. From both a symbolic and operational perspective, reform of section 96 of the original constitution holds out the most interesting possibility of establishing the constitutional basis for a truly national judiciary.


2019 ◽  
pp. 325-357
Author(s):  
Alison L. Young

When examining the recent evolution of the Constitution, it is argued that the UK has become more ‘legal’ as opposed to ‘political’. The last twenty years has seen a growth in legislation and case law, particularly that of the Supreme Court, regulating aspects of the UK constitution. This chapter investigates this claim. It argues that, whilst we can point to a growth in both legislation and case law, when we look at the case law more closely we can see that the courts balance an array of factors when determining how far to control executive actions. These factors include an analysis of the relative institutional features and constitutional role of the legislature, the executive and the courts. This evidence, in turn, questions the traditional understanding of the separation of powers as a hidden component of the UK constitution. It is not the case that courts merely balance the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty in order to determine how far to control executive actions. Rather, the courts determine how to make this balance through the lens of the separation of powers, evaluating institutional and constitutional features. In doing so, they are upholding necessary checks and balances in the UK constitution.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 383-404
Author(s):  
Ibnu Sina Chandranegara ◽  
Syaiful Bakhri ◽  
Muhammad Ali

AbstractConstitutional Reform after fall of Soeharto’s New Order bring favorable direction for judiciary. Constitutional guarantee of judicial independence as regulated in Art 24 (1) of the 1945 Constitution, closing dark memories in the past. In addition, in Art 24 (2) of the 1945 Constitution decide the Judiciary is held by the Supreme Court and the judicial bodies below and a Constitutional Court. Such a strict direction of regulation plus the transformation of the political system in a democratic direction should bring about the implementation of the independent and autonomous judiciary. But in reality, even though in a democratic political system and constitutional arrangement affirms the guarantee of independence, but it doesn’t represent the actual situation. There some problem which still remains, such as (i) the absence of a permanent format regarding the institutional relationship between the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court and Judicial Commission, and (ii) still many efforts to weaken judiciary through many ways such criminalization of judge. Referring to the problem above, then there are gaps between what “is” and what “ought”, among others, First, by changes political configuration that tend to be more democratic, the judiciary should be more autonomous. But in reality, various problems arise such as (i) disharmony in regulating the pattern of relations between judicial power actors, (ii) various attempts to criminalize judges over their decisions, (iii) judicial corruption. Second, by the constitutional guarantee of the independence of the judiciary, there will be no legislation which reduced constitutional guarantee. But in reality, many legislation or regulations that still not in line with a constitutional guarantee concerning judicial independence. This paper reviews and describes in-depth about how to implement constitutional guarantees of judicial independence under democratic consolidation after fall of new order and conceptualize its order to strengthening rule of law in IndonesiaKeyword: Judicial Reform, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, Democratic Consolidation AbstrakPerubahan UUD 1945 membawa arah yang menguntungkan bagi cabang kekuasaan kehakiman di Indonesia. Penjaminan kemerdekaan kekuasaan kehakiman sebagaimana diatur dalam Pasal 24 (1) UUD 1945 seperti menutup ingatan kelam di masa lalu. Selain itu, dalam Pasal 24 (2) UUD 1945 yang menentukan kekuasaan kehakiman dipegang oleh Mahkamah Agung dan badan-badan peradilan di bawahnya  dan Mahkamah Konstitusi. Dengan dasar ini, tidak ada landasan hukum sedikitpun bagi Presiden atau DPR untuk mengintervensi cabang kekuasaan kehakiman. Tetapi dalam kenyataannya, meskipun dalam sistem politik yang demokratis dan pengaturan konstitusional