scholarly journals Pricing Strategies of Dual-channel Green Supply Chain Considering Big Data Information Inputs

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pan Liu ◽  
Feng-jie Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Pricing Rules ◽  
Green Production ◽  
Online Channel

Abstract In the Big Data environment, when green manufacturers invest in the green production technology, to satisfy consumer demand timely and accurately, they may begin to gain consumer performance information (hereafter, CBDI) to design and produce product. However, these will go up their extra costs. Meanwhile, for a green manufacturer who sells the green product through the online channel and the offline channel, the expression of its market demand needs to rethink in the new environment. In these conditions, for a dual-channel green supply chain (hereafter, DGSC), chain members pay more attention on the pricing problems considering the inputs of CBDI and greening R&D. Hence, to resolve this question, a DGSC a green manufacturer selling by the online channel and with one retailer selling by the offline channel was chosen. Afterwards, the demand function of the DGSC was revised, and we analyzed the profits models and its pricing rules in the proposed four common cost-sharing models. Results indicate that whether the retailer bears the CBDI costs or the greening R&D costs, the retailer will not change its retail price. If the retailer can bear some CBDI costs, the alteration tendencies of the best wholesale price are related to the cost-sharing parameter.

scholarly journals Strategic Analysis of Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain with an Unreliable and Competitive Supplier

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (10) ◽  
pp. 5371
Author(s):  
Chongfeng Lan ◽  
Zhongzhen Miao ◽  
Huanyong Ji
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Technology ◽  
Public Awareness ◽  
Green Marketing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Channel Strategy ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
Green Production ◽  
Online Channel

With the increasing public awareness of environmental issues, green production has become an important issue for supply chain management. This study proposes an analytical model to investigate the dual-channel green supply chain decisions of a retailer and a competitive supplier; the latter suffers from unreliable production yield. The retailer’s environmental responsibility is considered as a two-echelon supply chain in which the retailer promotes the green product in their marketplace through green marketing. This problem is analyzed and modeled under three available channel strategies, considered in the order in which channel selections are made: a single online channel strategy, a single retail channel strategy, and a dual-channel strategy. The results show that the wholesale price of the manufacturer and the green-marketing effect of the retailer increase with the improvement in the level of the green production technology. Interestingly, the result reveals that a retailer’s expected profit is unimodal in the production technology level under the dual-channel strategy, which suggests that the retailer may not be incentivized to encourage the manufacturer to improve its production technology once a threshold has been reached. Further, we develop the channel selection: the retailer is strictly better off in the single retail channel scenario than that in the dual-channel scenario; however, while the unreliable supplier is better off in the single online channel scenario than that in the single retail channel scenario, its best option is still the dual-channel strategy. Additionally, numerical results illustrate that the expected profits of supply chain parties decrease with the improvement in customer acceptance of the online channel.

scholarly journals Decision and Coordination in a Dual-Channel Three-Layered Green Supply Chain

Symmetry ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zilong Song ◽  
Shiwei He ◽  
Baifeng An
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Environmental Performance ◽  
Fresh Produce ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Sustainable Performance ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Social And Environmental Performance

This paper investigated, for the first time, the game and coordination of a dual-channel, three-layered, green fresh produce supply chain, with regard to its economic, social, and environmental performance. Considering that the market demand is dual-channel priced and sensitive to the degree of greenness and the freshness-level, four game models, under different scenarios have been established. These included a centralized scenario, a decentralized scenario, and two contractual scenarios. The equilibrium solutions under the four scenarios were characterized. From the perspective of a sustainable development, the economic, social, and environmental performance of the supply chain was analyzed. To enhance the supply chain performance, two contract mechanisms were designed and the conditions for a multi-win outcome were obtained. Accordingly, many propositions and management implications were provided. The results showed that, (1) compared to the centralized supply chain case, the performance of the decentralized supply chain case is inferior; (2) in addition to increasing the concentration of the supply chain decisions, the two contracts proposed can effectively coordinate the green supply chain and improve its sustainable performance; and (3) the performance of the supply chain is positively driven by the consumers’ sensitivity to greenness degree and the freshness level of fresh produce. This paper fills a research gap and helps the participants of the channel recognize the operational decision principle of a complex green supply chain, in order to achieve a higher and a long-term sustainable-development performance.

