Russia in B. Obama's Foreign Policy Strategy: Continuation and Renovation

Author(s):  
E. Solov’ev

Unlike his predecessors, Barak Obama is bound to work amidst global balance of power rapidly changing to the disfavor of American interests. All attempts of the U.S. to build an unipolar world under its domination have failed. Obama is vigorously seeking to restructure U.S.–Russia relations; however, the divergence of interests in many fields is evident, and neither Washington nor Moscow can agree on the partnership as formulated by the other side.

Author(s):  
Trinh T. Minh-ha

This chapter discusses the problem of an exit strategy during the final days of the George W. Bush administration and how these issues echo the U.S. policy on Vietnam of many years before. It goes further, however, to analyze how the Obama administration approached future conflict in its initial years. On the one hand, the Bush administration's official storyline had revived the familiar paranoia of having victory turned over to the enemies. On the other, the exit strategy for withdrawal also raised widespread doubt about what was achievable in Iraq and Afghanistan and what the comprehensive results of the Iraq War turned out to be. The classic double bind thus wrote itself into every discussion of the “post-Iraq” era of U.S. foreign policy.


1976 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
George C. Edwards

Presidential prestige or popularity has often been cited as an important source of presidential influence in Congress. It has not been empirically and systematically demonstrated, however, that such a relationship exists. This study examines a variety of relationships between presidential prestige and presidential support in the U.S. House of Representatives. The relationships between overall national presidential popularity on the one hand and overall, domestic, and foreign policy presidential support in the House as a whole and among various groups of congressmen on the other are generally weak. Consistently strong relationships are found between presidential prestige among Democratic party identifiers and presidential support among Democratic congressmen. Similar relationships are found between presidential prestige among the more partisan Republican party identifiers and the presidential support by Republican congressmen. Explanations for these findings are presented, and the findings are related to broader questions of American politics.


2020 ◽  
pp. 112-153
Author(s):  
Vanessa Walker

This chapter addresses U.S. relations with Chile during the Carter administration as an avenue to explore the innate tensions within a policy that simultaneously sought to promote human rights abroad and champion nonintervention. The administration, seeking to appeal to both domestic and international constituencies, sought an approach that balanced distancing the U.S. government from the Pinochet regime, maintaining pressure to improve human rights, and avoiding overt interference in domestic Chilean affairs, which could prompt a nationalist backlash. The competing demands of demonstrating to domestic audiences a cooler relationship with the Pinochet regime on the one hand, and implementing a human rights policy that would improve conditions in Chile on the other, shaped and at times undermined the Carter administration's efforts. The administration was always aware that its leverage was limited and that regime change from without was not a primary objective. The assassination of former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C., on September 21, 1976, highlighted the tensions between the domestic and foreign policy objectives of the administration's human rights policy.


1989 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Evangelista

In the study of comparative foreign policy, two schools of thought disagree over what accounts for variations in processes and outcomes of foreign policies within and between states. One holds that differences in the characteristics of the countries in question lead to differences in their foreign policies. The other argues that the important differences are not between countries but between issue-areas. A comparison of the Soviet Union and the United States in the issue-area of military policy (in particular, the process of weapons innovation) suggests that the policy processes differ substantially, contrary to what an issue-area approach would predict. On the other hand, the distinctions made by some students of political economy who focus on domestic structures appear to account well for differences between the U.S. and Soviet processes of innovation. The domestic structural approach should be applied to the study of comparative military policy as well as foreign economic policy.


2003 ◽  
pp. 133-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mirjana Radojicic

The nature of the international politics, after the Cold War directed by the U.S. as the only current super-power, are considered in the text. The author?s intention is to stress the main points of divergence between moralistic-valuable rhetoric and the foreign policy practice of the U.S. In that sense, the examples of the American stand, i.e. the active treatment of the Yugoslav crisis, on the one hand, and the crisis in the Persian Gulf, on the other hand, is considered. The author?s conclusion is that the foreign policy of the only current super-power is still directed by interests rather then by values. In the concluding part, the author presents an anthropologic argument in favor of reestablishing "balance of power" as the only guarantee for peace and stability of the world.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-69
Author(s):  
Gerda Jakstaite

