scholarly journals Przestępstwo publicznego propagowania faszystowskiego lub innego totalitarnego ustroju państwa art. 256 k.k.. Analiza doktrynologiczna wybranych wypowiedzi piśmiennictwa i judykatury. Część szczególna III

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-28
Author(s):  
Tomasz Scheffler

THE CRIME OF PUBLIC PROPAGATION OF A FASCIST OR OTHER TOTALITARIAN GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM ARTICLE 256 OF THE PENAL CODE: A DOCTRINOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF SELECTED SCHOLARLY WRITINGS AND JUDICATURE. DETAILED PART IIIThe paper presents interpretations of the content of art. 256 of the Polish Penal Code of 1997 The crime of public propagation of a fascist or other totalitarian governmental/state system, which were developed amid amendment in 2009. The most difficult problem for commentators, much like authors, about whom we have deliberated earlier, was to understand the complexity of the phenomenon of totalitarianism and the consequences resulting from accepting one of the competing concepts of totalitarianism. Similarly, interpretational problems led to misunderstandings of the concept of  fascism and the state system. As a result, individual authors incorrectly found resemblance between the regulations contained in the Penal Code of 1969 and the regulation contained in art. 256 from 1997. In this paper we prove that the Polish Supreme Court and even Polish Constitutional Tribunal also had the same problem with the interpretation of the content of art. 256.

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-151
Author(s):  
Tomasz Scheffler

THE CRIME OF PUBLIC PROPAGATION OF A FASCIST OR OTHER TOTALITARIAN GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM ARTICLE 256 OF THE PENAL CODE: A DOCTRINOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF SELECTED SCHOLARLY WRITINGS AND JUDICATURE. DETAILED PART IIThe paper presents interpretations of the content of art. 256 of the Polish Penal Code of 1997 The crime of public propagation of a fascist or other totalitarian governmental system, which were developed before 2009. The most difficult problem for commentators, much like authors, about whom we have deliberated earlier, was to understand the complexity of the phenomenon of totalitarianism and the consequences resulting from accepting one of the competing concepts of totalitarianism. Similarly, interpretational problems led to misunderstandings of the concept of fascism and the governmental system. As a result, individual authors incorrectly found resemblance between the regulations contained in the Penal Code of 1969 and the regulation contained in art. 256 from 1997. In this paper we prove that the Polish Supreme Court also had the same problem with the interpretation of the content of art. 256.


2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 243-267
Author(s):  
Elżbieta Ura

ABSTRAKT Employment of officers in customs and tax administration after the reform The article presents the legal regulations concerning the officers of the former Customs Service adopted by the legislator on the occasion of the reformed customs and tax administration and the establishment of the National Tax Administration. The institution of terminating the service relations of officers by law was introduced, as well as transforming the service relations into contractual relations as a result of offering the officer further work in the structures of this administration and accepting this proposal by him. Problems with interpreting these solutions were visible in the varied jurisprudence of administrative courts as well as common courts. In order to understand these difficulties, some of the justifications of the judgments have been presented more broadly. In line with these considerations, the thesis is justified that in recent years the legislator has increasingly resorted to this type of solutions and introduced institutions of termination of employment relations by law, and their cause is not “exceptional, special circumstances justified by the state system reform,” which was emphasized by the Constitutional Tribunal, only reforms related to organizational transformations in public administration. This is viewed as the means of replacing public administration staff.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (4 (2)) ◽  
pp. 119-140
Author(s):  
Tomasz Scheffler

The paper presents interpretations of the content of the legal principle of nullum crimen sine lege and the influence of this principle on legal characterisation of crime of public propagation of a fascist or other totalitarian governance system and crime of public agitation to hatred based on national, ethnic, racial or religious differences or for reason of a lack of any religiousdenomination. In the author’s opinion, the most difficult problem in the case of crimes typified in Art. 256 § 1 of Polish Penal Code lies in that many layers consider the legal principle of nullum crimen as a commonplace. In the paper, there are several cases presented of adjudications of the Polish Supreme Court relating to what considerations of the legal principle of nullum crimen may cause so that we can obtain clear views on the problem.


