settlement period
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2021 ◽  
Vol specjalny (XXI) ◽  
pp. 583-595
Author(s):  
Beata Rutkowska

In response to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Anti-Crisis Shield has been enacted, which provides, inter alia, for the possibility to conclude collective agreements introducing economic demurrage, reduced working time, equivalent working time combined with prolongation of the settlement period to 12 months and less favourable conditions of employment of employees than those arising from the employment contracts concluded with them. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the above agreements and to try to assess whether they have been given the correct legal shape.


2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (6) ◽  
pp. 1369-1385 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda F Ziegler ◽  
Lisa Hahn-Woernle ◽  
Brian Powell ◽  
Craig R Smith

Synopsis Larval dispersal is a key process for community assembly and population maintenance in the marine environment, yet it is extremely difficult to measure at ecologically relevant spatio-temporal scales. We used a high-resolution hydrodynamic model and particle-tracking model to explore the dispersal of simulated larvae in a hydrographically complex region of fjords on the West Antarctic Peninsula. Modeled larvae represented two end members of dispersal potential observed in Antarctic benthos resulting from differing developmental periods and swimming behavior. For simulations of low dispersing larvae (pre-competency period = 8 days, settlement period = 15 days, swimming downward) self-recruitment within fjords was important, with no larval settlement occurring in adjacent fjords <50 km apart. For simulations of highly dispersing organisms (pre-competency period = 35–120 days, settlement period = 30–115 days, no swimming behavior), dispersal between fjords occurred when larvae were in the water column for at least 35 days, but settlement was rarely successful even for larvae spending up to 150 days in the plankton. The lack of ecological connectivity between fjords within a single spawning event suggests that these fjords harbor ecologically distinct populations in which self-recruitment may maintain populations, and genetic connectivity between fjords is likely achieved through stepping-stone dispersal. Export of larvae from natal fjord populations to the broader shelf region (>100 km distance) occurred within surface layers (<100 m depth) and was enhanced by episodic katabatic wind events that may be common in glaciomarine fjords worldwide.


Author(s):  
Beata Rogalska

In a situation where the taxpayer [resp. person taxable] holds an invoice prior to submittal of the return/statement for the settlement period in which the tax obligation occurred on the part of the contracting party, the term laid down in Article 178 (a) of Directive 112 has been met. Whilst the holding of an invoice is the only formal requirement, the notion of ‘holding’ ought to be interpreted in a manner compliant with its colloquial understanding. In turn, ‘holding’ is not equal in meaning to ‘receiving’/‘receipt’. In the event that an economic event has occurred and the taxpayer is capable of giving evidence for it, as he holds the invoice at the moment the tax settlement is made in the return/ statement, there are no grounds that would be legitimate under the EU laws for arguing that the taxpayer must shift his vested right to have the input tax deducted to the subsequent month, being the months in which he receives the invoice. The rule of prompt implementation of the right to deduct input tax should be taken into account. If the national regulations provide for shifting the above-specified moment through formulating any additional conditions are contrary to Directive 112. It is therefore apparent that Article 86, clause 10 (b), item 1 of the Polish Value-Added-Tax Act of 11th March 2004 is not in agreement with Article 178 (s) of Directive 112 as the former sets forth a condition that is not provided in the said EU regulation–namely, the right to have the output tax reduced by the input tax only as part of the settlement for the month in which the taxpayer receives the invoice.


2019 ◽  
pp. 124-170
Author(s):  
Manal A. Jamal

This chapter examines foreign donor assistance to the Palestinian territories and El Salvador in the post settlement period. It begins with an overview of funding patterns and discusses how the respective political settlements shaped different donor priorities in each case. It then provides more detailed examination of USAID funding program priorities, funding to civil society and democracy promotion, and funding to the women’s sector in each case.


2019 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Gosselin ◽  
Andrainolo Ravalihasy ◽  
Julie Pannetier ◽  
France Lert ◽  
Annabel Desgrées du Loû

ObjectiveRecent studies highlighted that many HIV-positive migrants in Europe acquired their infections post-migration. However, the timing of these infections is not always known. This study aims to estimate the timing of post-migration HIV acquisition among sub-Saharan migrants in France and to understand the correlates of post-migration infection.MethodsWithin the PARCOURS retrospective survey conducted in 2012–2013 in 74 healthcare facilities in the Paris region, life-event data were collected among a random sample of 926 patients living with HIV in HIV services and 763 patients undiagnosed with HIV in primary care centres born in sub-Saharan Africa (reference group). Based on previous analysis, we considered the first 6 years in France after migration as a settlement period. Among the persons who acquired HIV after migration, we estimated the proportion of persons infected during settlement (0–6 years after migration) and after settlement (>6 years after migration) by using an algorithm that combines life-event data and a modelisation of CD4+ T-cell count decline. We then assessed the determinants of HIV acquisition during settlement and after settlement using bivariate logistic regression models.ResultsOverall, 58% of sub-Saharan migrants who acquired HIV after migration were infected during the first 6 years in France. HIV acquisition during settlement was found to be linked to short/transactional partnerships and lack of a resident permit. 42% of migrants had contracted HIV after settlement. After settlement, HIV acquisition was associated with short/transactional but also with concurrent partnerships and not with social hardship.ConclusionTwo profiles of HIV post-migration acquisition emerged. The majority of HIV post-migration acquisition occurs during the settlement period: comprehensive combination prevention programmes among recently arrived migrants are needed. However, long-term migrants are also at risk for HIV through multiple partnerships. Prevention programmes should address the different profiles of migrants at risk for post-migration HIV acquisition.


2019 ◽  
Vol 129 (621) ◽  
pp. 2039-2063
Author(s):  
Péter Eső ◽  
Chris Wallace

Abstract This article studies how the presence of concealable hard evidence affects the timing of agreement and the size and distribution of surplus in bargaining. A buyer and a seller receive randomly arriving, verifiable, but concealable evidence about the value of a tradable good. Each party discloses individually favourable information but conceals signals that benefit the other side, giving rise to mutual suspicion; the seller repeatedly posts prices valid for one period. In the leading case of interest with a finite horizon and sufficiently patient players, the equilibrium is characterised by an interval of skimming (a sequence of prices acceptable only to a buyer who has learned that the good’s value is high) concluded by a single settlement period in which agreement is reached for sure. The length of delay until agreement and the corresponding efficiency loss are decreasing in the time horizon and in the abilities of the trading parties to identify the good’s value, but increasing in impatience. An arbitrarily long time horizon leads to immediate agreement if the parties are even slightly impatient and interaction is frequent enough; if the parties are perfectly patient, there is no trade without evidence disclosure.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 31-42
Author(s):  
Raymond H. Chan ◽  
Kelvin K. Kan ◽  
Alfred K. Ma

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