scholarly journals Physical layer key generation against MIMO eavesdropper by exploiting full-duplex technology

Author(s):  
Rong Jin ◽  
Kai Zeng

Abstract Generating a shared secret key from physical layer is an interesting topic with practical value. Inspired by the encouraging progress on full-duplex radio, a novel mechanism aiming at high and steady key generation rate with low cost is proposed in this paper. Legitimate users simultaneously send random bit sequences to actively interfere with each other. They extract those mutually jammed bits to form a secret key. A special digital modulation scheme, called Random Manchester coding is proposed. The proposed scheme achieves three goals. The first and the most important one is to prevent a MIMO eavesdropper from separating the superposed signal; the second one is to detect denial of service and key compromise attack to defend against an active attacker; the third one is to achieve design goal on low power radiation, computational complexity and memory cost. Theoretical analysis, numerical simulations and concept-proof experiments validate the effectiveness of our proposed scheme. Our solution is promising to facilitate key generation applications of nearby wireless devices such as ubiquitous smartphones, wearable devices.

Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (8) ◽  
pp. 960
Author(s):  
Miroslav Mitev ◽  
Arsenia Chorti ◽  
E. Veronica Belmega ◽  
H. Vincent Poor

Lightweight session key agreement schemes are expected to play a central role in building Internet of things (IoT) security in sixth-generation (6G) networks. A well-established approach deriving from the physical layer is a secret key generation (SKG) from shared randomness (in the form of wireless fading coefficients). However, although practical, SKG schemes have been shown to be vulnerable to active attacks over the initial “advantage distillation” phase, throughout which estimates of the fading coefficients are obtained at the legitimate users. In fact, by injecting carefully designed signals during this phase, a man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack could manipulate and control part of the reconciled bits and thus render SKG vulnerable to brute force attacks. Alternatively, a denial of service attack can be mounted by a reactive jammer. In this paper, we investigate the impact of injection and jamming attacks during the advantage distillation in a multiple-input–multiple-output (MIMO) system. First, we show that a MiM attack can be mounted as long as the attacker has one extra antenna with respect to the legitimate users, and we propose a pilot randomization scheme that allows the legitimate users to successfully reduce the injection attack to a less harmful jamming attack. Secondly, by taking a game-theoretic approach we evaluate the optimal strategies available to the legitimate users in the presence of reactive jammers.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 140-160
Author(s):  
Inka Trisna Dewi ◽  
Amang Sudarsono ◽  
Prima Kristalina ◽  
Mike Yuliana

One effort to secure vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication is to use a symmetrical cryptographic scheme that requires the distribution of shared secret keys. To reduce attacks on key distribution, physical layer-based key formation schemes that utilize the characteristics of wireless channels have been implemented. However, existing schemes still produce a low bit formation rate (BFR) even though they can reach a low bit error rate (BER). Note that V2V communication requires a scheme with high BFR in order to fulfill its main goal of improving road safety. In this research, we propose a higher rate secret key formation (HRKF) scheme using received signal strength (RSS) as a source of random information. The focus of this research is to produce keys with high BFR without compromising BER. To reduce bit mismatch, we propose a polynomial regression method that can increase channel reciprocity. We also propose a fixed threshold quantization (FTQ) method to maintain the number of bits so that the BFR increases. The test results show that the HRKF scheme can increase BFR from 40% up to 100% compared to existing research schemes. To ensure the key cannot be guessed by the attacker, the HRKF scheme succeeds in producing a key that meets the randomness of the NIST test.


2013 ◽  
Vol 21 (20) ◽  
pp. 23756 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantin Kravtsov ◽  
Zhenxing Wang ◽  
Wade Trappe ◽  
Paul R. Prucnal

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pedro Ivo da Cruz ◽  
Alexandre Miccheleti Lucena ◽  
Ricardo Suyama ◽  
Murilo Bellezoni Loiola

2019 ◽  
Vol 89 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Baldi ◽  
Franco Chiaraluce ◽  
Lorenzo Incipini ◽  
Marco Ruffini

2021 ◽  
pp. 99-128
Author(s):  
Chitra Javali ◽  
Girish Revadigar ◽  
Ming Ding ◽  
Zihuai Lin ◽  
Sanjay Jha

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