scholarly journals La aplicación privada del derecho de la competencia: acciones de daños y pronunciamientos judiciales = Private enforcement of competition law: damages actions and judicial pronouncements

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 267
Author(s):  
Fernando Díez Estella

Resumen: Tras más de medio siglo de aplicación eminentemente pública del Derecho de la Com­petencia, estamos asistiendo a un impulso de la aplicación privada, que permite a los perjudicados por conductas anticompetitivas reclamar daños y perjuicios ante los tribunales civiles. Tanto la Directiva 2014/104/CE como su transposición en España por el RD Ley 9/2017 significan grandes avances en este ámbito. El objeto del presente trabajo es el análisis y valoración crítica de los primeros pronuncia­mientos judiciales que han tenido lugar resolviendo estas reclamaciones, derivadas principalmente de cárteles (azúcar, seguro decenal, sobres de papel). Se prestará especial atención a los informes periciales de valoración del daño, así como la diferente eficacia de las acciones follow-on y las stand-alone.Palabras clave: aplicación privada, acciones de daños, Directiva, estimación del daño, acciones stand-alone.Abstract: After more than half a century of public enforcement of Competition law in the EU, we gaze at the fostering of private enforcement, which allows filling damages actions to those who have suffered the economic harm due to anticompetitive practices. Both Directive 2014/104/CE and its implementation in Spain through RD Ley 9/2017 are significant steps in this direction. The aim of this paper is the critical analysis of the first judicial pronouncements dictated when dealing with such claims, basically provoked by cartels (such as sugar, property insurance or envelopes). We examine closely the relevance in these proceedings of the economic proof, as well as the different effectiveness of follow-on and stand-alone actions.Keywords: private enforcement, damages actions, Directive, harm estimation, stand-alone claims.

2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-180
Author(s):  
Anna Piszcz

Abstract This paper attempts to address the question of how multilingualism in the EU might affect the consistency of private enforcement of competition law. In the literature, there have been concerns raised about the consistency of public enforcement of competition law, so in this paper attention has shifted to concerns about consistency of private enforcement. For the purposes of this paper, a distinction is drawn between rule-making and the application of competition law. The latter falls outside the scope of this paper. The article starts by going straight into aspects of public versus private enforcement of EU competition law and consistency of private enforcement of competition law. Next, by looking at examples of national rules implementing the EU Damages Directive, the author is going to discern what challenges for consistency of private enforcement of competition law are associated with the multilingualism in the EU.


Author(s):  
Wijckmans Frank ◽  
Tuytschaever Filip

This chapter explains the term ‘vertical agreements’ and what it covers. It addresses a number of general issues that are relevant to the EU competition law treatment of vertical agreements in general. It describes the implementation and the (public and private) enforcement of Article 101 TFEU before and after the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003. The chapter provides the historical background of both Regulation 330/2010 and Regulation 461/2010. In particular, it devotes specific attention to the nature and legal and practical consequences of soft EU competition law (in the form of notices, guidelines, etc) as opposed to hard EU competition law (provisions of primary and secondary EU law).


Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne

This chapter sketches the history and functions of the EU and its institutions in order to set the EU competition rules in context. It then describes the competition provisions themselves and outlines the way in which the rules are applied and enforced, including the public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 under Regulation 1/2003, the control of mergers with a European dimension under Regulation 139/2004, public enforcement by the national competition authorities of the Member States, and the role of private enforcement. It discusses the position and powers of the European Commission, particularly the role of the Competition Directorate General (DG Comp); the powers of the EU Courts; the significance of fundamental rights and the general principles of EU law in competition cases; the application of competition rules to particular sectors of the economy; and the application of the EU rules to the EEA.


