scholarly journals LOGICAL ANALYSIS IN THE ARGUMENTATION SYSTEM "PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE"

Author(s):  
Л. Г. Комаха
Author(s):  
Nicholas Asher

Discourse and its interpretation have interested philosophers since ancient times, and have been studied in different areas of philosophy such as rhetoric, the philosophy of language and the philosophy of literature. Discourse has attracted interest from philosophers working in the continental tradition, and it received considerable attention in the 1980s from analytic philosophers, philosophers of language, linguists, cognitive scientists and computer scientists; within these fields a formal, logical analysis of discourse interpretation, or discourse semantics, has emerged. Discourse semantics arose in an attempt to solve certain problems that affected formal theories of meaning for single sentences. These problems had to do with the interpretation of pronouns and other ‘anaphoric’ elements in language. A detailed examination of the data showed that the meaning of an individual sentence in a discourse could depend upon information given by previous sentences in the discourse. To analyse this dependence, discourse semantics developed a formal analysis of a discourse context and of the interaction between the meaning of a sentence and the discourse context in which it is to be interpreted. The essential idea of discourse semantics is that the meaning of a sentence is a relation between contexts. The ‘input’ discourse context furnishes the information needed to interpret the anaphoric elements in the sentence; the information conveyed by the sentence when added to the input context yields a new, or ‘output’, discourse context that can serve to interpret the next sentence in the discourse.


Max Black. Linguistic method in philosophy. Language and philosophy, Studies in method, by Max Black, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1949, pp. 1–22. (Reprinted from Philosophy and phenomenological research, vol. 8 no. 4 (1948), pp. 635–649.) - Max Black. Vagueness: An exercise in logical analysis. A reprint of III 48(3). Language and philosophy, Studies in method, by Max Black, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1949, pp. 23–58. - Max Black. The justification of induction. Language and philosophy, Studies in method, by Max Black, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1949, pp. 59–88. (Including a reprint of the abstract XIV 144(4)). - Max Black. The semantic definition of truth. A reprint of XIII 150. Language and philosophy, Studies in method, by Max Black, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1949, 89–107. - Max Black. Russell's philosophy of language. A reprint of IX 78(2). Language and philosophy, Studies in method, by Max Black, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1949, pp. 109–138. - Max Black. Wittgenstein's Tractatus. A reprint of V 120(4). Language and philosophy, Studies in method, by Max Black, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1949, pp. 139–165. - Max Black. The semiotic of Charles Morris. A reprint of XII 146(1). Language and philosophy, Studies in method, by Max Black, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1949, pp. 167–185. - Max Black. Ogden and Richard's theory of interpretation. A reprint of VII 102(5). Language and philosophy, Studies in method, by Max Black, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1949, pp. 186–200. - Max Black. Questions about emotive meaning. Language and philosophy, Studies in method, by Max Black, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1949, pp. 201–220. (Reprinted from The philosophical review, vol. 57, (1948), pp. 111–126.) - Max Black. Korzybski's general semantics. Language and philosophy, Studies in method, by Max Black, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1949, pp. 221–246. - Max Black. Additional notes and references. Language and philosophy, Studies in method, by Max Black, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1949, pp. 247–257.

1950 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 210-213
Author(s):  
J. F. Thomson

Author(s):  
Bob Hale

The central philosophical question about abstract objects is: Are there any? An affirmative answer – given by Platonists or Realists – draws support from the fact that while much of our talk and thought concerns concrete (roughly, spatiotemporally extended) objects, significant parts of it appear to be about objects which lie outside space and time, and are therefore incapable of figuring in causal relationships. The suggestion that there really are such further non-spatial, atemporal and acausal objects as numbers and sets often strikes Nominalist opponents as contrary to common sense. But precisely because our apparent talk and thought of abstracta encompasses much – including virtually the whole of mathematics – that seems indispensable to our best attempts to make scientific sense of the world, it cannot be simply dismissed as confused gibberish. For this reason Nominalists have commonly adopted a programme of reductive paraphrase, aimed at eliminating all apparent reference to and quantification over abstract objects. In spite of impressively ingenious efforts, the programme appears to run into insuperable obstacles. The simplicity of our initial question is deceptive. Understanding and progress are unlikely without further clarification of the relations between ontological questions and questions about the logical analysis of language, and of the key distinction between abstract and concrete objects. There are both affinities and, more importantly, contrasts between traditional approaches to ontological questions and more recent discussions shaped by ground-breaking work in the philosophy of language initiated by Frege. The importance of Frege’s work lies principally in two insights: first, that questions about what kinds of entity there are cannot sensibly be tackled independently of the logical analysis of language; and second, that the question whether or not certain expressions should be taken to have reference cannot properly be separated from the question whether complete sentences in which those expressions occur are true or false.


Author(s):  
James McElvenny

This book is a historical study of influential currents in the philosophy of language and linguistics of the first half of the twentieth century, explored from the perspective of the English scholar C. K. Ogden (1889–1957). Although no ‘Great Man’ in his own right, Ogden had a personal connection, reflected in his work, to several of the most significant figures of the age. The background to the ideas espoused in Ogden’s book The Meaning of Meaning, co-authored with I.A. Richards (1893–1979), is examined in detail, along with the application of these ideas in his international language project Basic English. A richly interlaced network of connections is revealed between early analytic philosophy, semiotics and linguistics, all inevitably shaped by the contemporary cultural and political environment. In particular, significant interaction is shown between Ogden’s ideas, the varying versions of ‘logical atomism’ of Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and Ludwig Wittgensten (1889–1951), Victoria Lady Welby’s (1837–1912) ‘significs’, and the philosophy and political activism of Otto Neurath (1882–1945) and Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) of the Vienna Circle. Amid these interactions emerges a previously little known mutual exchange between the academic philosophy and linguistics of the period and the practically oriented efforts of the international language movement.


Author(s):  
Stephen Yablo

Aboutness has been studied from any number of angles. Brentano made it the defining feature of the mental. Phenomenologists try to pin down the aboutness features of particular mental states. Materialists sometimes claim to have grounded aboutness in natural regularities. Attempts have even been made, in library science and information theory, to operationalize the notion. However, it has played no real role in philosophical semantics, which is surprising. This is the first book to examine through a philosophical lens the role of subject matter in meaning. A long-standing tradition sees meaning as truth conditions, to be specified by listing the scenarios in which a sentence is true. Nothing is said about the principle of selection—about what in a scenario gets it onto the list. Subject matter is the missing link here. A sentence is true because of how matters stand where its subject matter is concerned. This book maintains that this is not just a feature of subject matter, but its essence. One indicates what a sentence is about by mapping out logical space according to its changing ways of being true or false. The notion of content that results—directed content—is brought to bear on a range of philosophical topics, including ontology, verisimilitude, knowledge, loose talk, assertive content, and philosophical methodology. The book represents a major advance in semantics and the philosophy of language.


Author(s):  
Himani Chauhan ◽  
◽  
Garima Saxena ◽  
Arpit Tripathi ◽  
◽  
...  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document