The Contagion Effect of Compensation Regulation: Evidence From China

To shed light on whether and how firms changed compensation practices in response to a shift in the environment in which they operated, we examine whether there is contagion effect of executive compensation regulation on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the emerging market of China. Specifically, we investigate whether firms not directly affected by the changing regulatory environment nonetheless changed executive compensation in response to the actions of the directly affected firms, which is called contagion effect. We further examine the specific contagion mechanisms and the economic consequences of regulation on compensation. We find that the regulation has a significant effect on compensation gap in central SOEs and a contagion effect on local SOEs but not for non-SOEs. Within SOEs, there is an intra-industry contagion effect of compensation regulation but not an intra-region effect. Further, central SOEs and local SOEs experience reduced firm performance after the compensation regulations, but not the non-SOEs; indicating that the compensation regulation does not have favorable economic consequences for both the directly affected central SOEs and the indirectly affected local SOEs.

The Influence of Executive Compensation Gap on Earnings Management from the Perspective of Media Supervision: Evidence from China

To pursue higher compensation, the agent’s earnings management behavior may damage the principal’s interests. Can managers whose compensation reaches the expected level seek benefits for the company through earnings management? This study takes China’s A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2018 as samples. The conclusions show that managers with higher compensation levels will carry out earnings management in favor of the company while taking their own interests into consideration. For companies with stronger profitability, the higher the managers’ compensation is, the more they are inclined to reduce accrued earnings in the current period to further reduce taxes and fees. For companies with weaker profitability, managers with higher compensation tend to choose to increase real earnings to further optimize financial indicators. It has been found through further research that high pressure generated by media attention can make well-paid executives restrain the above earnings management behavior, which serves as an effective method to protect investors’ rights and interests.

Knowledge Graph of China’s Executive Compensation Gap: Visual Analysis Based on CiteSpace

This study selected 473 local research articles on executive compensation from core journals in the China Academic Journals (CNKI) full-text database and the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index (CSSCI) from 2003 to 2020. Then, the bibliometric analysis method was adopted and conducted in regard to the number of articles published, authors, research institutions, high-frequency keywords, etc. In view of the increasing studies of this field, this study showed that a few scholars and institutions with high academic influence have been involved in the research on executive compensation gap in China. The results from this study revealed that the research on the relationship between executive compensation gap and firm performance as well as the moderating variables between them were topics of interests. In the context of the increasing compensation gap which had become a global interest, the research on management power and promotion incentives have established their significance as important research frontiers.

The Pay Dispersion within Top Managers and Corporate Environmental Responsibility Information Disclosure

Because of the large scale of listed companies, they are often the main responsible parties for environmental problems. Therefore, from the perspective of compensation incentive, this study made an empirical test on how the pay dispersion within top managers affects corporate environmental responsibility information disclosure. By selecting A-share companies listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange which published corporate social responsibility reports from 2008 to 2018 as research samples, a multivariate regression analysis model was established. The results showed that there is a significant inverted U-shaped relationship between executive compensation gap and corporate environmental responsibility information disclosure. Further research found that this relationship was only significant in state-owned enterprises.

Minding the gap: the effect of CEO underpayment on firm-specific knowledge

Purpose This study aims to build on equity theory to assess the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) underpayment on the accumulation of firm-specific knowledge, accounting for the moderating effects of the CEO compensation gap and the clarity of the board’s informal hierarchy. Design/methodology/approach This study starts with all firms listed in the Execucomp database for the period 1992 to 2006. Then, all data sources are merged and entries with missing information are excluded. The final data set used for model estimations includes 1,152 firm-year observations. The command xtreg in Stata 12 with the fixed-effect option (fe) is used to estimate the relationship between CEO underpayment and firm-specific knowledge. Findings This study proposed and examined the role of CEO underpayment in discouraging CEO willingness to invest firm-specific human capital and, accordingly, to adopt a strategy of accumulating lower levels of firm-specific knowledge assets. The empirical analyses strongly support this argument. Moreover, CEO compensation gaps and the informal hierarchy of boards negatively moderated this relationship. That is, CEO underpayment had a weaker negative effect on firm-specific knowledge when the CEO compensation gap and the clarity of the board’s informal hierarchy were high. Originality/value Prior studies from the knowledge-based perspective have focused on the importance of firm-specific knowledge in enabling a firm to achieve superior financial performance. However, relatively little attention has been paid to CEOs’ willingness to accumulate firm-specific knowledge. The present study contributes to the knowledge-based view of the firm. This study integrates equity theory with the knowledge-based view of the firm by highlighting how unfair compensation of CEOs may discourage them to fully realize a firm’s potential to generate specific knowledge. By incorporating the fairness issue of CEO compensation into the knowledge-based view, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the origins of firm-specific knowledge.

Compensation gap, retrenchment strategy and organizational turnaround: a configurational perspective

PurposeThis paper extends the current understanding of the retrenchment-–turnaround relationship in declined companies by introducing a compensation gap view. It argues that the effectiveness of the retrenchment strategy is contingent on reducing the executive-employee compensation gap in the turnaround process.Design/methodology/approachDrawing from a two-stage turnaround model and insights from the literature on executive-employee compensation gap, we develop and test a theoretical model that explains how five attributes, which refer to executive-employee compensation gap, asset retrenchment, cost retrenchment, ownership and size, affect the outcome of the organizational turnaround. This paper uses the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) method and based on the samples of 112 listed companies that experience the decline between 2005 and 2013.FindingsThis paper concludes two valid causal paths and finds that small companies with small executive-employee compensation gap have a higher likelihood of successful turnaround when they implement cost or asset retrenchment actions. As for large state-owned companies, they should reduce the costs and maintain a small executive-employee compensation gap. An excessive compensation gap can be problematic, which could impair the organizational ability to cope with adversity and decline.Research limitations/implicationsFirst, this paper taps the vital role of employees in the turnaround process besides the mainstream “organizational decline-layoffs” logic, which hints a new human resource management strategy when organizations are facing decline. Second, this paper reveals the theoretical linkage between pay dispersion, internal stakeholder and organizational resilience. Third, as a methodological contribution, we introduce fsQCA, overcoming the shortcomings of turnaround strategy research with case and regression analysis and breaking through the paradigm of “specific factor-turnaround.”Practical implicationsOrganizational turnaround is a systematic process that constitutes multiple factors together. When organizations take the asset retrenchment to stop bleeding, reducing the executive-employee compensation gap will help enhance employee's cognition of organizational values and strategic goals, eliminate feelings of exploitation in retrenchment implementation and thus effectively promote turnaround. This paper also provides a basis for executive compensation restrictions and re-examines pay dispersion and economic inequality.Originality/valueThis study sheds some light on the importance of the executive-employee compensation gap in retrenchment strategy and contributes to both organizational turnaround and pay dispersion theories. Also, it reveals the theoretical linkage between internal stakeholders, organizational resilience and long-term orientation.