Foreign Donor Assistance and the Political Economy of Settlement Outcomes

2019 ◽  
pp. 94-123
Author(s):  
Manal A. Jamal
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Local Government ◽  
El Salvador ◽  
The Political ◽  
Civic Life ◽  
Legislative Council ◽  
Palestinian Territories ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Foreign Donor

This chapter explains how the respective political settlements came to shape associational and civic life in each case. It begins with an overview of the political settlements in each case. It then explains how the respective political settlements shaped the emergence of the different political tendencies, as well as the institutional openings of the legislative council and local government in each case. It concludes with an examination of electoral outcomes since the start of the conflicttopeace transitions in the Palestinian territories and El Salvador

Beyond Professionalization

2019 ◽  
pp. 124-170
Author(s):  
Manal A. Jamal
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
El Salvador ◽  
Detailed Examination ◽  
Democracy Promotion ◽  
Settlement Period ◽  
Palestinian Territories ◽  
Funding Program ◽  
Foreign Donor

This chapter examines foreign donor assistance to the Palestinian territories and El Salvador in the post settlement period. It begins with an overview of funding patterns and discusses how the respective political settlements shaped different donor priorities in each case. It then provides more detailed examination of USAID funding program priorities, funding to civil society and democracy promotion, and funding to the women’s sector in each case.

Political Settlements and the Reconfiguration of Civic and Political Life

2019 ◽  
pp. 57-93
Author(s):  
Manal A. Jamal
Keyword(s):  
El Salvador ◽  
Political Life ◽  
The Political ◽  
Mass Mobilization ◽  
Associational Life ◽  
Military Organizations ◽  
Palestinian Territories ◽  
Women's Organizing ◽  
History Of ◽  
Rich History

A rich history of civic organizing in El Salvador and the Palestinian territories undergirded the mass mobilization of the 1970s and 1980s. These mobilization efforts and much of the associational life that grew out of them were responses to conflicts with long historical roots. This chapter explains the historical roles of the political-military organizations of the FLMN and PLO in mass mobilization in the two cases. It then traces the evolution of mass mobilization and associational life leading to the beginning of the conflicttopeace transition in each case, including the development of mass based women’s organizing in both cases.

Political Economy of Fiscal Equalization: The Case of Croatia

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anto Bajo ◽  
Marko Primorac
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Central Government ◽  
The Political ◽  
Mountainous Areas ◽  
Fiscal Equalization ◽  
Political Alignment ◽  
Fiscal Equalization System ◽  
The Relationship

Due to ineffectiveness in mitigating fiscal inequalities, Croatian fiscal equalization system has recently been reformed. Before that, criteria for application of fiscal equalization instruments were based on a status of local government units in areas of special national concern and hill and mountainous areas. The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between the use of equalization instruments and political structure of local government units in 2010. The research revealed a statistically significant relationship between the political alignment of local and central government and the preferential status at areas of special national concern and the distribution of grants through the income tax return.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Township Government Debt, Township Enterprises and Rural Financial Institutions in China

2006 ◽  
Vol 186 ◽  
pp. 377-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynette Ong
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Government Debt ◽  
Financial Resource ◽  
Resource Mobilization ◽  
Financial Assistance ◽  
The Political ◽  
Township Government

This article sheds light on the ways in which township governments mobilized resources from local financial institutions, and how failure to repay many of these loans gave rise to sizeable local government debt. Mobilization of resources was done through loans to collective enterprises whose de facto owners were township authorities. Though the enterprises were nominal borrowers, loan transactions would not have occurred without guarantees by township governments. Another way of financial resource mobilization was by establishing local informal financial organizations that were subject to less strict regulations, and over which township authorities could exercise control. Further, because the enterprises' profits and taxes ultimately went to township authorities, and the enterprises also contributed towards provision of public goods that were the authorities' obligation, enterprise financing became a roundabout way in which township authorities sought financial assistance for their fiscal needs.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Program Enforcement: Evidence from Brazil

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 750-791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernanda Brollo ◽  
Katja Kaufmann ◽  
Eliana La Ferrara
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
School Attendance ◽  
The Political ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Welfare Programs ◽  
Municipal Elections ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Poor Families ◽  
Bolsa Familia

Abstract Do politicians manipulate the enforcement of conditional welfare programs to influence electoral outcomes? We study the Bolsa Familia Program (BFP) in Brazil, which provides a monthly stipend to poor families conditional on school attendance. Repeated failure to comply with this requirement results in increasing penalties. First, we exploit random variation in the timing when beneficiaries learn about penalties for noncompliance around the 2008 municipal elections. We find that the vote share of candidates aligned with the president is lower in zip codes where more beneficiaries received penalties shortly before (as opposed to shortly after) the elections. Second, we show that politicians strategically manipulate enforcement. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find weaker enforcement before elections in municipalities where mayors from the presidential coalition can run for reelection. We provide evidence that manipulation occurs through misreporting school attendance, particularly in municipalities with a higher fraction of students in schools with politically connected principals.

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