The Political Risks of China’s Foreign Direct Investment in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Author(s):  
Yonghui Wang
Author(s):  
Sotonye Frank

Stabilisation clauses are widely portrayed as an essential tool which developing countries use to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to their extractive industries. However, this view of stabilisation clauses is based on two presumptions. The first is that developing countries compete to attract FDI. The second is that developing countries have higher levels of political risks. This article argues that neither presumption is true as such. The available evidence points to intense competition among foreign investors, backed by their home governments, for access to the extractive industries in developing countries. The political risks that stabilisation clauses are aimed at also exist at least in equal measure, in developed countries. The article then relies on the findings of previous empirical studies and an analysis of current trends in stabilisation practices to argue that contrary to popular belief, stabilisation clauses do not play an ‘essential’ role in attracting FDI into developing countries.


Author(s):  
Ka Zeng

This chapter engages in an analysis of the political economy of Chinese outward foreign direct investment (COFDI) in ‘One-belt, One-Road’ (OBOR) countries between 2005 and 2014. Research findings yield a couple of interesting results. First, there is strong evidence supporting the resource-seeking motivation behind COFDI to OBOR countries. Secondly, in contrast to previous findings, this study yields some preliminary evidence that COFDI is more likely to seek out countries with low political risks. Thirdly, the results suggest that in addition to going to countries with good political relations with Beijing, COFDI has also been more likely to flow to countries with shared diplomatic interests and agenda with the United States. Taken together, these findings point to the politically driven nature of Chinese investment in OBOR countries and the potentially central role of the state in guiding Chinese investment in the region.


Author(s):  
Mollah Aminul Islam ◽  
Haiyun Liu ◽  
Muhammad Asif Khan ◽  
Md Tariqul Islam ◽  
Md Reza Sultanuzzaman

Author(s):  
Roudabeh Kishi ◽  
Giuseppe Maggio ◽  
Clionadh Raleigh

AbstractRates of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Africa are increasing, yet little is known about how this will affect the political environment. One possibility, explored here, is that increasing levels of FDI within developing states will incentivize state conflict activity. Using an instrumental strategy, we show that in states with a low regard for civil liberties, or with unhealthy economies (i.e. states with a cash deficit), increased access to investment is associated with a higher number of conflict actions by the state. We argue that access to investment can push regimes into using violent strategies to secure their internal environment and to ensure their survival, specifically in their engaging in conflict against opposition and armed combatants. This underscores the need for extensive monitoring of state behavior following the receipt of investment, similar to the oversight of conditional aid.


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