scholarly journals PENEGAKAN HUKUM PERSAINGAN USAHA DI INDONESIA MELALUI HARMONISASI PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT DAN PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT [Competition Law Enforcement in Indonesia through the Harmonization of Public Enforcement and Private Enforcement]

Law Review ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 342
Author(s):  
Carissa Christybella Wijaya ◽  
Micheline Hendrito ◽  
Monica Patricia Aripratama ◽  
Udin Silalahi
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Compensation Mechanism ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement ◽  
Civil Courts ◽  
Compensation Payments

<div class="WordSection1"><p><em>KPPU (Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition) as the authority for business competition law in Indonesia still has many shortcomings. This is related to the KPPU’s failure to accommodate compensation payments to victims of business competition law violations. This can happen because Indonesia has only provided room for public enforcement to be implemented. In public enforcement, compensation payments are not paid directly to consumers who have suffered losses but instead come into the state treasury. This article discusses the compensation mechanism that should be received by victims of competition law violations through private enforcement, which is a mechanism for enforcing competition law by using the regulations of the Competition Law in civil courts to demand compensation. This research was conducted with the aim of creating a healthy business competition climate through the enforcement of private enforcement in Indonesia by implementing harmonization between public and private enforcement. In this article, the Authors used normative juridical method and refers to statutory and comparative approaches. The research method used is juridical normative with a statute approach, a case approach, and a comparative legal approach. The results and conclusions of this study are that the KPPU's failure to provide compensation for compensation to victims of business competition violations encourages the need to implement private enforcement in Indonesia which is harmonized with the previous mechanism, namely public enforcement.</em></p><p><strong>Bahasa Indonesia Abstrak: </strong>KPPU (Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha) sebagai lembaga otoritas dalam hukum persaingan usaha di Indonesia masih memiliki banyak kekurangan. Salah satunya terkait dengan kegagalan KPPU dalam mengakomodir pembayaran ganti rugi kepada korban pelanggaran hukum persaingan usaha. Hal ini dapat terjadi karena selama ini Indonesia hanya memberikan ruang bagi <em>public enforcement</em> untuk diterapkan. Dalam <em>public enforcement</em>, pembayaran ganti rugi tidak dibayarkan langsung kepada konsumen yang dirugikan melainkan masuk ke dalam kas negara. Oleh sebab itu, terdapat sebuah urgensi untuk mengalihfungsikan fungsi kompensasi dari KPPU kepada pelaku usaha melalui <em>private enforcement</em>, yaitu sebuah mekanisme penegakan hukum persaingan usaha dengan menggunakan regulasi UU Persaingan Usaha di peradilan perdata untuk menuntut ganti rugi. Penelitian ini dilakukan dengan tujuan untuk menciptakan iklim persaingan usaha yang sehat melalui ditegakkannya <em>private enforcement</em> di Indonesia dengan menerapkan harmonisasi antara <em>public enforcement</em> dan <em>private enforcement</em>. Metode penelitian yang digunakan, yaitu yuridis normatif dengan pendekatan undang-undang, pendekatan kasus, dan pendekatan komparatif hukum. Hasil dan kesimpulan dari penelitian ini adalah kegagalan KPPU dalam memberikan kompensasi ganti rugi kepada korban pelanggaran persaingan usaha mendorong perlu diterapkannya <em>private enforcement</em> di Indonesia yang diharmonisasikan dengan mekanisme sebelumnya, yaitu <em>public enforcement.</em></p></div>

Modelling Public and Private Enforcement

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-24
Author(s):  
Kit Barker
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement ◽  
Moral Economic

Achieving a workable, hybrid model of competition law enforcement that is sensitive to both instrumental and non-instrumental ends and which commands broad, cross-jurisdictional support always struck me as a tall order. For one thing, it required a keen understanding of the nature of competition law wrongs, which sit awkwardly at the turnstile between public and private law. The enforcement processes of competition law have also evolved in very different social and historical contexts, the United States being an environment in which regulatory agencies have historically been regarded with scepticism (if not downright distrust) and Europe being a centralised bureaucracy in which they have tended to be regarded as the paradigm. Most challengingly of all, the project required a theory of ‘holism’ capable of explaining how it is possible to reconcile complex moral, economic and social objectives within a singular enforcement system, or (more accurately) within a linked network of distinct law enforcement systems.

scholarly journals Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions and Current Changes of Slovak Competition and Civil Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 259-272
Author(s):  
Ondrej Blažo
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Production Chain ◽  
New Approach ◽  
The Third ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Civil Courts

Slovak competition law enforcement can be characterized by infrequency of leniency applications and near absence of private enforcement. As a result, the adoption of the Damages D irective is not likely to cause substantial breakthrough in Slovakia, be it with respect to the rate of leniency applications or in private enforcement. A comprehensive amendment of Slovak competition law took place in 2014. Changes introduced therein reflected, among other things, the practice of the European Commission regarding access to its file. A new approach was also introduced towards damages claims submitted against leniency applicants. The paper will first consider the question whether it is necessary to further redesign these new Slovak rules because of the adoption of the Damages Directive, or if they have been successfully pre-harmonized. Along with changes to Slovak competition law, procedural rules for civil courts were also re-codified. Hence the second part of this analysis will focus on the question if a new civil procedure framework, including obligatory harmonization, could foster private enforcement of competition law. Summarizing the resulting answers, the third question focuses on who could benefit from further changes to Slovak legislation – final consumers or enterprises that are involved in the production chain. Finally, will changes in Slovak legislation driven by the Directive be coherent with its overall legal system, or will they appear to be an odd and peculiar piece of legislation?

