The Rule of No Law

2019 ◽  
pp. 82-102
Author(s):  
Ian Hurd
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
International Law ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Legal Questions ◽  
International Court ◽  
Specific Regulation ◽  
International Rule ◽  
Nuclear Arms

This chapter explores the legality of latter-day weapons—specifically, nuclear arms and lethal drones—to consider the potential for voids in the coverage of international law. When technological or other developments enable previously inconceivable kinds of warfare, states face open legal questions. Recent debates over the legality of U.S. drones illustrate this, as do earlier debates about the legality of nuclear arms. The weapons arise in a kind of legal vacuum, empty of specific regulation. Drawing on these examples, the chapter considers the power of the international rule of law in situations where there may be no law. With respect to nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice decided that despite there being no directly applicable laws, use is nonetheless governed by international law. Rules designed for other weapons are relevant, as is a general principle that in the end, international law must defend states' rights to protect their national security as they see fit. These two sets of resources—general principles and analogies to other laws—are also important in legal debates over drones today: the lawfulness of drones as instruments of war is inferred from the legality of what are said to be analogous weapons from earlier times, and the needs of the state are internalized in legality debates through the mechanism of self-defense.

Ongoing Tension in the Air

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-29
Author(s):  
Jae Woon Lee ◽  
Xiongfeng Li
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Traffic Control ◽  
Civil Aviation ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Air Defense ◽  
Legal Questions ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Moment ◽  
Advisory Opinions ◽  
Eastern Seaboard

Abstract Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) requires foreign aircrafts to identify themselves to local authorities and maintain contact with air traffic control while in the zone. ADIZ has an ambiguous legal grounding in international law. Since its inception, no comprehensive discussion on the topic has been conducted in the area of international law. When China declared its ADIZ over the waters off its eastern seaboard in November 2013, ADIZ suddenly received much attention. Although the conflict has come to a lull at the moment, a tinderbox still exists in the region and many legal questions about ADIZ remain. Although the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Council was asked to address the issue of ADIZ, any legal solution from the ICAO Council is hardly anticipated. This article suggests that the ICAO should consider advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality and proportionality of ADIZ.

The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the Law on the Use of Force: Missed Opportunities or Unrealistic Expectations?

2009 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
David McKeever
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Legal Regime ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Missed Opportunities ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Legal Questions ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Unrealistic Expectations

AbstractIn recent years, the International Court of Justice has been presented with opportunities to pronounce on important dimensions of the law on the use of force. An assessment of the court's handling of these issues must consider first the role attributed to the Court within the international legal regime for preventing and mitigating the use of force, and thus what exactly would amount to 'success' for the Court in such cases. Notwithstanding the inherent limitations on the Court's capacity in this area, this article argues that the Court has largely failed to provide clear guidance on pressing legal questions. An unwarranted caution in utilising the judicial tools at its disposal is one important factor in this regard. Finally, this article highlights some potential consequences of the Court's recent work for the development of international law on the use of force.

The Completeness of International Law and Hamlet's Dilemma

1999 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 225-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Advisory Opinion ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Public International Law ◽  
Current State ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Self Defence

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to examine whether the possibility of a genuine non liquet is ruled out by a so-called ‘closing rule’underlying public international law. The answer to this question largely determines the relevance of the debate on the legality and legitimacy of the pronouncement of a non liquet by an international court. This debate was recently provoked by the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons. In this opinion, the Court held that it could not definitively conclude whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was contrary to international law in an extreme circumstance of self-defence in which the survival of a state is at stake. Nevertheless, some authors have argued that, since international law contains a closing rule stating that the absence of a prohibition is equivalent to the existence of a permission (or vice versa), the Court had in fact decided the legality of nuclear weapons. By virtue of this closing rule, the pronouncement of a non liquet would be impossible. In our analysis, we have taken issue with this view and claim that there are no a priori reasons for the acceptance of a closing rule underlying international law. It is possible indeed that a legal system is simply indifferent towards a certain type of conduct. Moreover, even if a closing rule would be assumed, this rule would be of no help in determining the legality or illegality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons, since the Court asserted that the current state of international law and the facts at its disposal were insufficient to enable it to reach a definitive conclusion. Nothing follows from this assertion, except the assurance that international law cannot definitively settle the question of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons: to be permitted or not to be permitted, that is still the question. Hamlet's dilemma precisely.

Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons under international law — A few thoughts on its strengths and weaknesses

1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (316) ◽  
pp. 92-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manfred Mohr
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Advisory Opinion ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
The Public ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court

On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice finally rendered its Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The procedure had been dragging on since the start of the public sittings on 30 October 1995. Several deadlines set by the Court for reaching a decision came and went, ultimately giving rise to the fear that there would be no decisive majority to affirm the basic unlawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons. This would have been a bitter setback for the initiators of the Advisory Opinion proceeding and for the development of international law.

Functional Justiciability and the Existence of a Dispute: A Means of Jurisdictional Avoidance?

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 599-621
Author(s):  
Manuel Casas
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
International Law ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Nuclear Disarmament ◽  
Private International Law ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Nuclear Arms Race ◽  
International Adjudication

Abstract In the recent Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament string of cases the International Court of Justice declined jurisdiction by holding that there was no dispute between the parties. This Article examines the Court’s treatment of the existence of a dispute (‘EoD’) jurisdictional objection; it does not purport to analyze the Court’s broader reliance on jurisdictional doctrines as a general means of avoiding cases. From a doctrinal perspective, this Article argues that the Court's interpretation of the EoD objection in those cases is unpersuasive. Instead, the Article contends that the Court has relied on the existence of a dispute objection as a covert or functional justiciability doctrine. That is, as a ground for discretionarily declining jurisdiction or, to borrow a term from private international law, as an escape device. The Article considers that such jurisdictional avoidance may be normatively justified as a form of principled avoidance. Normatively, the decision to rely on a procedural technicality to avoid going into the merits of a potentially explosive case may be seen as a valid exercise of judicial self-restraint—something that can aid the Court navigate the tensions created by increased skepticism of international adjudication. And policy-wise, avoiding a case on a sensible subject-matter, that touches on core aspects of defense and national security, could be accepted as a way of side-stepping potential backlash.

International humanitarian law and nuclear weapons

1996 ◽  
Vol 36 (313) ◽  
pp. 500-502
Author(s):  
The Review
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
World Health ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Advisory Opinion ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Health Organization

On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice gave its advisory opinion in response to two enquiries as to the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Whilst the Court did not examine in detail the request put forward by the World Health Organization, it did give very close attention to the question presented by the General Assembly:“Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?”

Le Peuple, c’est moi! The World Court and Human Rights

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando R. Tesón
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Domestic Jurisdiction ◽  
Final Verdict ◽  
Law And Justice ◽  
The Relationship

This essay examines the discussion of human rights and domestic jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case. Independently of the final verdict about the lawfulness of U.S. help to the contras under principles of either self-defense or humanitarian intervention, the Court’s views on the relationship among human rights, domestic jurisdiction and intervention are wrong in law. Furthermore, the philosophical assumptions of the Judgment are profoundly disturbing. For the reasons set forth below, I submit that the Court’s approach embodies a backward view of international law and justice that was totally unnecessary to the resolution of the case.

Case Analysis: The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the WHO Nuclear Weapons Case: A Critique

1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 525-539 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. F. Amerasinghe
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
World Health ◽  
Advisory Opinion ◽  
Health And Environmental Effects ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Health Organization

The World Health Organization (WHO) had, among other things, been examining and deliberating the hazardous effects to health by the use of nuclear weapons. These discussions culminated in a resolution which requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons in the following terms: [i]n view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by a Stare in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law including the WHO Constitution?

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