scholarly journals Research on the Maritime Logistics Pricing Model of Risk-Averse Retailer-Dominated Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (s2) ◽  
pp. 107-116
Author(s):  
Qing Fang ◽  
Zeping Tong ◽  
Liang Ren ◽  
Ao Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Maritime Logistics ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
On Line ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Abstract Price decision is studied in a risk-averse retailer-dominated dual-channel supply chain, which consisting of one manufacturers and one retailer with both off-line and on-line channels. Firstly, two mean-variance models in centralized and decentralized supply chain are established. Secondly, the optimal solutions under the two decision modes are compared and analyzed. The results shows that the price of dual-channel of retailer decreased with the increase of retailers’ risk- aversion coefficient and the standard deviation of the fluctuation of market demand, while the wholesale price changes is on the contrary; in addition, when the market demand is greater than a certain value, the prices of dual channel are correspondingly higher in decentralized supply chain than in centralized supply chain, and vice versa. In addition, when the retailer’s risk aversion is in a certain interval, the expected utility of the whole supply chain is greater in centralized supply chain than in decentralized decision, and vice versa. Finally, a numerical example is given to verify the above conclusions.

scholarly journals Managing a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Fairness and Channel Preference

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Xianjin Du ◽  
Weijie Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Supply Chain Design ◽  
Operational Strategies ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Channel Preference ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells the product via an offline retailer or online store. The manufacturer sets the wholesale and online price, and the retailer decides the retail price with the retailer’s fairness preference and consumer’s online channel preference. Through investigating the combined impacts of fairness preference and channel preference on the enterprises’ operational strategies, this paper obtains some meaningful results. If a manufacturer thinks over the fairness preference, he decreases the wholesale price to mitigate a loss of retailer and benefit the supply chain design. The manufacturer intends to set up the online channel with a lower acceptance as the fairness preference grows. However, the gains from enhanced online channel acceptance cannot compensate for the manufacturer’s loss by the fairness effect that benefits the retailer. Moreover, the manufacturer cannot neglect the retailer’s fairness preference generating a “lose-lose” case for both members.

Impact of wholesale price discrimination by the manufacturer on the profit of supply chain members

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rofin TM ◽  
Biswajit Mahanty
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Price Strategy ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Channel Preference ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of wholesale price discrimination by a manufacturer in a retailer–e-tailer dual-channel supply chain for different product categories based on their online channel preference.Design/methodology/approachThis paper considers a dual-channel supply chain comprising of a retailer and an e-tailer engaged in competition. Game-theoretic models are developed to model the competition between the retailer and e-tailer and to derive their optimal price, optimal order quantity and optimal profit under (1) equal wholesale price strategy and (2) discriminatory wholesale price strategy. Further, a numerical example was employed to quantify the results and to capture the variation with respect to online channel preference of the product.FindingsIt is beneficial for the manufacturer to adopt a discriminatory wholesale price strategy for products having both high online channel preference and low online channel preference. However, equal wholesale price strategy is beneficial for the e-tailer and the retailer in the case of products having high online channel preference and in the case of products having low online channel preference, respectively.Practical implicationsThe study helps the manufacturers to maximize their profit by adopting the right wholesale price strategy considering the online channel preference of the product when the manufacturers are supplying to heterogeneous retailers.Originality/valueThere is scant literature on the wholesale price strategy of the manufacturer considering the heterogeneous downstream retailers. This paper contributes the literature by bridging this gap. In addition, the study establishes a link between the wholesale price strategy and online channel preference of the product.

