Effects of an Advancing Tenure on CEO Cognitive Complexity

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 936-959 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenz Graf-Vlachy ◽  
Jonathan Bundy ◽  
Donald C. Hambrick
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Cognitive Complexity ◽  
Theory Of Measurement ◽  
Reliability And Validity ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Conference Calls ◽  
Public Corporations ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
General Experience ◽  
Executive Officers

We study how the cognitive complexity of chief executive officers (CEOs) changes during their tenures. Drawing from prior theory and research, we argue that CEOs attain gradually greater role-specific knowledge, or expertise, as their tenures advance, which yields more complex thinking. Beyond examining the main effect of CEO tenure on cognitive complexity, we consider three moderators of this relationship, each of which is expected to influence the accumulation of expertise over a CEO’s time in office: industry dynamism, industry jolts, and CEO positional power. We conduct our tests on a sample of 684 CEOs of public corporations. The analytic centerpiece of our study is a novel index of CEO cognitive complexity based on CEOs’ language patterns in the question-and-answer portions of quarterly conference calls. As part of our extensive theory of measurement, we provide evidence of the reliability and validity of our index. Our results indicate that CEOs, in general, experience substantial increases in cognitive complexity over their time in office. Examined moderators somewhat, but modestly, alter this general trajectory, and nonlinearities are not observed. We discuss the implications of our findings.

scholarly journals CEO Career Concerns And Voluntary Disclosure

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (6) ◽  
pp. 1603 ◽  
Author(s):  
Soo Yeon Park ◽  
Kwan Hee Yoo
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Career Concerns ◽  
Management Forecasts ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Disclosure Decisions ◽  
Executive Officers

This paper investigates the relation between Chief Executive Officers (CEO) career concerns and voluntary disclosures using listed firm (KOSPI) data in Korea. Prior research suggests that explicit incentives in the form of CEO stock-based compensation or CEO’s equity ownership mitigate the agency problems of reluctance to make voluntary disclosure. In addition, implicit incentives arising from CEO career concerns are as important as explicit incentives for mitigating agency problems.The labor market assesses CEOs ability and CEO reputation in the market is a valuable asset that is associated with many long-term benefits, such as better future compensation, reappointment in the position, and greater managerial autonomy. CEOs are concerned about such an assessment and these concerns are referred to as career concerns. However, the market has incomplete information about CEOs’ ability especially when the CEOs have short tenures as a CEO position. Hence, CEOs with short tenures have more strong incentives to signal their ability to the labor market so that they can build proper reputation.Implicit incentives arising from CEO career concerns are measured by CEO tenure. I assume that short-tenured CEOs are more career-concerned than long-tenured CEOs. I find that CEOs with short tenures tend to more likely disclose management forecasts. I interpret this result that more career-concerned CEOs have strong incentives to signal their ability to the labor market in order to build their reputations which affect their future payoffs such as compensations and reappointment. In addition, management forecasts, means of voluntary disclosure, are used as effective mechanism. I also find that CEOs with short tenures tend to disclose more accurate management forecasts. This result implies that CEOs with more career concerns have more pressure to provide accurate forecasts because of their reliability in the labor market. Based on these empirical results, I infer that CEOs’ implicit incentives affect their voluntary disclosure decision.This study will contribute to academics and disclosure-related practitioners by documenting about CEOs’ career concerns and their voluntary disclosure decisions.

