scholarly journals CEO Career Concerns And Voluntary Disclosure

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (6) ◽  
pp. 1603 ◽  
Author(s):  
Soo Yeon Park ◽  
Kwan Hee Yoo
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Career Concerns ◽  
Management Forecasts ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Disclosure Decisions ◽  
Executive Officers

This paper investigates the relation between Chief Executive Officers (CEO) career concerns and voluntary disclosures using listed firm (KOSPI) data in Korea. Prior research suggests that explicit incentives in the form of CEO stock-based compensation or CEO’s equity ownership mitigate the agency problems of reluctance to make voluntary disclosure. In addition, implicit incentives arising from CEO career concerns are as important as explicit incentives for mitigating agency problems.The labor market assesses CEOs ability and CEO reputation in the market is a valuable asset that is associated with many long-term benefits, such as better future compensation, reappointment in the position, and greater managerial autonomy. CEOs are concerned about such an assessment and these concerns are referred to as career concerns. However, the market has incomplete information about CEOs’ ability especially when the CEOs have short tenures as a CEO position. Hence, CEOs with short tenures have more strong incentives to signal their ability to the labor market so that they can build proper reputation.Implicit incentives arising from CEO career concerns are measured by CEO tenure. I assume that short-tenured CEOs are more career-concerned than long-tenured CEOs. I find that CEOs with short tenures tend to more likely disclose management forecasts. I interpret this result that more career-concerned CEOs have strong incentives to signal their ability to the labor market in order to build their reputations which affect their future payoffs such as compensations and reappointment. In addition, management forecasts, means of voluntary disclosure, are used as effective mechanism. I also find that CEOs with short tenures tend to disclose more accurate management forecasts. This result implies that CEOs with more career concerns have more pressure to provide accurate forecasts because of their reliability in the labor market. Based on these empirical results, I infer that CEOs’ implicit incentives affect their voluntary disclosure decision.This study will contribute to academics and disclosure-related practitioners by documenting about CEOs’ career concerns and their voluntary disclosure decisions.

Effects of CEO duality and tenure on innovation

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 536-552
Author(s):  
Mengge Li ◽  
Jinxin Yang
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Monitoring And Control ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Upper Echelons Theory ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Advance Theory ◽  
Exploratory Innovation

Purpose As the primary decision makers, chief executive officers (CEOs) play pivotal roles in firm innovation. However, little is known regarding how CEOs influence the exploitation and exploration paradox. To advance theory and research, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the joint effects of CEO tenure and CEO–chair duality on a firm’s shifting emphasis between exploitative and exploratory innovation. Design/methodology/approach This paper takes the approach of a longitudinal sample of 81 US pharmaceutical firms. Findings As CEOs’ tenure advance, their firms’ percentage of exploitative innovation increases. Furthermore, non-duality (separation of board chair and CEO) further strengthens the positive relationship between CEO tenure and the percentage of exploitative innovation. Research limitations/implications This study integrates upper echelons theory and behavioral agency theory to juxtapose the effects of CEOs on technological innovation. This study extends knowledge of strategic leadership and innovation by showing that CEOs influence the balance between exploitative and exploratory innovation. Furthermore, this study also contributes to the corporate governance literature by demonstrating that monitoring vigilance could inhibit capable CEOs from pursuing more exploratory innovation. Practical implications Boards of directors should allow CEOs to have greater discretion over innovation, and vigilant monitoring and control may force CEOs to focus less on exploration. Originality/value This is one of the few studies that explicitly investigate how CEO influences a firm’s emphasis on exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation.

scholarly journals CEO Turnover and Volatility under Long-Term Employment Contracts

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (6) ◽  
pp. 1757-1791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Cziraki ◽  
Moqi Groen-Xu
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Ceo Turnover ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Employment Contracts ◽  
Corporate Policies ◽  
Ceo Contracts ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Remaining Time

We study the role of the contractual time horizon of chief executive officers (CEOs) for CEO turnover and corporate policies. Using hand-collected data on 3,954 fixed-term CEO contracts, we show that remaining time under contract predicts CEO turnover. When contracts are close to expiration, turnover is more likely and is more sensitive to performance. We also show a positive within-CEO relation between remaining time under contract and firm risk. Our results are similar across short and long contracts and are driven neither by firm or CEO survival, nor technological cycles. They are consistent with incentives to take long-term projects with interim volatility.

