scholarly journals O Tratado de Livre Comércio Peru e EUA: grupos de influência, ganhadores e perdedores

2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Fábio Borges ◽  
Edith Venero Ferro
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Decisive Role ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Negotiation Process ◽  
General Terms ◽  
Central Hypothesis ◽  
The Us ◽  
Strategic Role

Este artigo analisa o Tratado de Livre Comércio (TCL) firmado entre Peru e EUA em 2009. Começa por abrir um diálogo entre as teorias econômicas e de relações internacionais sobre os benefícios e custos de um TLC. Posteriormente fizemos uso do modelo Putnam para avaliar o processo decisório e que grupos de influência foram decisivos na assinatura do TLC. A hipótese central foi que o Consejo Empresarial de Negociaciones Internacionales (CENI) peruano teve papel determinante na ratificação do acordo. Para demonstrar que o CENI foi decisivo no processo de negociação, escolhemos trabalhar com os seguintes indicadores: (i) a interação privilegiada entre a elite decisória; (ii) a interação com a equipe burocrática-decisória; (iii) a interação com os membros do Congresso e; (iv) a interação com os meios de comunicação. Por fim fazemos uma reflexão sobre possíveis ganhadores e perdedores do TLC Peru EUA. A pregunta central que consideramos pertinente é se os grupos que influenciaram esse acordo expressariam o interesse nacional peruano em termos mais gerais. O papel estratégico do uso do argumento das vantagens comparativas e o modelo Putnam foram convenientes para se analisar o processo de assinatura do TLC Peru e EUA.Palavras-Chave: Peru; EUA; TLC; Grupos de InteressePeru-USA Free Trade Agreement: influence groups, winners and losersAbstractThis article analyses the Free Trade Agreement (TCL) signed between Peru and the US in 2009. It begins by opening a dialogue between economic and international relations theories about the benefits and costs of an FTA. Later we used the Putnam model to evaluate the decision-making process and which influence groups were decisive in signing the TLC. The central hypothesis was that the Peruvian Negotiating Business Negotiations Council (CENI) played a decisive role in ratifying the agreement. To demonstrate that the CENI was decisive in the negotiation process, we chose to work with the following indicators: (i) the privileged interaction between the decision-making elite; (ii) interaction with the bureaucratic-decision-making team; (iii) interaction with members of Congress; (iv) interaction with the media. Finally, we reflect on potential winners and losers of the US-Peru FTA. The central question that we consider pertinent is whether the groups that influenced the process of decision making would express the national interest of Peru in more general terms. The strategic role of using the comparative advantage argument and the Putnam model were convenient to analyse the signing process of the Peru and US FTA.El Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Perú y EEUU: grupos de influencia, ganadores y perdedoresResumenEste artículo analiza el Tratado de Libre Comercio (TCL) firmado entre Perú y Estados Unidos en 2009. Comienza por abrir un diálogo entre las teorías económicas y las relaciones internacionales sobre los beneficios y costos de un TLC. Posteriormente hicimos uso del modelo Putnam para evaluar el proceso decisorio y qué grupos de influencia fueron decisivos en la firma del TLC. La hipótesis central fue que el Consejo Empresarial de Negociaciones Internacionales (CENI) peruano tuvo un papel determinante en la ratificación del acuerdo. Para demostrar que el CENI fue decisivo en el proceso de negociación, elegimos trabajar con los siguientes indicadores: (i) la interacción privilegiada entre la elite decisoria; (ii) la interacción con el equipo burocrático-decisorio; (iii) la interacción con los miembros del Congreso y; (iv) la interacción con los medios de comunicación. Finalmente, hacemos una reflexión sobre posibles ganadores y perdedores del TLC Perú. La pregunta central que consideramos pertinente es si los grupos que influenciaran ese acuerdo expresarían el interés nacional peruano en términos más generales. El papel estratégico del uso del argumento de las ventajas comparativas y el modelo Putnam fueron convenientes para analizar el proceso de firma del TLC Perú y EEUU.

