Assessing the 2019 Redesign of Bulgarian Fiscal Equalization System

In many countries the narrowing of horizontal fiscal imbalance at local government level is an important issue of national fiscal policy. Large fiscal disparities at municipal level could lead either to lower service levels in fiscally poor regions or to higher tax rates for similar service levels in these regions. In turn, this could thwart efforts to reduce inequality in income distribution between individuals or could induce fiscally inefficient migration of business and individuals. Since the launch of fiscal decentralization reforms in Bulgaria in 2003 part of central government grants system for municipalities has been the equalization grant aimed at financing a minimum level of local services delivery. The equalization formula has undergone many changes during the years, and the last one was implemented in 2019. The main focus of the current study is to compare the equalizing effect of the equalization schemes applied in Bulgaria in 2018 and 2019. In order to test whether the 2018 and 2019 distribution formulas carry an equalizing effect with respect to municipal expenditure needs, per capita transfers received is regressed on three variables or indicators reflecting the differences in the municipal expenditure needs. Our results show that the new equalization mechanism as of 2019 is better designed to capture the differences in municipal expenditure needs and to alleviate fiscal disparities at local level when compared to the mechanism applied in 2018.

Ist im Länderfinanzausgleich die isolierte Berechnung von Grenzentzugsraten für einzelne Steuern sinnvoll?

In 2020 the new fiscal equalization system will come in force. One problem of the new system seems to be, that local tax revenues (e. g. local trade tax) are subject to much higher redistribution than under the status quo; the maximum of redistribution is higher than 100 %. But these results do ignore, that taxes could be seen as co-products. If e. g. the base of the local trade tax increases, the base of the corporation tax will raise, too. So it is not possible, to change only the revenue of one tax like the former analysis imply. Having this in mind, a simulation analysis shows, that the redistribution will always be lower than 100 %.

Verbesserte Finanzbedarfsmessung im nordrhein-westfälischen Finanzausgleich und ihre Verteilungswirkungen

Within the local fiscal equalization system of North Rhine-Westphalia, anticipated financial needs of municipalities are estimated by the use of regression analysis. In the recent past the previously exercised regression approach shows unexpected results concerning the main parameters determining intra-system allocation of general grants. Against this background the paper analyses the reasons for these parameter variations in order to identify an alternative approach to achieve regression results with higher accuracy and time stability both of which are of particular importance from a fiscal equalization policy perspective. It will be shown that the so-called robust regression is such an alternative method which leads – in case of its implementation – to divergent distributional effects compared to the status quo.

Education and fiscal decentralization. The case of municipal education in Chile

Chile implemented a radical reform in favor of decentralization at the beginning of the 1980s, with municipalities taking over the administration of public school education. The government that came to power in 2014 is committed to revert this reform, removing public schools from municipal control. Using panel data gathered between 2005 and 2013, this study shows that municipalities with greater autonomy performed better when administrating schools. Two major conclusions may be drawn. First, selective decentralization in favor of more autonomous municipalities is a better public policy approach relative to an all across the board solution. Second, since this autonomy is very unevenly distributed across municipal governments, a renewed and more effective fiscal equalization system should be established in Chile.

Political Economy of Fiscal Equalization: The Case of Croatia

Due to ineffectiveness in mitigating fiscal inequalities, Croatian fiscal equalization system has recently been reformed. Before that, criteria for application of fiscal equalization instruments were based on a status of local government units in areas of special national concern and hill and mountainous areas. The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between the use of equalization instruments and political structure of local government units in 2010. The research revealed a statistically significant relationship between the political alignment of local and central government and the preferential status at areas of special national concern and the distribution of grants through the income tax return.

The role of institutions in successful fiscal arrangements: The case of Australia and Argentina

This paper discusses the role of institutions in successful fiscal arrangements by comparing the fiscal equalization system of two nations, Argentina and Australia. The paper shows that Australia’s fiscal vertical and horizontal equalisation model is on the whole simpler, more transparent, efficient and accountable to that of Argentina. The paper also illustrates Argentina’s agency problem in fiscal financial arrangements. A major challenge for developing countries like Argentina is to strengthen their institutional matrices. One way of achieving this is through the consolidation of Argentina’s institutions. Another is to adopt an eclectic approach to ‘institutional matrix’ building. Looking at Australia’s experience might be the way forward for Argentina’s development

Finanzausgleichsbedingte Einheitslasten der Länder – eine empirische Schätzung am Beispiel Nordrhein-Westfalens

In Germany there exists a political consensus that the economic and fiscal burden of the German reunification should be shared by all three jurisdictional levels of the federal system. According to existing law the burden sharing between the state and local authorities has to be confined to the excess burden which follows from the financing of the German Unity Fund as well as the integration of the eastern German states into the fiscal equalisation system. Thereby, state and local authorities are in conflict with each other regarding an appropriate economic estimation of the excess burden to be caused by the fiscal equalization system. Against this background the paper explains and illustrates the economic concept of burden in terms of opportunity costs. Taking North Rhine-Westphalia as a case study the quantity of the excess burden is empirically estimated for the time period 1995 - 2009 by applying a multivariate data analysis.

Sinnhaftigkeit und Effektivität der deutschen Schuldenbremse

Since 2009 Germany has a new debt regime that requires the federal government to reduce its structural deficits to 0.35 percent of GDP until 2016 and the Länder to balance their budgets structurally until 2020. In this paper the rationale for a debt brake is discussed, the provisions of the new regime are summarized and its effectiveness is assessed. Although the new debt brake basically provides for a reasonable framework to achieve sustainable public finances, several loopholes remain that enable finance ministers to avoid fiscal consolidation. Particularly problematic are the provisions for the Länder which have incentives to appear excessively indebted until 2019 in order to negotiate better financial conditions in the fiscal equalization system that must be revised until 2019. These incentives may be stronger than the constitutional provision to reduce deficits.