menegaskan jaminan kemerdekaan namun kenyataannya tidak mewakili situasi aktual. Terdapat beberapa masalah yang masih tersisa, seperti (i) tidak adanya format permanen mengenai hubungan kelembagaan antara Mahkamah Agung, Mahkamah Konstitusi dan Komisi Yudisial, (ii) masih banyak upaya untuk melemahkan peradilan melalui banyak cara kriminalisasi hakim. Mengacu pada masalah di atas, maka ada kesenjangan antara apa yang senyatanya dan apa yang seharusnya antara lain, Pertama, perubahan konfigurasi politik yang cenderung lebih demokratis, kekuasaan kehakiman harus lebih otonom. Namun dalam kenyataannya, berbagai masalah muncul seperti (i) ketidakharmonisan dalam mengatur pola hubungan antara aktor kekuasaan Kehakiman, (ii) berbagai upaya untuk mengkriminalkan hakim atas keputusan mereka, (iii) berkembangnya praktek mafia peradilan. Kedua, dengan jaminan kemerdekaan kekuasaan kehakiman, seharusnya tidak akan ada undang-undang yang mengurangi jaminan kemerdekaan kekuasaan kehakiman. Namun pada kenyataannya, banyak peraturan perundang-undangan yang masih belum sejalan dengan jaminan konstitusional mengenai kemerdekaan kekuasaan kehakiman. Makalah ini bermaksud menguraikan secara mendalam tentang bagaimana menerapkan jaminan konstitusional atas kemerdekaan kekuasaan kehakiman dalam masa konsolidasi demokrasi pasca jatuhnya orde baru dan mengkonseptualisasikan agenda reformasi peradilan untuk memperkuat supremasi hukum di IndonesiaKeyword: Reformasi peradilan, kemerdekaan kekuasaan kehakiman, reformasi peradilan, konsolidasi reformasi АннотацияКонституционная реформа после падения Нового Порядка (New Order) Сухарто дала благоприятное направление для судебной власти. Конституционная гарантия на независимость судебной власти, регулируемая статьей 24 (1) Конституции 1945 года, позволяет оставить мрачные воспоминания в прошлом. Кроме того, в статье 24 (2) Конституции 1945 года определено, что судебная власть находится в ведении Верховного Суда, нижестоящих судебных органов и Конституционного Суда. Такие строгие нормативные директивы в сочетании с трансформацией политической системы в демократическом направлении должны привести к созданию независимой и автономной судебной власти. Но на самом деле, хотя в демократической политической системе и конституционных механизмах закрепляется гарантия независимости, онa не отражает реальную ситуацию. Существует ряд нерешенных вопросов, таких как (i) отсутствие постоянного формата об институциональных отношениях между Верховным Судом, Конституционным Судом и Судебной Комиссией, и (ii) по-прежнему предпринимаются многочисленные попытки ослабить судебную власть многими средствами, такими как криминализация судей. Ссылаясь на вышеупомянутую проблему, существует разрыв между тем, что «есть» и что «должно быть», среди прочего: во-первых, изменяя политические конфигурации, которые имеют тенденцию быть более демократичными, судебная власть должна быть более автономной. Во-вторых, с конституционной гарантией на независимость судебной власти не будет закона, который ограничивал бы конституционные гарантии. В этой статье рассматривается и подробно объясняется, как реализовать конституционные гарантии независимости судебной власти после политического преобразования и концептуализировать его порядок для укрепления верховенства закона в Индонезии.Ключевые слова: независимость судебной власти, судебная ответственность, судебная реформа


Author(s):  
Chintan Chandrachud

This essay discusses United Kingdom’s transition to the commission model of judicial appointments, with the advent of the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005 (CRA). The essay expounds that the commission model in the UK provides for a sustained participation of ‘lay’ members, who are expected to be representatives of the civil society. The author aligns with the view that the fragmentation of the appointments process amongst various actors is an exercise towards appointing a more diverse judiciary, and in no way impinging upon judicial independence. This essay analyses how the Supreme Court of India in the NJAC Case interpreted the appointments process ushered in by the UK CRA. This essay critiques the Indian Supreme Court’s reading of the CRA, and how the Court’s conclusion that the appointments processes in the UK shows an increasing trend toward judicialization may either be incorrect, or highly reductionist.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document