scholarly journals Determinants Of Chief Executive Officer Compensation: Some Recent Evidence For The Retail Sales And Food Industries

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 17
Author(s):  
W. Ken Farr ◽  
Joseph C. Samprone, Jr.
Keyword(s):  
Principal Component Analysis ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Principal Component ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Retail Sales ◽  
Food Industries ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

This study examines factors which influence compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs) in the retail sales and foods industries. Because many of the factors which potentially influence compensation are correlated with one another, multicollinearity becomes a problem in regression analysis. To avoid this problem, principal component analysis is employed. Specifically, the relationship of firm performance, firm size, and CEO tenure, all measured as a composite of factors, are studied to determine their influence on CEO compensation. In addition, specific industries are studied in isolation and then in combination to examine the effect of pooling data across industries.

Financial Reporting Transparency and Earnings Management (Retracted)

2006 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
James E. Hunton ◽  
Robert Libby ◽  
Cheri L. Mazza
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Comprehensive Income ◽  
Income Reporting ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

Prior research indicates that greater transparency in reporting formats facilitates the detection of earnings management. The current study hypothesizes and demonstrates that greater transparency in comprehensive income reporting also reduces the likelihood that managers will engage in earnings management in the area of increased transparency. In our experiment, 62 financial executives and chief executive officers decide which available-for-sale security to sell from a portfolio. We manipulate the transparency of comprehensive income reporting and the relationship of projected earnings to the consensus forecast in a 2×2 between-subjects design. When projected earnings are below (above) the consensus forecast, participants sell securities that increase (decrease) earnings. However, the rarely used, more transparent format for reporting comprehensive income significantly reduces both income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management. Participants in the less transparent setting indicate that earnings management attempts will not be obvious to readers, will improve stock prices, and have no effect on management's reputation for reporting integrity. Conversely, respondents in the more transparent condition suggest that earnings management will be obvious to readers, harmful to stock prices, and damaging to reporting reputation. Results of this study suggest that more transparent reporting requirements will reduce earnings management in the area of increased transparency or change the focus of earnings management to less visible methods.

In retrospect: The influence of chief executive officers’ historical relative pay on overconfidence

2021 ◽  
pp. 147612702110048
Author(s):  
J Daniel Zyung ◽  
Wei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Self Confidence ◽  
Self Worth ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Leadership Research ◽  
The Relationship

This study proposes that chief executive officers who have received over their tenure a greater sum of total compensation relative to the market’s going rate become overconfident. We posit that this happens because historically overpaid chief executive officers perceive greater self-worth to the firm whereby such self-serving attribution inflates their level of self-confidence. We also identify chief executive officer- and firm-level cues that can influence the relationship between chief executive officers’ historical relative pay and their overconfidence, suggesting that chief executive officers’ perceived self-worth is more pronounced when chief executive officers possess less power and when their firm’s performance has improved upon their historical aspirations. Using a sample of 1185 firms and their chief executive officers during the years 2000–2016, we find empirical support for our predictions. Findings from this study contribute to strategic leadership research by highlighting the important role of executives’ compensation in creating overconfidence.

scholarly journals Correlation of environmental factors and spatial distribution of moluscs communities in mangrove reboisation areas of Seribu Islands, Indonesia

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Syahrial Syahrial ◽  
Eryc Pranata ◽  
Hendri Susilo
Keyword(s):  
Principal Component Analysis ◽  
Spatial Distribution ◽  
Environmental Factors ◽  
Principal Component ◽  
Quality Standard ◽  
Small Plot ◽  
Line Transects ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Mangrove Reforestation

Mangrove reforestation is often carried out in various regions or regions, but information about the relationship of environmental factors and the distribution of fauna associations is still very minimal. The Principal Component Analysis (PCA) study on the correlation of environmental factors and the spatial distribution of the molusks community in the Seribu Islands mangrove reforestation area was conducted in March 2014 with the aim of analyzing environmental factors for the diversity and presence of the molusks. Environmental factors are measured insecurely, while the moluccan community is collected by making line transects and plots measuring 10 x 10 m2 and in the size of 10 x 10 m2, a small plot of 1 x 1 m2 is made. The results of the study show that environmental factors are not so different between stations and do not exceed the quality standard for the lives of 4 species of mollusks, where the parameters of aquatic pH are the environmental factors that most influence their distribution.Keywords: environmental factors, distribution, mollusks community, mangrove reforestation, Seribu Islands

scholarly journals CEO Career Concerns And Voluntary Disclosure

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (6) ◽  
pp. 1603 ◽  
Author(s):  
Soo Yeon Park ◽  
Kwan Hee Yoo
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Career Concerns ◽  
Management Forecasts ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Disclosure Decisions ◽  
Executive Officers

