On Re-invigorating the Australia-China Free Trade Agreement Negotiation Process

Author(s):  
Ling Ling He

Driven by both economic and geopolitical imperatives, negotiation of the Australia-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) has been slow and difficult. The negotiation process has reached an impasse since the latest round took place in March 2012. Major reasons for this include difficulties encountered in negotiating on agriculture, services, investment, and government procurement contracts and surrounding populist resistance from both Australian and Chinese domestic constituencies. Following more than eight years of negotiations and establishment of closer trade related ties, there is a lot at stake for both countries in the outcome of these discussions. This paper examines these issues and of the way forward towards a workable negotiation process.

Author(s):  
Benjamin Enahoro Assay

The failure of some African Union member-nations including Nigeria to endorse the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) that would create one of the largest free trade areas in the world has provoked a lot of controversies that are yet to be resolved. While some of the relevant stakeholders in the countries that have refused to sign the treaty are urging the heads of their countries' governments to withhold assent until when all the contending issues regarding the AfCFTA are amicably settled, others desire to have the agreement signed in order to harness its benefits for the continent. As the controversies rage, it appears that the implementation of the much awaited agreement has been put on hold, thus thwarting the progress of the continent. This chapter therefore wades through the controversies and points the way ahead for the AfCFTA to be acceptable by all.


2004 ◽  
Vol 111 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-45
Author(s):  
Justin Malbon

This article argues that the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) selectively recognises and affirms international conventions and agreements that promote the narrow economic self-interests of powerful groups. It does this whilst disregarding those international instruments — including the Convention on Biological Diversity and the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity — that seek to recognise and promote the cultural and intellectual property rights of Indigenous people. Although AUSFTA does make some concessions for Indigenous interests by providing negative exemptions from the chapters dealing with trade in services, government procurement and investment, these concessions are relatively weak in the face of the Agreement's pursuit of free trade. Using the model of Chapter 19, which imposes positive obligations on the United States and Australia to promote environmental interests, it is proposed that future Australian FTAs should enunciate positive obligations for Australia's Indigenous people.


Author(s):  
Fábio Borges ◽  
Edith Venero Ferro

Este artigo analisa o Tratado de Livre Comércio (TCL) firmado entre Peru e EUA em 2009. Começa por abrir um diálogo entre as teorias econômicas e de relações internacionais sobre os benefícios e custos de um TLC. Posteriormente fizemos uso do modelo Putnam para avaliar o processo decisório e que grupos de influência foram decisivos na assinatura do TLC. A hipótese central foi que o Consejo Empresarial de Negociaciones Internacionales (CENI) peruano teve papel determinante na ratificação do acordo. Para demonstrar que o CENI foi decisivo no processo de negociação, escolhemos trabalhar com os seguintes indicadores: (i) a interação privilegiada entre a elite decisória; (ii) a interação com a equipe burocrática-decisória; (iii) a interação com os membros do Congresso e; (iv) a interação com os meios de comunicação. Por fim fazemos uma reflexão sobre possíveis ganhadores e perdedores do TLC Peru EUA. A pregunta central que consideramos pertinente é se os grupos que influenciaram esse acordo expressariam o interesse nacional peruano em termos mais gerais. O papel estratégico do uso do argumento das vantagens comparativas e o modelo Putnam foram convenientes para se analisar o processo de assinatura do TLC Peru e EUA.Palavras-Chave: Peru; EUA; TLC; Grupos de InteressePeru-USA Free Trade Agreement: influence groups, winners and losersAbstractThis article analyses the Free Trade Agreement (TCL) signed between Peru and the US in 2009. It begins by opening a dialogue between economic and international relations theories about the benefits and costs of an FTA. Later we used the Putnam model to evaluate the decision-making process and which influence groups were decisive in signing the TLC. The central hypothesis was that the Peruvian Negotiating Business Negotiations Council (CENI) played a decisive role in ratifying the agreement. To demonstrate that the CENI was decisive in the negotiation process, we chose to work with the following indicators: (i) the privileged interaction between the decision-making elite; (ii) interaction with the bureaucratic-decision-making team; (iii) interaction with members of Congress; (iv) interaction with the media. Finally, we reflect on potential winners and losers of the US-Peru FTA. The central question that we consider pertinent is whether the groups that influenced the process of decision making would express the national interest of Peru in more general terms. The strategic role of using the comparative advantage argument and the Putnam model were convenient to analyse the signing process of the Peru and US FTA.El Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Perú y EEUU: grupos de influencia, ganadores y perdedoresResumenEste artículo analiza el Tratado de Libre Comercio (TCL) firmado entre Perú y Estados Unidos en 2009. Comienza por abrir un diálogo entre las teorías económicas y las relaciones internacionales sobre los beneficios y costos de un TLC. Posteriormente hicimos uso del modelo Putnam para evaluar el proceso decisorio y qué grupos de influencia fueron decisivos en la firma del TLC. La hipótesis central fue que el Consejo Empresarial de Negociaciones Internacionales (CENI) peruano tuvo un papel determinante en la ratificación del acuerdo. Para demostrar que el CENI fue decisivo en el proceso de negociación, elegimos trabajar con los siguientes indicadores: (i) la interacción privilegiada entre la elite decisoria; (ii) la interacción con el equipo burocrático-decisorio; (iii) la interacción con los miembros del Congreso y; (iv) la interacción con los medios de comunicación. Finalmente, hacemos una reflexión sobre posibles ganadores y perdedores del TLC Perú. La pregunta central que consideramos pertinente es si los grupos que influenciaran ese acuerdo expresarían el interés nacional peruano en términos más generales. El papel estratégico del uso del argumento de las ventajas comparativas y el modelo Putnam fueron convenientes para analizar el proceso de firma del TLC Perú y EEUU.


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