Author(s):  
Katalin J Cseres

This chapter evaluates the functioning of the decentralized public enforcement of EU competition law. The analysis focuses on the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement, which relies on Rule of Law principles. It has been argued that Rule of Law principles are a prerequisite for effective competition law enforcement. Aside from that, assessing the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement framework also takes account of the problems of multilevel governance which have emerged as a result of the decentralization of enforcement powers and the creation of parallel competences for the Commission and national actors which made it essential to guarantee uniform and consistent application of the EU competition rules. Centrifugal pulls from the Member States towards their national legal systems and centripetal pushes from the Commission create uniformity and consistency in this multilevel system. Analysing these bottom-up and top-down approaches allows us to analyse decentralized enforcement as a specific governance model.


2021 ◽  
pp. 79-112
Author(s):  
Renato Nazzini

Chapter 4 deals with exclusionary abuses under the Competition Act 1998, covering both public and private enforcement cases. The analysis concerns the approach to dominance as well as tests for abuse, focusing on retroactive rebates and bundled discounts, exclusion in multi-market settings, exclusivity, most favoured nation and equivalent clauses, discrimination, and exclusionary abuses in the pharmaceutical sector. This chapter argues that, in its second decade, modern UK competition law continued a trend that was already clear in the first decade: the prohibition of abuse of dominance is applied in a more economically robust and commercially reasonable way than it is by the EU institutions - the Commission and the EU courts - and in certain other Member States. The chapter notes that the third decade of the Competition Act 1998 will see the UK develop its competition policy free from the constraints of EU law and may allow for some divergence in the approach to exclusionary abuses in the future.


2014 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 143-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niamh Dunne

AbstractPrivate enforcement is an increasingly prominent element of EU competition law. The forthcoming Directive on damages actions aims to strengthen and, to a degree, harmonise procedures for private competition litigation, while recent case law of the Court of Justice reaffirms the centrality of the right to claim compensation for losses stemming from breach of the competition rules. Moreover, this right has been presented as an essentially unitary one, whereby any victim of any type of competition infringement has, in principle, the right to claim damages. This chapter reviews the evolving framework, and considers, specifically, the role for private enforcement within the overall system of EU competition law. Taking into account the Commission’s efforts to facilitate and increase private enforcement, the emerging EU public enforcement framework, as well as the substantive EU competition rules more generally, this chapter argues that, contrary to the rhetoric, private enforcement is a mechanism best adapted, and arguably most appropriate, for use only in the context of hard-core cartels. It is further suggested that the gap between rhetoric and reality is not problematic as such, yet difficulties may arise insofar as these divergences conflict with the principle of effectiveness.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (14) ◽  
pp. 43-67
Author(s):  
Tihamér Tóth

The paper explores the changes the EU Directive on harmonizing certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions will bring about in Hungary, with a special focus placed on damages liability rules, the interaction of public and private enforcement of these rules, and the importance of class actions. Amendments of the Competition Act introduced in 2005 and 2009 had created new rules to promote the idea of private enforcement even before the Directive was adopted. Some of these rules remain unique even now, notably the legal presumption of a 10% price increase for cartel cases. However, subsequent cases decided by Hungarian courts did not reflect the sophistication of existing substantive and procedural rules. There has only ever been one judgment awarding damages, while most stand-alone cases involved minor competition law issues relating to contractual disputes. The paper looks at the most important substantial rules of tort law (damage, causality, joint and several liability), the co-operation of competition authorities and civil courts, as well as at (the lack of) class action procedures from the perspective of the interaction of public and private enforcement of competition law.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 31-47
Author(s):  
Ondrej Blažo

The paper will focus on requirements and thresholds set for the judiciary by the Damages Directive. Answered will also be questions on the specialization of courts and its application in Central and Eastern European (CEE) Member States of the EU, as well as on the involvement of national competition authorities (NCAs) in court proceedings. The paper provides also general thoughts regarding the specialization of courts and confronts them with the judiciary structure in CEE Member States in the context of private enforcement of competition law. While there is no uniform model of a judicial system, the paper provides a critical analysis of the centralization, specialization and decentralization of private enforcement models, taking into account also the importance of the training of judges. The relationship between NCAs and courts will be discussed whereby the role of NCAs in private enforcement defines the responsibility of the given public authority in private enforcement as a country’s policymaker.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 181-194
Author(s):  
Raimundas Moisejevas

