Pricing rules of Green Supply Chain considering Big Data information inputs and cost-sharing model

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pan Liu
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pan Liu ◽  
Feng-jie Zhang

Abstract In the Big Data environment, when green manufacturers invest in the green production technology, to satisfy consumer demand timely and accurately, they may begin to gain consumer performance information (hereafter, CBDI) to design and produce product. However, these will go up their extra costs. Meanwhile, for a green manufacturer who sells the green product through the online channel and the offline channel, the expression of its market demand needs to rethink in the new environment. In these conditions, for a dual-channel green supply chain (hereafter, DGSC), chain members pay more attention on the pricing problems considering the inputs of CBDI and greening R&D. Hence, to resolve this question, a DGSC a green manufacturer selling by the online channel and with one retailer selling by the offline channel was chosen. Afterwards, the demand function of the DGSC was revised, and we analyzed the profits models and its pricing rules in the proposed four common cost-sharing models. Results indicate that whether the retailer bears the CBDI costs or the greening R&D costs, the retailer will not change its retail price. If the retailer can bear some CBDI costs, the alteration tendencies of the best wholesale price are related to the cost-sharing parameter.


2022 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuqiang Wang ◽  
Huimin Li ◽  
Yongchao Cao ◽  
Chengyi Zhang ◽  
Yunlong Ran

Knowledge sharing (KS) in the green supply chain (GSC) is jointly determined by the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers. This study uses the differential game method to explore the dynamic strategy of KS and the benefits of emission reduction in the process of low carbon (LC) technology in the GSC. The optimal trajectory of the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of suppliers and manufacturers under different strategies are obtained. The validity of the model and the results are verified by numerical simulation analysis, and the sensitivity analysis of the main parameters in the case of collaborative sharing is carried out. The results show that in the case of centralized decision-making, the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers are the highest, and the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of GSC are also the best. The cost-sharing mechanism can realize the Pareto improvement of GSC’s knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits, but the cost-sharing mechanism can only increase the supplier’s KS effort level. In addition, this study found that the price of carbon trading and the rate of knowledge decay have a significant impact on KS. The study provides a theoretical basis for promoting KS in the GSC and LC technology innovation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 1419-1450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ata Allah Taleizadeh ◽  
Mahsa Noori-Daryan ◽  
Shib Sankar Sana

Purpose This paper aims to deal with optimal pricing and production tactics for a bi-echelon green supply chain, including a producer and a vendor in presence of three various scenarios. Demand depends on a price, refund and quality where the producer controls quality and the vendor proposes a refund policy to purchasers to encourage them to order more. Design/methodology/approach In the first scenario, the members seek to optimize their optimum decision variables under a centralized decision-making method while in the second scenario, a decentralized system is assumed where the members make a decision about variables and profits under a non-cooperative game. In the third scenario, a cost-sharing agreement is concluded between the members to provide a high-quality item to the purchasers. Findings The performance of the proposed model is investigated by illustrating a numerical example. A sensitivity analysis of some key parameters has been done to study the effect of the changes on the optimal values of the decision variables and profits. From sensitivity analysis, the real features are observed and mentioned in this section. Originality/value This research examines the behavior of partners in a green supply chain facing with a group of purchasers whose demand is the function of a price, greenery degree and refund rate. This proposed mathematical model is developed and analyzed which has an implication in supply chain model.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Pan Liu

In the Big Data era, Big Data Information (BDI) has been used in the book supply industry. Data Company as an important BDI supplier should be included in a book supply chain. Thus, to explore the investment decision-making problems of BDI and its effects on the coordination and pricing rules of book supply chain, a three-stage book supply chain with one book publisher, one retailer, and one Data Company was chosen. Meanwhile, four benefit models about BDI investment were proposed and analyzed in the environments of symmetry information and asymmetric information. A revenue sharing contract was used to achieve book supply chain coordination. Findings: whether the book publisher and the retailer were suitable to invest in BDI, it was influenced by the cost improvement coefficient. With the ascent of the cost improvement coefficient, benefits of supply chain members will reduce, and, in different investment models, their prices show different change trends with the cost improvement coefficient.


2019 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vinay Ramani ◽  
Sanjeev Swami ◽  
Debabrata Ghosh

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of collaboration between supply chain entities in a dyadic setting where the manufacturer invests in greening and technology adoption effort leading to a price premium effect for the supply chain players. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses game theoretic approach to analyze the model of inter-firm interaction in a vertical channel setting consisting of a retailer and manufacturer. The paper studies strategic decisions of the channel members in a decentralized and centralized structure and extends this to decision making under contractual settings. Findings A two-part tariff completely coordinates the green supply chain, while a cost sharing and revenue sharing contract only achieve partial coordination. Nevertheless, a cost sharing, as well as a revenue sharing contract, increases the greening and technological adoption effort by the manufacturer while yielding the supply chain members a strictly larger profit. Furthermore, a revenue sharing contract in comparison to a cost sharing contract, leads to a larger greening and technological adoption effort by the manufacturer, lower wholesale and retail prices and a strictly larger profit for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Originality/value This paper contributes to the green supply chain pricing, technology and contract literature considering strategic interactions between a manufacturer and retailer in a supply chain under price premium effects of greening activities and technological advancements.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianhu Cai ◽  
Huazhen Lin ◽  
Xiaoqing Hu ◽  
Minyan Ping

Abstract This paper incorporates the players’ risk attitudes into a green supply chain (GSC) consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier conducts production and determines the green level and wholesale price as a game leader, the retailer sells green products to consumers and determines the retail price as a follower. Equilibrium solutions are derived, and the influence of risk aversion on the GSC is examined. Our results show that, for the centralized GSC, risk aversion lowers the green level and the retail price; while for the decentralized GSC, risk aversion lowers the wholesale price and the retail price, but it may induce the supplier to increase the green level given a large risk tolerance of the supplier. Meanwhile, the risk-averse decentralized GSC may obtain more expected profit than the risk-neutral decentralized GSC. Furthermore, this paper designs a revenue-and-cost-sharing joint contract to coordinate the risk-neutral GSC, and such a contract can improve the risk-averse GSC under specific conditions.


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