Effects of an Advancing Tenure on CEO Cognitive Complexity

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 936-959 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenz Graf-Vlachy ◽  
Jonathan Bundy ◽  
Donald C. Hambrick
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Cognitive Complexity ◽  
Theory Of Measurement ◽  
Reliability And Validity ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Conference Calls ◽  
Public Corporations ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
General Experience ◽  
Executive Officers

We study how the cognitive complexity of chief executive officers (CEOs) changes during their tenures. Drawing from prior theory and research, we argue that CEOs attain gradually greater role-specific knowledge, or expertise, as their tenures advance, which yields more complex thinking. Beyond examining the main effect of CEO tenure on cognitive complexity, we consider three moderators of this relationship, each of which is expected to influence the accumulation of expertise over a CEO’s time in office: industry dynamism, industry jolts, and CEO positional power. We conduct our tests on a sample of 684 CEOs of public corporations. The analytic centerpiece of our study is a novel index of CEO cognitive complexity based on CEOs’ language patterns in the question-and-answer portions of quarterly conference calls. As part of our extensive theory of measurement, we provide evidence of the reliability and validity of our index. Our results indicate that CEOs, in general, experience substantial increases in cognitive complexity over their time in office. Examined moderators somewhat, but modestly, alter this general trajectory, and nonlinearities are not observed. We discuss the implications of our findings.

Voice pitch and the labor market success of male chief executive officers

2013 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 243-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
William J. Mayew ◽  
Christopher A. Parsons ◽  
Mohan Venkatachalam
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Voice Pitch ◽  
Labor Market Success ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Market Success

CEO characteristics: do they matter for carbon performance? An empirical investigation of Australian firms

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jibriel Elsayih ◽  
Rina Datt ◽  
Ali Hamid
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Upper Echelons Theory ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Carbon Performance ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Industry Experience ◽  
Ceo Characteristics

Purpose Research suggests that chief executive officers (CEOs) play an important role in enhancing a firm’s legitimacy with regard to environmental performance. The purpose of this paper is to use the upper echelons theory and stakeholder theory to investigate whether the characteristics of CEOs are associated with carbon performance (CP). Design/methodology/approach This paper uses a sample of 128 firm-year observations from Australian companies that participated in the carbon disclosure project from 2011 through 2014. Findings Two-stage least squares estimation reveals that CEO executive experience and CEO duality are positively associated with CP. By contrast, CEO tenure, CEO functional background experience and CEO industry experience are negatively related to CP, and CEO ownership is not related to CP. Practical implications The results might provide evidence for investors, policymakers and regulators with respect to the effectiveness of CEO characteristics for addressing carbon risks and possible linkages between CEO characteristics and carbon emission levels. In addition, the results give support CEO accountability regarding the carbon emissions. Originality/value This study provides the first empirical evidence of the impact of CEO characteristics on CP. Furthermore, this study contributes to the existing literature by showing how the characteristics of CEOs can impact corporate CP and provides a more in-depth understanding of whether such characteristics play important roles in determining corporate carbon action.

Do CEOs get rewarded for CSR activities in the director labor market?

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee M. Dunham ◽  
Tirimba Obonyo ◽  
Sijing Wei
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Corporate Board ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Director ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
Csr Engagement

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to determine if Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are rewarded or punished in the corporate director labor market for engaging in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities.Design/methodology/approachThe authors empirically examine the relation between CEOs' CSR engagement and their corporate board appointments in retirement using logit, ordinary least squares (OLS) and Poisson regression models.FindingsResults indicate that CSR engagement has significant director labor market consequences for retiring CEOs. Specifically, CSR engagement has a favorable impact on the ability of retired CEOs to obtain board seats and board seats at larger firms generally associated with higher pay, even after controlling for firm performance and other determinants previously documented to explain director selection. The authors also find evidence that CEOs of firms with high CSR engagement build up their firms' CSR scores over time as they approach retirement, which is consistent with the labor market for directors providing incentives to attract CEOs to board service in retirement.Originality/valueBy examining the relationship between a CEO's CSR engagement and their external corporate board directorships, this paper advances the understanding of the determinants of corporate board appointments. Further, while most prior research assesses the value of CSR engagement by looking at the relation between CSR engagement and that firm's performance, this is the first study to our knowledge to look outside the firm to determine if CSR engagement has value to the CEO.

scholarly journals The Impact of CEO Image on the Consumer Trust in the Organization

