scholarly journals Santo Tomás de Aquino y el Motor inmóvil / Aquinas and the Unmoved Mover

2011 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 123
Author(s):  
David TORRIJOS CASTRILLEJO
Keyword(s):  
Final Cause ◽  
Efficient Cause ◽  
The World ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias

Alexander of Aphrodisias understood the Aristotle ́s Unmoved Mover as efficient cause only to the extent that it is the final cause of heaven, which by moving strives to imitate the divine rest. Aquinas seems to agree with him. However his interpretation is original and philosophically more satisfactory: God is the efficient cause of the world, not only as creator, but also as it ́s ruler. In this way God is also the final cause.

A Cosmos Without a Creator

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-42
Author(s):  
Pietro Daniel Omodeo ◽  
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
Close Reading ◽  
Final Cause ◽  
Efficient Cause ◽  
The World ◽  
University Professor ◽  
Idea Of God

In the years after the first circulation of Sidereus Nuncius, Galileo’s Padua anti-Copernican colleague, the staunch Aristotelian philosopher, Cesare Cremonini, published a book on ‘traditional’ cosmology, Disputatio de coelo in tres partes divisa (Venice, 1613) which puzzled the Roman authorities of the Inquisition and the Index much more than any works on celestial novelties and ‘neo-Pythagorean’ astronomy. Cremonini’s disputation on the heavens has the form of an over-intricate comment of Aristotle’s conceptions, in the typi­cally argumentative style of Scholasticism. Nonetheless, it immediately raised the concern of Cardinal Bellarmin, the Pope and other Inquisitors. At a close reading, Cremonini’s interpretation of Aristotle’s cosmos proved radically anti- Christian. It represented a radicalization of Pomponazzian Alexandrism. In fact, Cremonini did not only circulate Aristotelian principles used by Pom­ponazzi to argue for the soul’s mortality (first, no thought is possible without imagination and the latter faculty is dependent on the body; secondly, all that is generated will eventually perish). He also wiped away all transcendence from the Aristotelian cosmos. In fact, he marginalized the function of the motive Intelligences by explaining heavenly motions through the action of animal-like inseparable souls although he did not erase nor reduced all Intelligences to only one, in accordance with Alexander. Also, he put at the center of Aristotle’s cosmos the idea of its eternity, a thesis which he explicitly connected with the rejection of the idea of God the Creator. Cremonini assumed that the univer­sal efficiens, that is the efficient cause of all motion and change in the world, is nothing but the first heaven. As a result of this radically naturalist reading of Aristotle, he banned God from the cosmos, reduced Him to the final cause of the world, and deprived Him of any efficiency and will. This essay on less ex­plored sources of Renaissance astronomical debates considers the institutional, cultural and religious setting of Cremonini’s teaching and conceptions. It as­sesses the reasons for his troubles with the religious authorities, and the politi­cal support he was granted by the Serenissima Republic of Venice inspite of the scandalous opinions he circulated as a university professor. My reconstruction of his views is based on the Disputatio de coelo of 1613 and later works, which are directly connected with cosmo-theological polemics with the religious au­thorities: his Apologia dictorum Aristotelis de quinta coeli substantia (1616) and the unpublished book De coeli efficientia, two manuscript copies of which are preserved in the libraries of Padua and Venice.

Predictions in economic-financial news

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rudi Palmieri ◽  
Johanna Miecznikowski
Keyword(s):  
Financial Markets ◽  
Speech Acts ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Final Cause ◽  
Financial News ◽  
Information Intermediaries ◽  
Efficient Cause ◽  
Future Events ◽  
Complex Forms ◽  
Argumentative Reasoning

Compared to other domains of media discourse, economic-financial news contain a considerable amount of speech acts regarding future events, in particular predictions. This can be explained by their specific institutional context, financial markets, where investors constantly seek to single out gain opportunities and to correctly assess their risk. One of the crucial factors making economic-financial predictions worthy of being considered in investment decisions is argumentation, in particular the extent to which the predicted proposition follows from a plausible and acceptable reasoning. Starting from a corpus of 50 articles of the Italian economic-financial press, we consider the inferential dimension of prediction-oriented arguments, focusing on the locus, i.e. the ontological relation on which the connection between the argument(s) and the predictive conclusion rests. All predictions found in the corpus were manually annotated with the software UAM Corpus Tool. For each of them we identified the source, which could be either the journalist him/herself or a third party, typically financial analysts or corporate actors. We distinguished mere predictive opinions from predictive standpoints, i.e. predictions for which the journalist advances one or more supportive arguments (either confirmatory of refutatory). For the latter category, we identified the locus referring to an adaptation of the taxonomy outlined by Rigotti (2009). The findings highlight in particular the following three interesting aspects: (1) in predictions, journalists reinforce their stance by plausible justifications, but weaken it at the same time by marking it as uncertain and/or by using reported speech or evidential means to reduce their responsibility for the predictive speech act; (2) the justification of a predictive standpoint, by the journalist or by third parties, is mostly based on loci of causality, in particular on the locus from efficient cause, the locus from final cause and complex forms of causality where the involvement of rational agents is implied but defocused; (3) moreover, journalists refer to the predictive opinions of experts or corporate insiders to activate the locus from authority, either by explicit argumentation or implicitly, by reporting speech from reliable sources. Our study suggests that the role of predictions in financial news is not so much that of giving any straightforward advice to investors, but rather that of providing chunks of sound argumentative reasoning, including both supportive evidence and rebuttals or refutatory moves, that the investor-reader might apply and combine in the highly uncertain context of financial markets. Overall, our findings shed light on how financial journalists fulfil the function of information intermediaries in finance.

