Big Bath Earnings Management: The Case Of Goodwill Impairment Under SFAS No. 142

Author(s):  
Charles E. Jordan ◽  
Stanley J. Clark

<p class="MsoBodyText2" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="font-style: normal; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">The big bath theory of earnings management suggests that firms experiencing low earnings in a given year may take discretionary write downs to reduce even further the current period&rsquo;s earnings.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The notion is that the company and its management will not be punished proportionately more for the big hit it takes to its already depressed earnings.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>This &ldquo;clearing of the decks&rdquo; makes it easier to generate higher profits in later years.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>SFAS No. 142, with its new requirement to test goodwill annually for impairment, provided a unique opportunity to test this big bath theory.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Examining Fortune 100 companies, this study presents compelling evidence that the big bath theory is more than just a theory but is instead a practiced method of managing earnings.</span></span></span></p>

Author(s):  
Yousef Jahmani ◽  
William A. Dowling ◽  
Paul D. Torres

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none; mso-layout-grid-align: none;"><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">The Financial Accounting Standards Board promulgated standard No. 142 in an attempt to improve the understandability of accounting information. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp;</span>This new rule eliminated the practice of automatically amortizing goodwill. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp;</span>No. 142 requires public companies to test goodwill for possible impairment at least annually. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp;</span>An unintended consequence of this new standard is the opportunity for companies to use it in earnings management.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>To test the possibility that the rule is being used for this purpose, a sample of companies was chosen, all of which had amounts of goodwill on their balance sheet during the 2003-2005 interval. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp;</span>The results reveal that the number of companies experiencing losses or low rates of return on total assets who actually impaired goodwill was statistically insignificant during the period under consideration.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Thus, the results strongly suggest that companies are using No. 142 in an attempt to manage the volatility of earnings.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></span></p>


Author(s):  
Charles E. Jordan ◽  
Stanley J. Clark ◽  
Carol E. Vann

Prior research (Bens and Heltzer, 2004) shows that the market penalizes firms less for reporting goodwill write-downs below-the-line than it does for presenting them above-the-line.  Only in 2002, the year SFAS No. 142 became effective, did goodwill impairments enjoy below-the-line treatment.  The current research provides evidence that firms “cherry picked” this year to recognize large impairment losses, thus removing much of the burden from future years when these losses otherwise would have been reported above-the-line.  The study also indicates that, even though the number of firms taking goodwill write-offs declined subsequent to 2002, those entities that did so seemed to be taking these discretionary hits because earnings were already depressed in the current year.  As such, the big bath earnings management observed in the year of adoption in previous studies (Jordan and Clark, 2004 and 2005) appears to continue even though these impairment losses no longer receive favorable below-the-line treatment.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 120-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Davide Caruso ◽  
Elisa Rita Ferrari ◽  
Vincenzo Pisano

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to understand whether managerial behavior in impairing goodwill arising from M & As has changed after the adoption of IAS/IFRS, searching for evidences of earnings management (EM) practices. Thus, our goal is to provide a response to the following research questions. Are goodwill impairments used by listed firms’ managers to manipulate earnings? If so, what kind of EM practice is mostly used? Design/methodology/approach – In this paper the authors tested the following hypothesis: H1. In the year of the deal’s closure and in the following four years, the management detects impairment of goodwill in difformity with the previous Italian regulations and related accounting practices. Moreover, the authors tried to determine, for each considered firms, potential symptoms of typical DEM practices widely debated in the financial accounting literature (income smoothing, income minimization, income minimization, or big bath accounting). Findings – Our analysis does not prove evidence of certain EM practices, but it highlights very clearly that, after the adoption of IAS/IFRS, managers’ behavior has deeply changed. Moreover, the analysis shows that there is no univocal choice in favor of a specific EM practice and that every firm pursues its own “strategy.” Originality/value – Considering the importance of the topic from both the perspectives of managerial (with regard to M & As valuation processes) and financial accounting (with regard to intangibles valuation fulfilled by applying the impairment test instead of the amortization), this work aims to provide a multi-dimensional contribution to the current debate.