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-253
Author(s):  
Jurgita Stravinskiene ◽  
Rimantė Hopenienė ◽  
Indre Levickyte
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Corporate Image ◽  
Consumer Trust ◽  
Management Styles ◽  
Psychological Traits ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
The Impact

Corporate image entails several elements of which the image of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) is regarded as one of the most significant in building the consumer opinion about the organisation. The study of academic literature has shown that the role of a leader, the impact of management styles for the achievements of the organisation are investigated quite extensively by researchers of leadership, psychology or sociology. However, from the prospect of marketing, the effect of CEO image and its elements on consumer behaviour and establishment of long-term relationships has not been analysed. The aim of the paper was to evaluate an impact of CEO image and its elements on consumer trust in the organisation. The empirical data was collected from 186 respondents who are potential consumers of successful Lithuanian business companies. The survey has showed that the psychological traits and verbal/non-verbal behaviour of the CEOs have the highest impact, and the leadership has the lowest impact on consumer trust on the organisation. The impact on the consumer trust with organisation varies and depends on the assessment of the overall image of CEOs, i.e. the CEO image has the most influence when the consumers are neutral about the overall image of the CEO and the lowest influence when the CEO is evaluated negatively.

scholarly journals Determinants Of Chief Executive Officer Compensation: Some Recent Evidence For The Retail Sales And Food Industries

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 17
Author(s):  
W. Ken Farr ◽  
Joseph C. Samprone, Jr.
Keyword(s):  
Principal Component Analysis ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Principal Component ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Retail Sales ◽  
Food Industries ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

This study examines factors which influence compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs) in the retail sales and foods industries. Because many of the factors which potentially influence compensation are correlated with one another, multicollinearity becomes a problem in regression analysis. To avoid this problem, principal component analysis is employed. Specifically, the relationship of firm performance, firm size, and CEO tenure, all measured as a composite of factors, are studied to determine their influence on CEO compensation. In addition, specific industries are studied in isolation and then in combination to examine the effect of pooling data across industries.

Implementation of CEO Servant Leadership

2021 ◽  
pp. 190-212
Author(s):  
SookYoung S. Yoon ◽  
Jeffrey J. Darville
Keyword(s):  
Servant Leadership ◽  
Organizational Climate ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Employee Morale ◽  
Corporate Scandals ◽  
Organizational Barriers ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
The Impact

The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact that expressions of servant leadership (SL) have on perceived corporate outcomes, performance, and employee satisfaction. Linking symbolic interactionism and grounded theory, this research analyzed the descriptive, empirically-driven, and theoretical underpinnings of the implementation of servant leadership philosophy and value on chief executive officers (CEOs), as well as the organizational barriers associated with the implementation of SL in American for-profit organizations. This qualitative study found indications of a relationship between SL and a strong ethical organizational climate and culture, employee morale, empowerment, and commitment to organizational effectiveness. The interviews with CEOs formed a consensus among executives that SL provides long-term sustainability, boosts social responsibility, and encourages a global mindset. Additionally, a servant leader's approach to strategy mitigates corporate scandals, toxic work environments, and the risk of employee burnout.

External Corporate Governance and Strategic Investment Behaviors of Target CEOs

2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (7) ◽  
pp. 2065-2089 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariano L. M. Heyden ◽  
Nikolaos Kavadis ◽  
Qiomy Neuman
Keyword(s):  
Performance Feedback ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Matched Pair ◽  
Hostile Takeover ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Target Firm ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
External Governance ◽  
Executive Officers

Hostile takeover attempts are considered a key external governance mechanism aimed at addressing perceived managerial underperformance in a target firm. Studies show that target chief executive officers (CEOs) are usually dismissed shortly after a takeover attempt, regardless of whether the bidder actually completes the acquisition. Yet, little is known about the investment behaviors of target CEOs who actually retain their positions in the wake of an unsuccessful hostile takeover attempt. Engaging with this underexplored governance context, we advance a behaviorally informed model of CEO investment behaviors in response to external governance as a function of the negative performance feedback event of the takeover attempt and the timing of the market’s attempt in terms of the stage of the target CEO’s tenure. Based on a matched-pair study of 71 failed takeover attempts from 1995 to 2006, we find evidence of a nonlinear relation between target CEO tenure and degree of uncertainty of expected returns in subsequent strategic investments in the wake of a failed hostile takeover attempt. We discuss the implications for research on external governance, behavioral agency, and executives’ influences on firm processes and outcomes.

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