Effects of CEO duality and tenure on innovation

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 536-552
Author(s):  
Mengge Li ◽  
Jinxin Yang
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Monitoring And Control ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Upper Echelons Theory ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Advance Theory ◽  
Exploratory Innovation

Purpose As the primary decision makers, chief executive officers (CEOs) play pivotal roles in firm innovation. However, little is known regarding how CEOs influence the exploitation and exploration paradox. To advance theory and research, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the joint effects of CEO tenure and CEO–chair duality on a firm’s shifting emphasis between exploitative and exploratory innovation. Design/methodology/approach This paper takes the approach of a longitudinal sample of 81 US pharmaceutical firms. Findings As CEOs’ tenure advance, their firms’ percentage of exploitative innovation increases. Furthermore, non-duality (separation of board chair and CEO) further strengthens the positive relationship between CEO tenure and the percentage of exploitative innovation. Research limitations/implications This study integrates upper echelons theory and behavioral agency theory to juxtapose the effects of CEOs on technological innovation. This study extends knowledge of strategic leadership and innovation by showing that CEOs influence the balance between exploitative and exploratory innovation. Furthermore, this study also contributes to the corporate governance literature by demonstrating that monitoring vigilance could inhibit capable CEOs from pursuing more exploratory innovation. Practical implications Boards of directors should allow CEOs to have greater discretion over innovation, and vigilant monitoring and control may force CEOs to focus less on exploration. Originality/value This is one of the few studies that explicitly investigate how CEO influences a firm’s emphasis on exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation.

CEO characteristics: do they matter for carbon performance? An empirical investigation of Australian firms

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jibriel Elsayih ◽  
Rina Datt ◽  
Ali Hamid
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Upper Echelons Theory ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Carbon Performance ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Industry Experience ◽  
Ceo Characteristics

Purpose Research suggests that chief executive officers (CEOs) play an important role in enhancing a firm’s legitimacy with regard to environmental performance. The purpose of this paper is to use the upper echelons theory and stakeholder theory to investigate whether the characteristics of CEOs are associated with carbon performance (CP). Design/methodology/approach This paper uses a sample of 128 firm-year observations from Australian companies that participated in the carbon disclosure project from 2011 through 2014. Findings Two-stage least squares estimation reveals that CEO executive experience and CEO duality are positively associated with CP. By contrast, CEO tenure, CEO functional background experience and CEO industry experience are negatively related to CP, and CEO ownership is not related to CP. Practical implications The results might provide evidence for investors, policymakers and regulators with respect to the effectiveness of CEO characteristics for addressing carbon risks and possible linkages between CEO characteristics and carbon emission levels. In addition, the results give support CEO accountability regarding the carbon emissions. Originality/value This study provides the first empirical evidence of the impact of CEO characteristics on CP. Furthermore, this study contributes to the existing literature by showing how the characteristics of CEOs can impact corporate CP and provides a more in-depth understanding of whether such characteristics play important roles in determining corporate carbon action.

scholarly journals Determinants Of Chief Executive Officer Compensation: Some Recent Evidence For The Retail Sales And Food Industries

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 17
Author(s):  
W. Ken Farr ◽  
Joseph C. Samprone, Jr.
Keyword(s):  
Principal Component Analysis ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Principal Component ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Retail Sales ◽  
Food Industries ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

This study examines factors which influence compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs) in the retail sales and foods industries. Because many of the factors which potentially influence compensation are correlated with one another, multicollinearity becomes a problem in regression analysis. To avoid this problem, principal component analysis is employed. Specifically, the relationship of firm performance, firm size, and CEO tenure, all measured as a composite of factors, are studied to determine their influence on CEO compensation. In addition, specific industries are studied in isolation and then in combination to examine the effect of pooling data across industries.

External Corporate Governance and Strategic Investment Behaviors of Target CEOs

2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (7) ◽  
pp. 2065-2089 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariano L. M. Heyden ◽  
Nikolaos Kavadis ◽  
Qiomy Neuman
Keyword(s):  
Performance Feedback ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Matched Pair ◽  
Hostile Takeover ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Target Firm ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
External Governance ◽  
Executive Officers