The article focuses on the novelties introduced by the Damages Directive in the field of consensual settlements of disputes concerning private enforcement. The Damages Directive obliges Member States to ensure that the limitation period for bringing an action for damages is suspended for the duration of any consensual dispute resolution process. The Directive also establishes the main principles that govern the effect of consensual settlements on subsequent actions for damages. Since the EU framework for consensual dispute resolution of private enforcement disputes is quite new, many issues must still be solved in Member States’ practice. While analysing consensual dispute resolution in private enforcement cases, particular interest should be paid to mediation and arbitration as a form of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). Mediation is often used in competition law litigation. In a mediation process, parties are subject to fewer legal costs than in litigation and arbitration. It may thus be concluded that consensual dispute resolution is usually a faster way to receive compensation. However, voluntary arrangements and ADR in competition law still raise many problems concerning both procedural and substantial legal acts


Law Review ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 342
Author(s):  
Carissa Christybella Wijaya ◽  
Micheline Hendrito ◽  
Monica Patricia Aripratama ◽  
Udin Silalahi

<div class="WordSection1"><p><em>KPPU (Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition) as the authority for business competition law in Indonesia still has many shortcomings. This is related to the KPPU’s failure to accommodate compensation payments to victims of business competition law violations. This can happen because Indonesia has only provided room for public enforcement to be implemented. In public enforcement, compensation payments are not paid directly to consumers who have suffered losses but instead come into the state treasury. This article discusses the compensation mechanism that should be received by victims of competition law violations through private enforcement, which is a mechanism for enforcing competition law by using the regulations of the Competition Law in civil courts to demand compensation. This research was conducted with the aim of creating a healthy business competition climate through the enforcement of private enforcement in Indonesia by implementing harmonization between public and private enforcement. In this article, the Authors used normative juridical method and refers to statutory and comparative approaches. The research method used is juridical normative with a statute approach, a case approach, and a comparative legal approach. The results and conclusions of this study are that the KPPU's failure to provide compensation for compensation to victims of business competition violations encourages the need to implement private enforcement in Indonesia which is harmonized with the previous mechanism, namely public enforcement.</em></p><p><strong>Bahasa Indonesia Abstrak: </strong>KPPU (Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha) sebagai lembaga otoritas dalam hukum persaingan usaha di Indonesia masih memiliki banyak kekurangan. Salah satunya terkait dengan kegagalan KPPU dalam mengakomodir pembayaran ganti rugi kepada korban pelanggaran hukum persaingan usaha. Hal ini dapat terjadi karena selama ini Indonesia hanya memberikan ruang bagi <em>public enforcement</em> untuk diterapkan. Dalam <em>public enforcement</em>, pembayaran ganti rugi tidak dibayarkan langsung kepada konsumen yang dirugikan melainkan masuk ke dalam kas negara. Oleh sebab itu, terdapat sebuah urgensi untuk mengalihfungsikan fungsi kompensasi dari KPPU kepada pelaku usaha melalui <em>private enforcement</em>, yaitu sebuah mekanisme penegakan hukum persaingan usaha dengan menggunakan regulasi UU Persaingan Usaha di peradilan perdata untuk menuntut ganti rugi. Penelitian ini dilakukan dengan tujuan untuk menciptakan iklim persaingan usaha yang sehat melalui ditegakkannya <em>private enforcement</em> di Indonesia dengan menerapkan harmonisasi antara <em>public enforcement</em> dan <em>private enforcement</em>. Metode penelitian yang digunakan, yaitu yuridis normatif dengan pendekatan undang-undang, pendekatan kasus, dan pendekatan komparatif hukum. Hasil dan kesimpulan dari penelitian ini adalah kegagalan KPPU dalam memberikan kompensasi ganti rugi kepada korban pelanggaran persaingan usaha mendorong perlu diterapkannya <em>private enforcement</em> di Indonesia yang diharmonisasikan dengan mekanisme sebelumnya, yaitu <em>public enforcement.</em></p></div>


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