The Early Moderns

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Clatterbaugh
Keyword(s):  
Causal Explanations ◽  
Efficient Cause ◽  
The World ◽  
Four Causes ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Idea Of God

The early moderns confronted an abundance of causes and types of causal explanations. From Aristotle through the Scholastics they had inherited the doctrine of the four causes, that is, depending upon context the material, formal, final, or efficient cause provides the proper explanation or answer to a ‘Why?’ question. From the Christianization of Aristotle's Unmoved Mover they had inherited the idea of God as creator of the universe. And to the creator role had been added the idea of providence whereby God in some sense ‘manages’ the world of mundane events. Aquinas had actually identified God as the efficient cause of all things.

Alexander of Aphrodisias,De Fato: some Parallels

1978 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. W. Sharples
Keyword(s):  
Common Source ◽  
Common Features ◽  
The World ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias

As was first pointed out by Gercke, there are close parallels, which clearly suggest a common source, between Apuleius,de Platone1.12, the treatiseOn Fatefalsely attributed to Plutarch, Calcidius'excursuson fate in his commentary on Plato'sTimaeus, and certain sections of the treatisede Natura hominisby Nemesius. Gercke traced the doctrines common to these works to the school of Gaius; recently however Dillon has pointed out that, while Albinus shares with these works the characteristic Middle-Platonic notion of fate as conditional or hypothetical – our actions are free, but once we have acted the consequences of our actions are fated and inevitable – he doesnotshare certain other common features, such as the identification of fate as substance with the world-soul and the hierarchy of three providences.

Causation, Indian theories of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roy W. Perrett
Keyword(s):  
Indian Philosophy ◽  
Identity Theory ◽  
Causal Relation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Western Philosophy ◽  
Transformation Theory ◽  
Ritual Action ◽  
Efficient Cause ◽  
The World ◽  
Underlying Reality

Causation was acknowledged as one of the central problems in Indian philosophy. The classical Indian philosophers’ concern with the problem basically arose from two sources: first, the cosmogonic speculations of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, with their search for some simple unitary cause for the origin of this complex universe; and second, the Vedic concern with ritual action (karman) and the causal mechanisms by which such actions bring about their unseen, but purportedly cosmic, effects. Once the goal of liberation (mokṣa) came to be accepted as the highest value, these two strands of thought entwined to generate intense interest in the notion of causation. The systematic philosophers of the classical and medieval periods criticized and defended competing theories of causation. These theories were motivated partly by a desire to guarantee the efficacy of action and hence the possibility of attaining liberation, partly by a desire to understand the nature of the world and hence how to negotiate our way in it so as to attain liberation. Indian philosophers extensively discussed a number of issues relating to causation, including the nature of the causal relation, the definitions of cause and effect, and classifications of kinds of causes. Typically they stressed the importance of the material cause, rather than (as in Western philosophy) the efficient cause. In India only the Cārvāka materialists denied causation or took it to be subjective. This is unsurprising given that a concern with demonstrating the possibility of liberation motivated the theories of causation, for only the Cārvākas denied this possibility. The orthodox Hindu philosophers and the heterodox Buddhists and Jainas all accepted both the possibility of liberation and the reality of causation, though they differed sharply (and polemically) about the details. The Indian theories of causation are traditionally classified by reference to the question of whether the effect is a mode of the cause. According to this taxonomy there are two principal theories of causation. One is the identity theory (satkāryavāda), which holds that the effect is identical with the cause, a manifestation of what is potential in the cause. This is the Sāṅkhya-Yoga view, though that school’s particular version of it is sometimes called transformation theory (pariṇāmavāda). Advaita Vedānta holds an appearance theory (vivartavāda), which is often considered a variant of the identity theory. According to the appearance theory effects are mere appearances of the underlying reality, Brahman. Since only Brahman truly exists, this theory is also sometimes called satkāraṇavāda (the theory that the cause is real but the effect is not). The other principal theory of causation is the nonidentity theory (asatkāryavāda), which denies that the effect pre-exists in its cause and claims instead that the effect is an altogether new entity. Both adherents of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhists are usually classified as nonidentity theorists, but they differ on many important details. One of these is whether the cause continues to exist after the appearance of the effect: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika claims it does, the Buddhists mostly claim it does not. Finally, some philosophers try to take the middle ground and claim that an effect is both identical and nonidentical with its cause. This is the position of the Jainas and of some theistic schools of Vedānta.