Hostile takeover attempts are considered a key external governance mechanism aimed at addressing perceived managerial underperformance in a target firm. Studies show that target chief executive officers (CEOs) are usually dismissed shortly after a takeover attempt, regardless of whether the bidder actually completes the acquisition. Yet, little is known about the investment behaviors of target CEOs who actually retain their positions in the wake of an unsuccessful hostile takeover attempt. Engaging with this underexplored governance context, we advance a behaviorally informed model of CEO investment behaviors in response to external governance as a function of the negative performance feedback event of the takeover attempt and the timing of the market’s attempt in terms of the stage of the target CEO’s tenure. Based on a matched-pair study of 71 failed takeover attempts from 1995 to 2006, we find evidence of a nonlinear relation between target CEO tenure and degree of uncertainty of expected returns in subsequent strategic investments in the wake of a failed hostile takeover attempt. We discuss the implications for research on external governance, behavioral agency, and executives’ influences on firm processes and outcomes.

Effect of leadership styles on organizational commitment and performance in small- and medium-sized enterprises in Iraqi Kurdistan

2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (9) ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Karwan Hamasalih Qadir ◽  
Mehmet Yeşiltaş
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Commitment ◽  
Organizational Performance ◽  
Leadership Styles ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Mediating Effect ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Iraqi Kurdistan ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Executive Officers

Since 2003 the number of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has increased exponentially in Iraqi Kurdistan. To facilitate further growth the owners and chief executive officers of these enterprises have sought to improve their leadership skills. This study examined the effect of transactional and transformational leadership styles on organizational commitment and performance in Iraqi Kurdistan SMEs, and the mediating effect of organizational commitment in these relationships. We distributed 530 questionnaires and collected 400 valid responses (75% response rate) from 115 SME owners/chief executive officers and 285 employees. The results demonstrate there were positive effects of both types of leadership style on organizational performance. Further, the significant mediating effect of organizational commitment in both relationships shows the importance of this variable for leader effectiveness among entrepreneurs in Iraqi Kurdistan, and foreign entrepreneurs engaging in new businesses in the region.

scholarly journals Toward a Working Model of Leadership in Nonprofit Sport Governance

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 189-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian O’Boyle ◽  
David Shilbury ◽  
Lesley Ferkins
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Leadership Skills ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Limited Attention ◽  
Study Approach ◽  
Working Model ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Scholarly Discourse

The aim of this study is to explore leadership within nonprofit sport governance. As an outcome, the authors present a preliminary working model of leadership in nonprofit sport governance based on existing literature and our new empirical evidence. Leadership in nonprofit sport governance has received limited attention to date in scholarly discourse. The authors adopt a case study approach involving three organizations and 16 participant interviews from board members and Chief Executive Officers within the golf network in Australia to uncover key leadership issues in this domain. Interviews were analyzed using an interpretive process, and a thematic structure relating to leadership in the nonprofit sport governance context was developed. Leadership ambiguity, distribution of leadership, leadership skills and development, and leadership and volunteerism emerged as the key themes in the research. These themes, combined with existing literature, are integrated into a preliminary working model of leadership in nonprofit sport governance that helps to shape the issues and challenges embedded within this emerging area of inquiry. The authors offer a number of suggestions for future research to refine, test, critique, and elaborate on our proposed working model.

In retrospect: The influence of chief executive officers’ historical relative pay on overconfidence

2021 ◽  
pp. 147612702110048
Author(s):  
J Daniel Zyung ◽  
Wei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Self Confidence ◽  
Self Worth ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Leadership Research ◽  
The Relationship

This study proposes that chief executive officers who have received over their tenure a greater sum of total compensation relative to the market’s going rate become overconfident. We posit that this happens because historically overpaid chief executive officers perceive greater self-worth to the firm whereby such self-serving attribution inflates their level of self-confidence. We also identify chief executive officer- and firm-level cues that can influence the relationship between chief executive officers’ historical relative pay and their overconfidence, suggesting that chief executive officers’ perceived self-worth is more pronounced when chief executive officers possess less power and when their firm’s performance has improved upon their historical aspirations. Using a sample of 1185 firms and their chief executive officers during the years 2000–2016, we find empirical support for our predictions. Findings from this study contribute to strategic leadership research by highlighting the important role of executives’ compensation in creating overconfidence.

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