scholarly journals Evidence on the Effect of DoD Acquisition Policy and Process on Cost Growth of Major Defense Acquisition Programs

Author(s):  
David L. McNicol ◽  
Linda Wu
10.7249/mg670 ◽  
2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Bolten ◽  
Robert Leonard ◽  
Mark Arena ◽  
Obaid Younossi ◽  
Jerry Sollinger

2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (98) ◽  
pp. 420-451
Author(s):  
Eric Plack ◽  
Jonathan Ritschel ◽  
Edward White ◽  
Clay Koschnick ◽  
Scott Drylie

Science and technology (S&T) programs serve an important function in the defense acquisition process as the initial phase leading to discovery and development of warfighting technology. The results of these programs impact the larger major defense acquisition programs, which integrate the technologies in subsequent phases of the life cycle. Despite this important role, little prior research has examined the performance of S&T programs. In this study, the authors investigate the impact of technological maturation as a critical success factor in Air Force S&T programs. The results suggest that S&T programs with mature technologies are more likely to experience above average cost growth and larger contract values while less likely to experience schedule growth. Additionally, the authors find the partnership method between the government and contractor matters for both technological maturation and schedule growth. Lastly, the nature of the S&T program is important, with aerospace programs more likely to technologically mature than human systems programs.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atharva Hans ◽  
Ashish M. Chaudhari ◽  
Ilias Bilionis ◽  
Jitesh H. Panchal

Abstract Cost and schedule overruns are common in the procurement of large-scale defense acquisition programs. Current work focuses on identifying the root causes of cost growth and schedule delays in the defense acquisition programs. There is need for a mix of quantitative and qualitative analysis of cost and schedule overruns which takes into account program factor such as, technology maturity, design maturity, initial acquisition time, and program complexity. Such analysis requires an easy to access database for program-specific data about how an acquisition programs’ technical and financial characteristics vary over the time. To fulfill this need, the objective of this paper is twofold: (i) to develop a database of major US defense weapons programs which includes details of the technical and financial characteristics and how they vary over time, and (ii) to test various hypotheses about the interdependence of such characteristics using the collected data. To achieve the objective, we use a mixed-method analysis on schedule and cost growth data available in the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s (GAO’s) defense acquisitions annual assessments during the period 2003–2017. We extracted both analytical and textual data from original reports into Excel files and further created an easy to access database accessible from a Python environment. The analysis reveals that technology immaturity is the major driver of cost and schedule growth during the early stages of the acquisition programs while technical inefficiencies drive cost overruns and schedule delays during the later stages. Further, we find that the acquisition programs with longer initial length do not necessarily have higher greater cost growth. The dataset and the results provide a useful starting point for the research community for modeling cost and schedule overruns, and for practitioners to inform their systems acquisition processes.


2022 ◽  
Vol 29 (99) ◽  
pp. 2-20
Author(s):  
David McNicol

This question asked in this article is whether the shared intellectual property of the acquisition community includes an adequate theory of cost growth in major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs). This question is given concrete form by cost growth data for 123 MDAPs. These data are grouped into categories, which range from very small—negative, in fact—cost growth to cost growth in excess of 100%. Potential explanations for this broad range of cost growth considered are: the conventional wisdom about cost growth; a recent RAND study that closely examined cases at both ends of the distribution, along with some possible extensions of that study; and a recent model of the root causes of cost growth. The author argues that each of these falls short; in particular, it seems that the defense acquisition community at large does not have a good explanation of cost growth in the broad range of 30% to 100%.


2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (98) ◽  
pp. 420-451
Author(s):  
MSgt Eric A. Plack ◽  
Jonathan D. Ritschel ◽  
Edward D. White ◽  
Lt Col Clay M. Koschnick ◽  
Lt Col Scott T. Drylie

Science and technology (S&T) programs serve an important function in the defense acquisition process as the initial phase leading to discovery and development of warfighting technology. The results of these programs impact the larger Major Defense Acquisition Programs, which integrate the technologies in subsequent phases of the life cycle. Despite this important role, little prior research has examined the performance of S&T programs. In this study, the authors investigate the impact of technological maturation as a critical success factor in Air Force S&T programs. The results suggest that S&T programs with mature technologies are more likely to experience above average cost growth and larger contract values while less likely to experience schedule growth. Additionally, the authors find the partnership method between the government and contractor matters for both technological maturation and schedule growth. Lastly, the nature of the S&T program is important, with aerospace programs more likely to technologically mature than human systems programs.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (92) ◽  
pp. 168-193
Author(s):  
Capt Emily E. Angell ◽  
Dr. Edward D. White ◽  
Dr. Jonathan D. Ritschel ◽  
Dr. Alfred E. Thal

This study uses descriptive and inferential statistics to identify cost growth Analysis of Military Construction of military construction (MILCON) at the programmatic level, while bridging the gap between Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) estimates and actual project costs. Findings of this study aid the cost community with appropriate allocation of resources in developing these estimates. Overall, Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) appear to experience more negative growth (cost savings) in MILCON estimates on reviewed SARs— typically less than 0.2% of the total program cost. SAR estimates became more accurate from the first to last SAR in comparison to the total MILCON programmed for all projects within a program. However, the last SAR’s median MILCON cost estimate was approximately $31 million underestimated on projects currently authorized and appropriated for MDAPs. Preliminary research was restricted to 32 programs of which only 10 had authorized and accessible projects for comparison. Initial results suggest building on this exploratory analysis.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara R. Collins Collins ◽  
David C. Radley Radley ◽  
Sophie Beutel Beutel ◽  
Munira Z. Gunja Gunja
Keyword(s):  

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