The Influence of Executive Compensation Gap on Earnings Management from the Perspective of Media Supervision: Evidence from China

To pursue higher compensation, the agent’s earnings management behavior may damage the principal’s interests. Can managers whose compensation reaches the expected level seek benefits for the company through earnings management? This study takes China’s A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2018 as samples. The conclusions show that managers with higher compensation levels will carry out earnings management in favor of the company while taking their own interests into consideration. For companies with stronger profitability, the higher the managers’ compensation is, the more they are inclined to reduce accrued earnings in the current period to further reduce taxes and fees. For companies with weaker profitability, managers with higher compensation tend to choose to increase real earnings to further optimize financial indicators. It has been found through further research that high pressure generated by media attention can make well-paid executives restrain the above earnings management behavior, which serves as an effective method to protect investors’ rights and interests.

The Influence of Fair Value Measurement on the Pledge of Overconfident Major Shareholders Based on Multiple Regression and Fisher Test

Adopting fair value measurement may bring more earnings fluctuations and induce irrational psychology and radical financing behavior of managers and major shareholders. Based on behavioral corporate governance theory, using the sample of A-share nonfinancial listed companies of China during 2015–2017, this paper empirically examines the regulatory effect of fair value measurement; that is, whether fair value measurement affects the company’s financing decisions when major shareholders have irrational psychological characteristics, i.e., overconfidence. The study found that overconfident major shareholders increase the probability of equity pledge and increase the proportion of equity pledge; further inspection found that if the level of accrued earnings management is higher, the adjustment effect of fair value measurement is also higher; when the risk of stock price collapse is higher, fair value measurement obviously increases the probability and ratio of overconfident major shareholders’ equity pledge. The above conclusions provide empirical evidence that fair value measurement has a positively regulatory effect on financing decisions of major shareholders.

The Empirical Research on the Correlation Between the Internal Control and Earning Management in Private Listed Companies

Under the background of industrial innovation, this paper takes the data of private listed companies from 2011 to 2016 as the sample for empirical analysis, and finds that internal control is an important factor in earnings management. There is a significant negative correlation between internal control and accrued earnings management and real earnings management. That is to say, having a good and rigorous internal control system can effectively reduce earnings management. Moreover, compared with earnings management of accounting selective activities, internal control has more restrictive effect on earnings management of real activities.

The Embellishment of Bottom Line through Hyperbole of Accrued Earnings: A Case of Deliberate Earnings Management of a Non-bank Financial Institution Enlisted in Dhaka Stock Exchange and Chittagong Stock Exchange

The study has tried to find out the key parameters through which a non-bank financial institution can embellish its earnings. The study has found that loan loss provisions increases in line with the increase in loan and advances and interest suspense. Moreover, non-bank financial institutions always report other assets except accounts receivable figure which foreshadows an existence of deliberate inflation of earnings. The study has found a positive impact of total loan loss provisions and interest suspense on accrued income, a clear message that non-bank financial institutions always report more accrued earnings to safeguard their profit. Increase in accrued income in line with total loan loss provision and interest suspense is also validated by increase in accrued income with respect to other assets except accounts receivable figure even though the impact of other assets on accrued income is insignificant at 5% level, an accounting channel through which excess other assets except accounts receivable would be inflated for excess increase in accrued income. The study has deduced that other assets except accounts receivable is a reserve bank for discretionary inflation of earnings even though it is insignificant. The study has used time series monthly data of International Leasing and Financial Services Limited, a non-bank financial institution from 2009-2015 reported in the Statement of NBDC sent to Bangladesh Bank each month. Two-time series models have been used in this study. The first model has tried to find out the impact of loan and advances, interest suspense, and other assets except accounts receivable on total loan loss provision. In the first model, there is a significant impact of loan and advances, interest suspense, and other assets except accounts receivable on total loan loss provision. The second model has tried to discern the impact of total loan loss provision, interest suspense, and other assets on accrued income along with other independent variables namely-loan and advances, total fixed assets, and operating income. The study has found a significant positive impact of total loan loss provision and interest suspense on accrued income and insignificant impact of other assets except accounts receivable on accrued income. For both models, there is no long-run relationship among the variables.

Accrued Earnings and Growth: Implications for Future Profitability and Market Mispricing

Prior research reveals that the accrual component of profitability is less persistent than the cash flow component, and that investors fail to fully appreciate their differing implications for future profitability (Sloan 1996). However, accruals are a component of growth in net operating assets as well as a component of profitability. Just as we can disaggregate profitability into accruals and cash flows from operations, we can disaggregate growth in net operating assets into accruals and growth in long-term net operating assets. We find that, after controlling for current profitability, both components of growth in net operating assets—accruals and growth in long-term net operating assets—have equivalent negative associations with one-year-ahead return on assets. This result is consistent with conservative accounting and diminishing marginal returns on investments. We also find that, after controlling for current profitability, the market appears to equivalently overvalue accruals and growth in long-term net operating assets relative to their association with one-year-ahead ROA. Our evidence suggests that the accrual anomaly documented in Sloan (1996) is a special case of what could be viewed as a more general growth anomaly.