On Re-invigorating the Australia-China Free Trade Agreement Negotiation Process

2013 ◽  
pp. 672-696 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ling Ling He
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Negotiation Process ◽  
Government Procurement ◽  
Procurement Contracts ◽  
The Way

Driven by both economic and geopolitical imperatives, negotiation of the Australia-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) has been slow and difficult. The negotiation process has reached an impasse since the latest round took place in March 2012. Major reasons for this include difficulties encountered in negotiating on agriculture, services, investment, and government procurement contracts and surrounding populist resistance from both Australian and Chinese domestic constituencies. Following more than eight years of negotiations and establishment of closer trade related ties, there is a lot at stake for both countries in the outcome of these discussions. This paper examines these issues and of the way forward towards a workable negotiation process.

The US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement

2005 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
JEAN F. CROMBOIS
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
The Us

Multilateralism compromised: the mysterious origins of GATT Article XXIV

2006 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
KERRY CHASE
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Cold War ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Free Trade Area ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Area ◽  
Policy Ideas ◽  
The Us

The GATT treaty's loophole for free trade areas in Article XXIV has puzzled and deceived prominent scholars, who trace its postwar origins to US aspirations to promote European integration and efforts to persuade developing countries to endorse the Havana Charter. Drawing from archival records, this article shows that in fact US policymakers crafted the controversial provisions of Article XXIV to accommodate a trade treaty they had secretly reached with Canada. As a result, the free trade area exemption was embedded in the GATT–WTO regime, even though neither the Havana Charter nor the US–Canada free trade agreement was ever ratified. Theoretically, the case is an important example of how Cold War exigencies altered the policy ideas of US officials.

The Political Dynamics of Agricultural Liberalisation in the US-Chile Free Trade Agreement

2008 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
JESSICA LEIGHT
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Liberalisation ◽  
Trade Negotiations ◽  
Economic Costs ◽  
Price Supports ◽  
The Us

AbstractThe 2003 US-Chile free trade agreement, regarded by many as consistent with Chile's long-held trade liberalisation strategy, nonetheless engendered a surprisingly vigorous debate focused on the proposed elimination of the bandas de precio protecting traditional agricultural crops. Opposition to the agreement, mounted by the conservative Alianza por Chile, offers an intriguing political case study that suggests that populist posturing surrounding free trade agreements may persist long after a trade liberalisation strategy has become well-established. This article argues that agricultural liberalisation will be a significant challenge for Chile's governing coalition if it wishes to pursue trade negotiations while seeking to avoid costly political battles at home over the economic costs of abandoning price supports and the challenges of ‘reconverting’ to an export-oriented sector. Even given the strong elite consensus around trade liberalisation in Chile, the interconnections between sectoral interest groups, domestic politics and trade negotiations remain relevant, and deserving of analytical attention.

Power of discourse in free trade agreement negotiation

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-455
Author(s):  
Yan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Technology Transfer ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Incomplete Contracts ◽  
Legal Culture ◽  
Normative Values ◽  
The Us ◽  
Political Stance ◽  
Domestic Law

AbstractThis article illustrates the power of discourse in free trade agreement (FTA) negotiation, elucidating the concept from the perspective of a country’s abilities of rule control, rule assimilation and rule contestation. To enhance rule control, the G2 (the US and EU) have chosen their FTA partners, designed the FTA rules, and offered offensive-defensive exchange strategically. They have approached weak or trade-dependent parties first in FTA negotiation, innovated new rules to accelerate FTA negotiation, skillfully constructed intentional ambiguity and exemptions to remove rule discrepancies and made offensive-defensive exchange with their negotiating parties. Some of these strategies have been copied by China although in a different way. Further, a template approach for negotiating an FTA and exporting domestic laws and normative values to others contributes to the G2’s rule assimilation. A de facto FTA template has also been established by China recently, but its legal culture and political stance have led it to sign incomplete contracts and tolerate rule differences with its negotiating parties instead of transposition of domestic law. In facing the rival rules adopted by their competitors, the G2 have incorporated counteractive rules in their FTAs with their competitors’ close trading nations. China has also contested rules treating China as a non-market economy in its FTAs, but its stance toward state-owned enterprises (SOE) disciplines and rules forbidding forced technology transfer is milder due to its lack of experience in dealing with unfavourable rules.

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