This paper investigates the relation between Chief Executive Officers (CEO) career concerns and voluntary disclosures using listed firm (KOSPI) data in Korea. Prior research suggests that explicit incentives in the form of CEO stock-based compensation or CEO’s equity ownership mitigate the agency problems of reluctance to make voluntary disclosure. In addition, implicit incentives arising from CEO career concerns are as important as explicit incentives for mitigating agency problems.The labor market assesses CEOs ability and CEO reputation in the market is a valuable asset that is associated with many long-term benefits, such as better future compensation, reappointment in the position, and greater managerial autonomy. CEOs are concerned about such an assessment and these concerns are referred to as career concerns. However, the market has incomplete information about CEOs’ ability especially when the CEOs have short tenures as a CEO position. Hence, CEOs with short tenures have more strong incentives to signal their ability to the labor market so that they can build proper reputation.Implicit incentives arising from CEO career concerns are measured by CEO tenure. I assume that short-tenured CEOs are more career-concerned than long-tenured CEOs. I find that CEOs with short tenures tend to more likely disclose management forecasts. I interpret this result that more career-concerned CEOs have strong incentives to signal their ability to the labor market in order to build their reputations which affect their future payoffs such as compensations and reappointment. In addition, management forecasts, means of voluntary disclosure, are used as effective mechanism. I also find that CEOs with short tenures tend to disclose more accurate management forecasts. This result implies that CEOs with more career concerns have more pressure to provide accurate forecasts because of their reliability in the labor market. Based on these empirical results, I infer that CEOs’ implicit incentives affect their voluntary disclosure decision.This study will contribute to academics and disclosure-related practitioners by documenting about CEOs’ career concerns and their voluntary disclosure decisions.

Effects of CEO duality and tenure on innovation

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 536-552
Author(s):  
Mengge Li ◽  
Jinxin Yang
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Monitoring And Control ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Upper Echelons Theory ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Advance Theory ◽  
Exploratory Innovation

Purpose As the primary decision makers, chief executive officers (CEOs) play pivotal roles in firm innovation. However, little is known regarding how CEOs influence the exploitation and exploration paradox. To advance theory and research, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the joint effects of CEO tenure and CEO–chair duality on a firm’s shifting emphasis between exploitative and exploratory innovation. Design/methodology/approach This paper takes the approach of a longitudinal sample of 81 US pharmaceutical firms. Findings As CEOs’ tenure advance, their firms’ percentage of exploitative innovation increases. Furthermore, non-duality (separation of board chair and CEO) further strengthens the positive relationship between CEO tenure and the percentage of exploitative innovation. Research limitations/implications This study integrates upper echelons theory and behavioral agency theory to juxtapose the effects of CEOs on technological innovation. This study extends knowledge of strategic leadership and innovation by showing that CEOs influence the balance between exploitative and exploratory innovation. Furthermore, this study also contributes to the corporate governance literature by demonstrating that monitoring vigilance could inhibit capable CEOs from pursuing more exploratory innovation. Practical implications Boards of directors should allow CEOs to have greater discretion over innovation, and vigilant monitoring and control may force CEOs to focus less on exploration. Originality/value This is one of the few studies that explicitly investigate how CEO influences a firm’s emphasis on exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation.

scholarly journals The relationship between chief executive officer compensation and the size and industry of South African state-owned enterprises

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariette Coetzee ◽  
Magda L. Bezuidenhout
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
African State ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Performance Contracts ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
The Relationship

Orientation: Concerns about exorbitant executive compensation are making headlines, because executives receive lucrative packages despite state-owned enterprises (SOEs) performing poorly. It appears as if chief executive officers (CEOs) are not being held accountable for the performance of the SOEs.Research purpose: The purpose of the study was to determine whether the size and the industry of an SOE had an impact on CEO compensation packages.Motivation for the study: A greater understanding of the relationship between CEO remuneration and the size and type of industry of SOEs would assist with the standardisation of CEO remuneration and linking CEO pay to SOE performance.Research approach/design and method: A multiple regression analysis on a pooled dataset of 162 panel observations was conducted over a 9-year period. Financial data of 18 SOEs were extracted from the McGregor BFA database and the annual reports of SOEs.Main findings: The findings show that the size of an SOE does not influence the total compensation of CEOs. However, larger SOEs pay larger bonuses due to these SOEs being in a stronger financial position to offer lucrative bonuses. CEO’s remuneration was aligned within certain industries.Practical/managerial implications: The findings emphasise the need to link CEO compensation with SOE performance. Standardisation in setting CEO compensation and implementing performance contracts should be considered.Contribution/value-add: The study confirms that CEO pay is not linked to performance and not justified when considering SOE size or industry.

