Managerial Incentives And Changes In Corporate Focus
<p class="MsoTitle" style="text-align: justify; line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-weight: normal; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">We examine how Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity ownership, CEO tenure, and the percentage of options in CEO annual compensation are related to decisions regarding changes in corporate focus.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We document that the CEOs whose companies change their level of corporate focus have significant differences from CEOs whose firms do not change focus.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, we find no differences in the characteristics of CEOs who increase their firm’s level of diversification and the CEOs who decrease their firm’s level of diversification.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Firm characteristics, such as size or whether the firm sells at a premium or discount to its peers, are better predictors of changes in corporate focus than CEO characteristics. Overall, we find no evidence that changes in diversification are related to self-serving managers attempting to maximize their own wealth.</span></span></p>