scholarly journals Covid-19 meets game theory: a proposed experiment

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giorgos Stamatopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Shapley Value ◽  
Relative Weight ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Marginal Contribution ◽  
Combination Theory ◽  
Shapley Values ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Practical Level ◽  
Bliss Independence

Abstract Researchers around the globe are searching for a "combo-drug" against Covid-19 by trying to combine various existing drugs. Given a set of such drugs, various algorithms (based, for example, on artificial intelligence) are used to identify the efficacy of different shares of the constituent drugs in the combo-drug. Namely, the relative weight of each drug in a "cooperative" scheme of therapy is sought-after. In the current note we propose to identify these weights using the theory of cooperative games, and in particular the Shapley value, one of the fundamental solution concepts of such games. We derive the weight of each drug by its (normalized) average marginal contribution over all possible "coalitions" of drugs it is used with, where a drug's marginal contribution to a coalition is defined as the increase in the coalition's probability to act against a virus should the drug become its "member". Hence we endow each drug with a consistent measure of significance (which is due to the consistency that Shapley value is associated with). At a theoretical level, we build the cooperative game, and compute the Shapley values, within a milestone model in drug combination theory, the Bliss independence model. At a practical level, the predictions of our game-theoretic model can be tested by using in-vitro experiments, namely experiments that are conducted in test tubes.

STABLE COOPERATION UNDER ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (04) ◽  
pp. 453-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
NADEZHDA KOZLOVSKAYA ◽  
NIKOLAY ZENKEVICH
Keyword(s):  
Shapley Value ◽  
Stable Distribution ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Cooperative Solution ◽  
Irrational Behavior ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Common ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Cooperative Differential Game ◽  
Total Stock

A game-theoretic model of territorial environmental production under Cournot competition is studied. The process is modeled as cooperative differential game. The stable distribution mechanism of the common cooperative benefit among players is proposed. We proved that the cooperative total stock of accumulated pollution is strictly less then the pollution under Nash equilibrium for the whole duration of the game. We design a stable Shapley value as a cooperative solution, which is time-consistent. The Shapley value is also strategic stable and satisfies the irrational-behavior-proofness condition. The numerical example is given.

A Shapley Value based Approach to Market Basket Analysis

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Rahul Lakhotia ◽  
Pratibha Goenka
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Purchase Behavior ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Marginal Contribution ◽  
Market Basket Analysis ◽  
Market Basket ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Market Basket Analysis is an interesting concept wherein a set of historical purchase data is studied extensively and data-mining techniques are applied to predict a user’s purchase behavior. In the resent times, every e-commerce giant, like Amazon, Flip-kart etc. are trying to increase their sales by this technique. It has been found in study that when a user is purchasing an item then he/she might be interested in purchasing other items too. So, by analyzing this purchase behavior if we can recommend other products at the time of purchasing then that could increase the sale and profit as well. Analyzing the correlation among the products by studying the purchase pattern and then finding the associated products is the main objective of Market Basket Analysis. Several algorithms have been developed to find the association among the products. But most of the traditional algorithms are based on support value of the product. They do not consider another important factor i.e. the marginal contribution of the product. Considering this into account in this paper we are going to propose a Shapley Value based game theoretic approach for market basket analysis. Shapley Value is a well-known solution concept in cooperative game theory. It gives the measure of marginal contribution of a player in a cooperative game.

APPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORY TO ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM

1999 ◽  
Vol 01 (01) ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
GUILLERMO OWEN
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Random Variable ◽  
Market Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
Thin Markets ◽  
Shapley Values ◽  
Game Theoretic

One of the original expectations for the theory of cooperative games was that it would give us results valid for thin markets (where the number of traders is too small for an equilibrium to be reached). Over a period of years, however, it has been shown that, for market games, both the core and the Shapley values converge, in some sense, to the competitive equilibrium. Thus, the feeling arises that for large market games, the game-theoretic concepts yield nothing other than the equilibrium. In this article, we study the question of convergence of the Shapley value to the equilibrium and show that in some cases the convergence can be extremely slow. A very simple example (the "shoe" game) suggests that replacing the value by the equilibrium is in some sense akin to replacing a random variable by its mean.

Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Value Transfer ◽  
Partner Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

Hollywood’s Movie Production Companies in Game Theoretic Model

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nargiz Mammadova ◽  
Aygun Malikova ◽  
Arzu Heydarova
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

A novel q-rung orthopair fuzzy TODIM approach for multi-criteria group decision making based on Shapley value and relative entropy

2021 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 235-250
Author(s):  
Liuxin Chen ◽  
Nanfang Luo ◽  
Xiaoling Gou
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Relative Entropy ◽  
Group Decision Making ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Group Decision ◽  
Similarity Measures ◽  
Entropy Measure ◽  
Shapley Values ◽  
Interactive Relationship ◽  
The Difference

In the real multi-criteria group decision making (MCGDM) problems, there will be an interactive relationship among different decision makers (DMs). To identify the overall influence, we define the Shapley value as the DM’s weight. Entropy is a measure which makes it better than similarity measures to recognize a group decision making problem. Since we propose a relative entropy to measure the difference between two systems, which improves the accuracy of the distance measure.In this paper, a MCGDM approach named as TODIM is presented under q-rung orthopair fuzzy information.The proposed TODIM approach is developed for correlative MCGDM problems, in which the weights of the DMs are calculated in terms of Shapley values and the dominance matrices are evaluated based on relative entropy measure with q-rung orthopair fuzzy information.Furthermore, the efficacy of the proposed Gq-ROFWA operator and the novel TODIM is demonstrated through a selection problem of modern enterprises risk investment. A comparative analysis with existing methods is presented to validate the efficiency of the approach.

Digital Authoritarianism and the Future of Human Rights

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Tiberiu Dragu ◽  
Yonatan Lupu
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
Human Rights Regime ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Future ◽  
Technological Developments ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Strategic Context

Abstract How will advances in digital technology affect the future of human rights and authoritarian rule? Media figures, public intellectuals, and scholars have debated this relationship for decades, with some arguing that new technologies facilitate mobilization against the state and others countering that the same technologies allow authoritarians to strengthen their grip on power. We address this issue by analyzing the first game-theoretic model that accounts for the dual effects of technology within the strategic context of preventive repression. Our game-theoretical analysis suggests that technological developments may not be detrimental to authoritarian control and may, in fact, strengthen authoritarian control by facilitating a wide range of human rights abuses. We show that technological innovation leads to greater levels of abuses to prevent opposition groups from mobilizing and increases the likelihood that authoritarians will succeed in preventing such mobilization. These results have broad implications for the human rights regime, democratization efforts, and the interpretation of recent declines in violent human rights abuses.

Augmenting Employees’ Efforts in Innovation

2021 ◽  
pp. 097674792198917
Author(s):  
Nikita Jain
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Wrongful Discharge ◽  
Equilibrium Level ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact

Strong labour laws play a major role in motivating innovation among employees. It has been found in the literature that stringency of labour laws is positively linked with employees’ efforts in innovation, in particular, wrongful discharge laws (WDL). However, employees may also bring nuisance suits against employers. Usually, the result of these suits is that both parties settle with each other. Thus, even if employees are justly dismissed, they may be able to bring nuisance suits against employers and gain a settlement amount. This article investigates how the possibility of nuisance suits affects the impact of WDL on employees’ efforts in innovation. In this respect, a game-theoretic model is developed in the article to find the equilibrium level of employees’ efforts in the presence of nuisance suits, where there is a possibility of employees getting discharged from the firm. I find that if nuisance suits are a possibility, the stringency of WDL has no impact on employees’ efforts if defence cost of the firm is low; but for higher defence costs, WDL affects employees’ efforts. The efforts exerted by an employee are found to be weakly increasing in the defence costs of the firm.

scholarly journals Formalization and study of the game-theoretic model of the optimal distribution of workers in enterprises

2019 ◽  
Vol 1399 ◽  
pp. 033095
Author(s):  
Irina Zaitseva ◽  
Tatiana Svechinskaya ◽  
Vladimir Zakharov ◽  
Natalia Zakharova ◽  
Andrey Murashko
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Optimal Distribution ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model
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