Abstract Traditionally, Containment and Engagement strategies are considered to be the part of the United States foreign policy during the Cold War. However, recent developments in international relations indicated that these strategies are still relevant to the contemporary foreign policy of the U.S., particularly in the U.S.-Russian relations. Contradictory presidency of George W. Bush has raised a question which of the mentioned foreign policy strategies was dominating in the U.S.-Russian relations. On the one hand, U.S. officials had declared that partnership with Russia was being pursued. On the other hand, the administration of G.W. Bush favored the expansion of NATO and did not surrender the initiative of missile defense shield. This paper intends to assess which foreign policy strategy (Containment or Engagement) dominated in U.S.-Russian relations during the presidency of G.W. Bush and to analyse reasons of such domination and the ways these strategies were implemented. The results of the research indicate that G. W. Bush administration implemented different foreign policy towards Russia on the declared and practical foreign policy levels. If on the official U.S. foreign policy level Russia’s engagement strategy dominated, in the U.S. foreign policy practice, particularly influenced by the foreign policy of Russia, and to a lesser extent by the events in the international arena, the dominant foreign policy strategy towards Russia was Russia’s containment strategy.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Young

This article revisits the creation of NSC 68, a landmark in Cold War history, in the light of continuing historical debates and with the assistance of archival material recently made available. The article reviews the historiography of NSC 68, including controversies over the language adopted, together with recent writings that stress a broader political economy analysis of U.S. foreign policy. The article revisits the contested issue of whether NSC 68 represented continuity with past policy or a sharp departure from it. In addressing this issue, the article looks closely at the style and tone of the document as well as its impact on the U.S. defense budget and finally its convergence with the other transformative decision of the time, the commitment of resources to the development of the hydrogen bomb.


2016 ◽  
Vol 02 (01) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Zhao Gancheng

Triangle relationships usually occur between three parties that are neither friends nor allies. The subtle nature of the triangle, wherein change of one pair of bilateral ties impacts the other two geopolitically, is determined by many factors, among which pursuit for balance of power in the changing landscape of geopolitics is usually the most decisive. In this context, the interactions among China, the U.S. and India in recent years seem to have brought up the birth of a new triangle in international politics. It is the U.S. that pushed for this interactive formula in the first place when India’s role and function as a counterweighing element was perceived. The dynamics have remained unchanged since the U.S. decided to make a nuclear deal with India despite various difficulties. However, China, the subject against which India was seen as a counterweight, is trying to keep itself away from the game in order to diminish the impacts of these interactions. Dealing with the other two nations separately, China continues to work on improving and redefining China-India relations not because of closer U.S.-Indian ties, but rather, because of its perception of India’s status as both its close neighbor and another rising power. This particular situation puts India in a position to play its own balancing game to maximize its self-interests. India’s pursuit for global power status will be promoted by its attempts toward achieving economic growth and military buildup. In both areas, India is likely to obtain more leverage in keeping a balanced approach to handling China and the U.S. In that sense, the geopolitical model between the three is already taking shape, if only perceptually, though it is still far away from substantial operation in real politik terms. Given the different sizes and power statuses of China and India, the U.S. may find it difficult to manage its relations with both nations, and the future of the triangle will thus remain largely uncertain.


Author(s):  
K.H. Westmacott

Life beyond 1MeV – like life after 40 – is not too different unless one takes advantage of past experience and is receptive to new opportunities. At first glance, the returns on performing electron microscopy at voltages greater than 1MeV diminish rather rapidly as the curves which describe the well-known advantages of HVEM often tend towards saturation. However, in a country with a significant HVEM capability, a good case can be made for investing in instruments with a range of maximum accelerating voltages. In this regard, the 1.5MeV KRATOS HVEM being installed in Berkeley will complement the other 650KeV, 1MeV, and 1.2MeV instruments currently operating in the U.S. One other consideration suggests that 1.5MeV is an optimum voltage machine – Its additional advantages may be purchased for not much more than a 1MeV instrument. On the other hand, the 3MeV HVEM's which seem to be operated at 2MeV maximum, are much more expensive.


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