2012 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 709 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hei Wai Lee ◽  
Yan Alice Xie ◽  
Jian Zhou

<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><p style="margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; text-align: justify; mso-pagination: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">We investigate the </span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN;">relationship</span><span style="font-size: 10pt;"> between underwriter</span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN;"> reputation</span><span style="font-size: 10pt;"> and earnings management of IPO firms over the period of 1991-2005. We find that </span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN;">IPO firms engage in less earnings management</span><span style="font-size: 10pt;"> if </span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN;">they</span><span style="font-size: 10pt;"> are underwritten by prestigious investment bankers. Furthermore, the role of prestigious underwriters in restraining earnings management of IPO issuers do not change during the Internet Bubble period or after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). The findings support the certification role of underwriters in the IPO process.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We also document that</span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN;"> firms going public in the post-SOX period engage in less earnings management compared to firms going public in the pre-SOX period</span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">. Further findings suggest that the changing objectives of venture capitalists may explain the reduction in the level of earnings management of IPO firms following the passage of SOX.</span></span></p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span>


Author(s):  
Don E. Giacomino ◽  
Michael D. Akers

This paper examines goodwill on corporate balance sheets.  Specifically, the paper measures the extent to which goodwill exists on corporate balance sheets and the degree of goodwill write-downs that have occurred recently.   We report on our study and a study by Intangible Business, which show that many firms carry substantial amounts of goodwill on their 2008 balance sheets.  Thus, because of the recent downturn in the economy and the markets, the potential for big bath earnings management for 2008 and 2009 exists.   In addition, because of reductions in expected returns on pension plan assets, many firms are likely to record much higher pension expenses.   We expect that the combination of goodwill impairments and increased pension expense will have significant effects on both the amount and the quality of earnings for 2008 and, possibly, 2009.


Author(s):  
John E. McEnroe

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">Over fifteen years ago, Martens and McEnroe (1992) conducted a behavioral study involving earnings management through the use of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Their findings indicated that auditors issued unqualified audit opinions on those financial statements and perceived little risk to litigation as a result. A decade later they conducted a similar study (Martens and McEnroe 2002) with the expectation that increased attention to earnings management by then chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Arthur Levitt, would reduce auditors’ perceptions that the letter of GAAP is in itself an aegis or “safe harbor” against litigation. Although the authors found that auditors had become more conservative, they still issued unqualified opinions on financial statements in which transactions were reported in their form rather than their substance. Given the accounting scandals of Enron and WorldCom, among others, and the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, especially with its officers’ certification requirements, it was posited that auditors would exhibit a much more conservative approach than in either of the two previous studies. The results indicate that although auditors are more conservative than in the 1992 study, they still allow clients to engage in earnings management practices through the use of GAAP by issuing unqualified audit opinions on their financial statements. <strong style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"></strong></span></span></p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Ye Wang ◽  
Fusheng Wang ◽  
Shiyu Liu

To pursue higher compensation, the agent’s earnings management behavior may damage the principal’s interests. Can managers whose compensation reaches the expected level seek benefits for the company through earnings management? This study takes China’s A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2018 as samples. The conclusions show that managers with higher compensation levels will carry out earnings management in favor of the company while taking their own interests into consideration. For companies with stronger profitability, the higher the managers’ compensation is, the more they are inclined to reduce accrued earnings in the current period to further reduce taxes and fees. For companies with weaker profitability, managers with higher compensation tend to choose to increase real earnings to further optimize financial indicators. It has been found through further research that high pressure generated by media attention can make well-paid executives restrain the above earnings management behavior, which serves as an effective method to protect investors’ rights and interests.


2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 793
Author(s):  
Karin A. Petruska ◽  
Gulraze Wakil

<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><p style="margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; text-align: justify; mso-pagination: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">This study examines whether the components of accounting conservatism as described in Watts (2003a): contracting, litigation, regulation, and taxation, provide insight on the value relevance of financial information. During the years 1993 through 2009, we explore whether these four factors are value relevant in capturing information in contemporaneous stock returns and prices and whether the trends in value relevance for these drivers vary across time. Specifically, our study aids in helping to reconcile the competing results of Balachandran and Mohanram (2011), who state that there is no compelling evidence that firms with higher levels of accounting conservatism exhibit decreasing levels of value relevance, and Lev and Zarowin (1999), who suggest that accounting conservatism is a factor causing a decline in the usefulness of financial information over time. Our results provide evidence that the level of contracting, litigation, and regulation are associated with returns and prices and their value relevance has not decreased over time, findings which differ from Lev and Zarowin (1999), and support Balachandran and Mohanram (2011), such that the expectation of these drivers are associated with value relevance. In addition, we find less consistent evidence that the taxation explanation of accounting conservatism is associated with value relevance. </span></span></p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span>


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