Stabilisation Clauses and Foreign Direct Investment: Presumptions versus Realities
Stabilisation clauses are widely portrayed as an essential tool which developing countries use to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to their extractive industries. However, this view of stabilisation clauses is based on two presumptions. The first is that developing countries compete to attract FDI. The second is that developing countries have higher levels of political risks. This article argues that neither presumption is true as such. The available evidence points to intense competition among foreign investors, backed by their home governments, for access to the extractive industries in developing countries. The political risks that stabilisation clauses are aimed at also exist at least in equal measure, in developed countries. The article then relies on the findings of previous empirical studies and an analysis of current trends in stabilisation practices to argue that contrary to popular belief, stabilisation clauses do not play an ‘essential’ role in attracting FDI into developing countries.