The effects of global financial crisis on the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 389-408 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oheneba Assenso-Okofo ◽  
Muhammad Jahangir Ali ◽  
Kamran Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Multivariate Tests ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose This paper aims to examine the effects of global financial crisis (GFC) on chief executive officers’ (CEO) compensation and earnings management relationship. Specifically, the authors examine whether the recent financial crisis had moderated the relationship between CEO bonus and discretionary accruals. Design/methodology/approach The authors use panel data for 1,800 firm-year observations (over a period of six years from 2005 to 2010) and use univariate and multivariate tests to test their hypothesis. The authors divide the period into pre-crisis, during-crisis and post-crisis periods to examine how the different financial crisis periods affect the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management. Various alternative tests including endogeneity test suggest that the results are robust. Findings The authors’ multivariate results indicate that the relationship between CEO’ compensation and earnings management changes because of the GFC. Practical implications The findings, therefore, justify more monitoring and scrutiny to limit the existence of opportunistic managerial behaviour and for the appropriate designing of CEO compensation packages during abnormal economic circumstances. Originality/value So far as the authors’ knowledge goes, this is the first study which examines the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management during GFC.

Effects of an Advancing Tenure on CEO Cognitive Complexity

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 936-959 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenz Graf-Vlachy ◽  
Jonathan Bundy ◽  
Donald C. Hambrick
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Cognitive Complexity ◽  
Theory Of Measurement ◽  
Reliability And Validity ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Conference Calls ◽  
Public Corporations ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
General Experience ◽  
Executive Officers

We study how the cognitive complexity of chief executive officers (CEOs) changes during their tenures. Drawing from prior theory and research, we argue that CEOs attain gradually greater role-specific knowledge, or expertise, as their tenures advance, which yields more complex thinking. Beyond examining the main effect of CEO tenure on cognitive complexity, we consider three moderators of this relationship, each of which is expected to influence the accumulation of expertise over a CEO’s time in office: industry dynamism, industry jolts, and CEO positional power. We conduct our tests on a sample of 684 CEOs of public corporations. The analytic centerpiece of our study is a novel index of CEO cognitive complexity based on CEOs’ language patterns in the question-and-answer portions of quarterly conference calls. As part of our extensive theory of measurement, we provide evidence of the reliability and validity of our index. Our results indicate that CEOs, in general, experience substantial increases in cognitive complexity over their time in office. Examined moderators somewhat, but modestly, alter this general trajectory, and nonlinearities are not observed. We discuss the implications of our findings.

Perceived accountability for local government infrastructure assets: the influence of stakeholders

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 551-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavithra Siriwardhane ◽  
Dennis Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Stakeholder Salience ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Government ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Policy Incentives ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between the degree of stakeholder salience and the degree of emphasis placed on accountability dimensions for infrastructure assets (IFAs) as perceived by mayors and chief executive officers (CEOs) of local government authorities (LGAs). Comparisons are drawn between the salience accorded to two broad stakeholder groups at the public level and at the government level. Design/methodology/approach Perceptions of mayors and CEOs are examined through a mail questionnaire survey administered among LGAs in Australia. Findings Overall accountability for IFAs by the LGAs is influenced by the salience accorded to the demands and needs of public stakeholders (PSs) but not the salience accorded to government stakeholders (GS). It is evident that public and managerial accountabilities are impacted by PS salience, whereas political accountability is impacted by the salience of GS. Thus, it emphasises that the establishment and implementation of policies, processes and systems that render transparency and responsiveness to the public, as well as service quality and the disclosure of performance measures, are positively affected by the salience accorded to PS groups. Research limitations/implications The results of the study may be affected by the inherent weaknesses associated with mail surveys. Practical implications Accountability of LGAs for IFAs to GS needs enhancement, specifically stronger policy incentives. Originality/value This paper contributes to the literature, providing evidence on how mayors and CEOs of LGAs perceive the salience of different stakeholders of IFAs and its impact on the perceived accountability.

Socializing accounting practices in governing boards: dairy co-operatives down-under

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen VanPeursem ◽  
Kevin Old ◽  
Stuart Locke
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Document Analysis ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Challenges And Opportunities ◽  
Small Pool ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Accountability Practices ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the accountability practices of the directors in New Zealand and Australian dairy co-operatives. An interpretation of their practices, which focus on the relationship between directors and their farmer-shareholders, is informed by Roberts’ (2001a) understandings of a socializing accountability. Design/methodology/approach – The fieldwork consists of interviews with 23 directors, including all chief executive officers and chairmen, of six dairy co-operatives together with observations and document analysis. These co-operatives together comprise a significant portion of the regional dairy industry. The methodology draws from Eisenhardt’s (1989) qualitative approach to theory formation. Findings – The authors find that these directors engage in a discourse-based, community-grounded and egalitarian form of socializing accountability. As such, their practices adhere generally to Roberts (2001a) hopes for a more considerate and humble relationship between an accountor and an accountee. Social implications – Findings add to the small pool of research on the lived experiences of co-operative boards and to a parsimonious literature in socializing accountability practices. The contributions of the study are in advancing real understandings of alternative forms of accountability, in evaluating the conditions in which these alternatives may be likely to arise and in anticipating the challenges and opportunities that arise therefrom. Originality/value – The originality of the project arises from accessing the views of these industry leaders and, through their frank expressions, coming to understand how they achieve a form of a socializing accountability in their relationships with farmer-shareholders.

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