Avicenna on Teleology: Final Causation and Goodness

Teleology ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 71-89
Author(s):  
Jeffrey K. McDonough
Keyword(s):  
Basic Theory ◽  
Final Cause ◽  
Efficient Cause ◽  
Good For

This chapter examines Avicenna’s theory of final causation in light of two competing interpretations of Aristotelian teleology. According to the good-centered view, Aristotle’s claim that the end is a cause primarily conveys that some things are caused to occur by goodness. On this view, the concept of an end or goal, for Aristotle, is the concept of something good (from some perspective), and the concept of final causation is that of causation by goodness. According to the agent-centered view, Aristotle’s basic theory of the final cause says that it is the goal of the efficient cause, or the object of a power, that is, what the power is for. On this view, Aristotle’s fundamental account of what it is for something to be an end need not and should not refer to the goodness of that end. Avicenna’s portrayal of the final cause as the “cause of causes,” as well as his distinction between the end of motion and the good of motion, indicate that he adopts an agent-centered view. Though he also holds that every essential agent acts for the sake of something that is good, or apparently good, for the recipient of action, his explanation for this claim is compatible with his fundamentally value-neutral account of what it is to be a final cause.

scholarly journals Notes on Avicenna's Concept of Thingness (šay'iyya)

2000 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Wisnovsky
Keyword(s):  
Final Cause ◽  
Efficient Cause ◽  
Final Causes ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Way

Did classical kalām debates about how thing (šay') and existent (maw[gcaron]ūd) relate to each other pave the way for Avicenna's distinction between essence (māhiyya) and existence (wu[gcaron]ūd)? There are some indications that the concept of thingness (šay'iyya) may have played a bridging role between the mutakallimūn's discussions and those of Avicenna. Nevertheless, Avicenna's appeals to thingness occur most densely in passages devoted to analyzing the relationship between efficient and final causes, an entirely Aristotelian topic. A philological question arises: should these passages be emended to read causality (sababiyya) in place of thingness (šay'iyya)? I argue that the balance of evidence compels us to retain thingness. For Avicenna, thingness is the respect in which the final cause is prior to the efficient cause (as well as to the formal and material causes); existence, by contrast, is the respect in which the efficient cause is prior to the final cause. In fact, over the course of Avicenna's career a progression from the kalām problematic of šay' v. maw[gcaron]ūd to his own problematic of māhiyya v. wu[gcaron]ūd can be detected in his discussions of efficient and final causation.

The Metaphor of Light and the Active Intellect as Final Cause: De Anima III.5

1998 ◽  
pp. 112-120
Author(s):  
Sandro D’Onofrio
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Unresolved Problem ◽  
Final Cause ◽  
Human Thought ◽  
Efficient Cause ◽  
History Of ◽  
Classical Conception ◽  
Active Intellect ◽  
Aristotle's Metaphysics

The classical unresolved problem of the active intellect, raised by Aristotle in De Anima III.5, has received several interpretations in the history of philosophy. In this paper, I will recover the old hypotheses according to which the active intellect is the god of Aristotle's metaphysics. I propose that if the active intellect is god, it is not an efficient cause but the final cause of human thought-the entelecheia of the human rational soul. Nevertheless, the problem of the active intellect is insoluble simply because we do not count with all the elements required to obtain a sound solution. Yet it can be attenuated by an approach that renders much more coherence to De Anima III.5 than other attempts. To this end, I will (1) analyse the classical conception of Aristotle's two intellects, (2) work on the explanation par excellence of the active intellect, the metaphor of light, distinguishing the double conception of potency and act that may be found in it, and (3) analyse the concept of entelecheia as the process by which the active intellect actualizes intelligibles in the sense of the final cause.

Alexander of Aphrodisias on Divine Providence: Two Problems

1982 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 198-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. W. Sharples
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Divine Providence ◽  
The World ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
The One ◽  
Topical Interest

The position on the question of divine providence of the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. A.D. 200) is of particular interest. It marks an attempt to find a via media between the Epicurean denial of any divine concern for the world, on the one hand, and the Stoic view that divine providence governs it in every detail, on the other.2 As an expression of such a middle course it finds a place in later classifications of views concerning providence.3 It is also of topical interest: Alexander's fullest discussion, in his treatise De providentia (On Providence) (surviving only in two Arabic versions), has only recently been edited and translated,4 although some aspects of his position had long been known from other texts preserved in Greek.5

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