scholarly journals The Interaction of Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Lithuania

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 237-257
Author(s):  
Rimantas Antanas Stanikunas ◽  
Arunas Burinskas
Keyword(s):  
Economic Effect ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Causal Link ◽  
Antitrust Policy ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement ◽  
Leniency Programme

This paper provides a study of the interaction between public and private enforcement of Lithuanian antitrust law. The study refers to the Damages Directive. It has been found that private enforcement depends greatly on public enforcement of competition law. Therefore, their compatibility and balance are of great importance to antitrust policy. The Lithuanian NCA prioritises cases where an economic effect on competition does not have to be proven. This creates uncertainty about the outcome of private enforcement cases. Private enforcement in Lithuania is also in need of detailed rules on the identification of harm and causality. The analysis reveals how challenging it can be to estimate and prove harm or a causal link in private enforcement cases. Support from the NCA is therefore exceedingly needed. Moreover, even though the use of the leniency programme helps, it remains insufficient to solve the problem of under-deterrence. However, measures introduced by the Damages Directive do not make the leniency programme safe.

scholarly journals The Interaction Between Public and Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law: a Case Study of the Swedish Booking Cases

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (21) ◽  
pp. 55-70
Author(s):  
Katharina Voss ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Standard Of Proof ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement

This article studies the private enforcement conducted in Visita v Booking from the perspective of the interaction between public and private enforcement of competition law. This case concerned the question whether the narrow MFN clauses maintained by Booking were contrary to Article 101 TFEU and could therefore be prohibited by a Swedish court. The focus of this article is placed on the assessment carried out by the Swedish courts to determine whether the MFN clauses were restrictive of competition by effect and on the standard of proof attached to the claimant in this regard. With regard to the interaction between public and private enforcement, Visita v. Booking is viewed as an illustration of the increased complexity of competition policy, in particular were novel practices are at issue

Part I Introduction, 1 Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wijckmans Frank ◽  
Tuytschaever Filip
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Public ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement ◽  
The Eu

This chapter explains the term ‘vertical agreements’ and what it covers. It addresses a number of general issues that are relevant to the EU competition law treatment of vertical agreements in general. It describes the implementation and the (public and private) enforcement of Article 101 TFEU before and after the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003. The chapter provides the historical background of both Regulation 330/2010 and Regulation 461/2010. In particular, it devotes specific attention to the nature and legal and practical consequences of soft EU competition law (in the form of notices, guidelines, etc) as opposed to hard EU competition law (provisions of primary and secondary EU law).

Part I EU Competition Law Private Enforcement and the Antitrust Damages Directive, 2 Promotion and Harmonization of Antitrust Damages Claims by Directive 2014/104/EU?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodger Barry ◽  
Ferro Miguel Sousa ◽  
Marcos Francisco
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Member States ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Eu Competition Law

This chapter explains the contents and goals of the Antitrust Damages Directive (Directive 2014/104/EU), the corollary of the EU’s policy towards the promotion and facilitation of private enforcement of competition law. It first traces the evolution in EU competition law enforcement and policy that led to the adoption of the Directive before considering the goals of the Directive in more detail, namely to provide rules for the effective compensation of victims of antitrust infringements and to harmonize some rules concerning damages claims. It then examines the Directive’s legal basis under EU Law as well as substantive provisions, including those relating to compensatory principles, quantification of harm, and consensual dispute resolution. The chapter goes on to highlight neglected issues, limitations, and inherent biases regarding the scope and nature of the Directive’s rules and concludes with an analysis of issues arising from implementation of the Directive in Member States.

Skanska: are jurisdiction challenges now an impossible undertaking?

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-103
Author(s):  
Andrew Leitch
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Member State ◽  
National Court ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Public ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Industrial Solutions

Claimants in private damages actions following on from European Commission cartel decisions are often faced with a choice of jurisdiction in which to pursue their claims. However, seising jurisdiction in the national court of a desired Member State can require the claim to be pursued against an anchor defendant that is not an addressee of a Commission decision. This may, in the English courts, give rise to various disputes as to the role of that non-addressee defendant in the cartel and, accordingly, whether a claim can in fact be sustained as against that defendant. The Court of Justice's recent judgment in Vantaan Kaupunki v Skanska Industrial Solutions potentially relieves claimants from the burden of having to establish that the non-addressee defendant participated in, or implemented, the cartel in order to sustain a claim against it, by holding that it is entire undertakings that are liable for compensation in private damages actions. The Skanska judgment harmonizes the scope of liability under the public and private spheres of EU competition law enforcement and has potentially significant ramifications for competition litigation in the English courts.

Rule of Law Values in the Decentralized Public Enforcement of EU Competition Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katalin J Cseres
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Governance Model ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Consistent Application ◽  
The Eu

This chapter evaluates the functioning of the decentralized public enforcement of EU competition law. The analysis focuses on the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement, which relies on Rule of Law principles. It has been argued that Rule of Law principles are a prerequisite for effective competition law enforcement. Aside from that, assessing the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement framework also takes account of the problems of multilevel governance which have emerged as a result of the decentralization of enforcement powers and the creation of parallel competences for the Commission and national actors which made it essential to guarantee uniform and consistent application of the EU competition rules. Centrifugal pulls from the Member States towards their national legal systems and centripetal pushes from the Commission create uniformity and consistency in this multilevel system. Analysing these bottom-up and top-down approaches allows us to analyse decentralized enforcement as a specific governance model.

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