National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
PACIFIC AIR FORCES HICKAM AFB HI CHECO DIV
2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward F. Smith ◽  
Bobbitt Jr. ◽  
Kreis Rosser ◽  
Olson John F. ◽  
Pechous Warren K. ◽  
...  

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
Chris I. Nwagboso

This paper examines the various internal security challenges confronting Nigeria in the 21st century. The paper adopts historical method and content analysis to investigate how the abysmal failure of the poorly formulated and ineffectively implemented National Security Policy has hitherto exacerbated internal security challenges in Nigeria. The paper further attempts a critical review of major internal security challenges hitherto confronting the country; such as the Niger Delta crises, kidnapping in the South-East geo-political zone, Jos crises, Boko Haram crises and crises by Fulani Herdsmen in the Northern part of Nigeria. The result of the analysis shows that these internal security challenges have not only been difficult to address by the National Security Policy, but have also impacted negatively on the country's desired socio-economic development in the 21st century. The paper, therefore, recommends among others, the need for a careful review of the Nigeria's National Security Policy that will not only be integrative/comprehensive in outlook, but will also take cognizance of some domestic factors that are currently responsible for internal security problems in the country; such as unemployment, inequality, poverty, fraudulent electoral process, corruption, skewed federalism, porous nature of the Nigeria’s borders, sabotage among politicalelites, bad governance, religious intolerance, citizen-settler controversies, among others.


Author(s):  
Michael C. Desch

This chapter assesses whether academic social science had any influence on nuclear strategy. Social science did have important effects on strategy. At times this was direct. More often it was indirect, working not through the formulation of doctrine or the drafting of operational plans, but rather by providing the intellectual frameworks and mental road maps that shaped senior policymakers' and presidents' thinking about the utility of nuclear weapons during confrontations with other nuclear states. Academic strategists such as Thomas Schelling reputedly exercised such influence that the period between 1945 and 1961 is regarded as the “golden age” of academic national security studies. However, scientific strategists reached a dead end by privileging internal disciplinary concerns like logical rigor and the use of sophisticated methods over addressing concrete policy problems.


Author(s):  
Ian Hurd

This chapter explores the legality of latter-day weapons—specifically, nuclear arms and lethal drones—to consider the potential for voids in the coverage of international law. When technological or other developments enable previously inconceivable kinds of warfare, states face open legal questions. Recent debates over the legality of U.S. drones illustrate this, as do earlier debates about the legality of nuclear arms. The weapons arise in a kind of legal vacuum, empty of specific regulation. Drawing on these examples, the chapter considers the power of the international rule of law in situations where there may be no law. With respect to nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice decided that despite there being no directly applicable laws, use is nonetheless governed by international law. Rules designed for other weapons are relevant, as is a general principle that in the end, international law must defend states' rights to protect their national security as they see fit. These two sets of resources—general principles and analogies to other laws—are also important in legal debates over drones today: the lawfulness of drones as instruments of war is inferred from the legality of what are said to be analogous weapons from earlier times, and the needs of the state are internalized in legality debates through the mechanism of self-defense.


Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Daryl G. Press

This chapter summarizes key findings in the proponents of the “theory of the nuclear revolution,” which contend that nuclear weapons are transformative because they greatly reduce the need for countries to engage in intense security competition. It emphasizes that although nuclear weapons are the greatest tools of deterrence ever created, they do not automatically confer national security benefits on their owners, much less guarantee enduring safety from foreign threats. The chapter looks into the unfortunate reality of international politics in the shadow of nuclear weapons, in which countries must still pay close attention to the balance of power, search for ways to change the balance when they find themselves at a disadvantage and contemplate and plan for war in order to protect vital national interests. It explains how fears that tragically drove international politics for centuries still exist and how those fears are justified. The nuclear age remains an age of power politics.


2021 ◽  
pp. 162-200
Author(s):  
Michael E. O’Hanlon

This chapter delves much deeper into three areas — nuclear weapons, space and satellites, and missile defense. It argues that these are among the subjects in military technology that are both simple enough to be accessible to the generalist, and important and enduring enough that they can be expected to remain relevant for policymakers well into the future. The chapter also discusses the significance of space and its purposes for military activities, noting the basic principles of the national security space subject are grounded in immutable principles of physics. It examines the approach used in the study which suggests a methodology for diving deeper into other key areas of defense technology. Ultimately, the chapter contends that constructing adequate defenses, stable military balances of power, and robust means of national protection is fated to be a very difficult undertaking. To put it bluntly, two opposing countries or blocs of nations with roughly comparable military capabilities are generally not inherently safe from each other.


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