2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 145-159
Author(s):  
Tomasz Scheffler

THE CRIME OF PUBLIC PROPAGATION OF A FASCIST OR OTHER TOTALITARIAN GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM ARTICLE 256 OF THE PENAL CODE: A DOCTRINOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF SELECTED SCHOLARLY WRITINGS AND JUDICATURE. DETAILED PART IThe paper presents interpretations of the content of art. 256 of the Polish Penal Code of 1997 The crime of public propagation of a fascist or other totalitarian governmental system, which were developed in the years 1998–2001. The most difficult problem for commentators was to understand the complexity of the phenomenon of totalitarianism and the consequences resulting from accepting one of the competing concepts of totalitarianism. Similarly, interpretational problems led to misunderstandings of the concept of fascism and the governmental system. As a result, individual authors incorrectly found resemblance between the regulations contained in the Penal Code of 1969 and the regulation contained in art. 256 from 1997.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-121
Author(s):  
Shamier Ebrahim

The right to adequate housing is a constitutional imperative which is contained in section 26 of the Constitution. The state is tasked with the progressive realisation of this right. The allocation of housing has been plagued with challenges which impact negatively on the allocation process. This note analyses Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 51 which dealt with a situation where one of the main reasons provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal for refusing the eviction order was because the appellants subjected the unlawful occupiers to defective waiting lists and failed to engage with the community regarding the compilation of the lists and the criteria used to identify beneficiaries. This case brings to the fore the importance of a coherent (reasonable) waiting list in eviction proceedings. This note further analyses the impact of the waiting list system in eviction proceedings and makes recommendations regarding what would constitute a coherent (reasonable) waiting list for the purpose of section 26(2) of the Constitution.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 213
Author(s):  
Budi Suhariyanto

Diskresi sebagai wewenang bebas, keberadaannya rentan akan disalahgunakan. Penyalahgunaan diskresi yang berimplikasi merugikan keuangan negara dapat dituntutkan pertanggungjawabannya secara hukum administrasi maupun hukum pidana. Mengingat selama ini peraturan perundang-undangan tentang pemberantasan tindak pidana korupsi tidak merumuskan secara rinci yang dimaksudkan unsur menyalahgunakan kewenangan maka para hakim menggunakan konsep penyalahgunaan wewenang dari hukum administrasi. Problema muncul saat diberlakukannya Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2014 dimana telah memicu persinggungan dalam hal kewenangan mengadili penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) antara Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara dengan Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi. Pada perkembangannya, persinggungan kewenangan mengadili tersebut ditegaskan oleh Peraturan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 4 Tahun 2015 bahwa PTUN berwenang menerima, memeriksa, dan memutus permohonan penilaian ada atau tidak ada penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) dalam Keputusan dan/atau Tindakan Pejabat Pemerintahan sebelum adanya proses pidana. Sehubungan tidak dijelaskan tentang definisi dan batasan proses pidana yang dimaksud, maka timbul penafsiran yang berbeda. Perlu diadakan kesepakatan bersama dan dituangkan dalam regulasi tentang tapal batas persinggungan yang jelas tanpa meniadakan kewenangan pengujian penyalahgunaan wewenang diskresi pada Pengadilan TUN.Discretion as free authority is vulnerable to being misused. The abuse of discretion implicating the state finance may be prosecuted by both administrative and criminal law. In view of the fact that the law on corruption eradication does not formulate in detail the intended element of authority abuse, the judges use the concept of authority abuse from administrative law. Problems arise when the enactment of Law No. 30 of 2014 triggered an interception in terms of justice/ adjudicate authority on authority abuse (including discretion) between the Administrative Court and Corruption Court. In its development, the interception of justice authority is affirmed by Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 4 of 2015 that the Administrative Court has the authority to receive, examine and decide upon the appeal there is or there is no misuse of authority in the Decision and / or Action of Government Officials prior to the criminal process. That is, shortly before the commencement of the criminal process then that's when the authority of PTUN decides to judge the misuse of authority over the case. In this context, Perma No. 4 of 2015 has imposed restrictions on the authority of the TUN Court in prosecuting the abuse of discretionary authority.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven J. Twist ◽  
Paul G. Cassell ◽  
Allyson N. Ho ◽  
Bradley Hubbard ◽  
John Ehrett

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul G. Cassell ◽  
John Ehrett ◽  
Allyson N. Ho ◽  
Bradley Hubbard ◽  
Matthew Scorcio ◽  
...  

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