Quantity Leadership for a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Retail Service

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (02) ◽  
pp. 2050005
Author(s):  
Ciwei Dong ◽  
Liu Yang ◽  
Chi To Ng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Optimal Solutions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Numerical Studies ◽  
Retail Service ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

In a dual-channel supply, the manufacturer sells the products by both a traditional channel via the retailer and an online channel directly. Comparing with the direct channel, the retailer may provide additional services to the traditional channel. This paper studies the quantity leadership for a dual-channel supply chain with retail service. The manufacturer decides the wholesale price of the products and its selling quantity via the online channel, and the retailer decides the service level and its selling quantity via the traditional channel. We consider three Cournot competition games: Manufacturer-as-leader game, retailer-as-leader game, and simultaneous game. Optimal solutions are derived for these games. Based on the optimal solutions, we investigate the quantity leadership/followership decisions for the manufacturer and retailer, associated with the changes of some parameters. We observe that when the service sensitivity parameters are low, being a follower is a dominant strategy for the retailer; otherwise, both strategies of manufacturer-as-leader (retailer as the follower) and retailer-as-leader (manufacturer as the follower) are Nash equilibriums. We further conduct the numerical studies to investigate the impacts of parameters related to the retail service, and discuss the insights of the findings.

scholarly journals Impact of Retailer’s Vertical and Horizontal Fairness Concerns on Manufacturer’s Online Channel Mode

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Xuemei Zhang ◽  
Chenhao Ma ◽  
Haoran Chen ◽  
Guohu Qi
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Channel Structure ◽  
Direct Selling ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Channel Mode ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, where the retailer exhibits vertical and horizontal fairness concerns. The manufacturer or the retailer direct selling and e-commerce platform agency selling modes are employed to characterize the impact of retailer’s fairness concerns on the online channel mode strategy. Results show that the retailer’s fairness concerns only affect the wholesale price and online channel mode strategy. Without the retailer’s fairness concerns, the manufacturer direct selling mode is the best strategy for the manufacturer, which harms the retailer’s utility. With the retailer’s fairness concerns, the manufacturer may choose the manufacturer direct selling or e-commerce platform agency selling mode. When the fairness concern parameters meet a certain range, the e-commerce platform agency selling mode strategy is better for the supply chain members, which can solve the interest conflict between supply chain members. These research findings help dual-channel supply chain members understand how to choose the channel structure strategy to balance the supply chain members’ interests by considering fairness concerns.

scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Game Model and Contract Design: Risk Neutrality vs. Risk Aversion

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianhu Cai ◽  
Huazhen Lin ◽  
Xiaoqing Hu ◽  
Minyan Ping
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Risk Tolerance ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Risk Neutral

Abstract This paper incorporates the players’ risk attitudes into a green supply chain (GSC) consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier conducts production and determines the green level and wholesale price as a game leader, the retailer sells green products to consumers and determines the retail price as a follower. Equilibrium solutions are derived, and the influence of risk aversion on the GSC is examined. Our results show that, for the centralized GSC, risk aversion lowers the green level and the retail price; while for the decentralized GSC, risk aversion lowers the wholesale price and the retail price, but it may induce the supplier to increase the green level given a large risk tolerance of the supplier. Meanwhile, the risk-averse decentralized GSC may obtain more expected profit than the risk-neutral decentralized GSC. Furthermore, this paper designs a revenue-and-cost-sharing joint contract to coordinate the risk-neutral GSC, and such a contract can improve the risk-averse GSC under specific conditions.

scholarly journals Effect of Capital Constraint in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Lang Xu ◽  
Jia Shi ◽  
Jihong Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Channel Strategy ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Capital constraint is a significant factor that mainly restricts the development of small- and medium-sized enterprises. This paper explores the channel strategy and pricing decision in a dual-channel supply chain, which consists of one supplier and one retailer. Adequate and inadequate capital constraints for the supplier are distinguished by determining whether open the retail channel to sell. The observations offer managerial insights into supply chain member. First, the results indicate that the capital constraint is a key factor affecting channel strategies and pricing decisions. With the increased value of capital constraint, the wholesale price of offline channel and the selling price of online channel firstly decrease and then remain constant. Second, the results demonstrate that, with capital constraint, the supplier pays more attention to consumers’ brand loyalty if it chooses to open the online channel only. Additionally, the price-sensitivity parameter has no effect on the strategy of opening only the offline channel. Moreover, when the channel competition is too intense, the supplier will choose to only open the online channel strategy and increase the online selling price if the capital is insufficient.

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