Performance Measurement, Value-Creation and Managerial Compensation: The Missing Link

Author(s):  
Wolfgang Schultze ◽  
Andreas Weiler

2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 132-162
Author(s):  
David Hillier ◽  
Patrick McColgan ◽  
Athanasios Tsekeris


2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Bryant ◽  
Denise A. Jones ◽  
Sally K. Widener

There has been an emphasis in recent years on understanding how value is created within the firm. To understand what drives value, managers must have in place performance measurement systems designed to capture information on all aspects of the business, not just the financial results. Many firms are implementing a Balanced Scorecard (BSC) performance measurement system that tracks measures across four hierarchical perspectives: learning and growth, internal business processes, customer, and financial perspectives. Although BSCs should ideally be tailored to each firm's unique strategy, evidence shows that managers tend to rely on generic measures, particularly as measures of the outcome of each perspective. We use cross-sectional data on seven archival measures from 125 firms over a five-year period to proxy for typical outcome measures of the four BSC perspectives. We find that a model that allows each outcome measure to be associated with outcome measures in all higherlevel BSC perspectives captures the value-creation process better than a relatively simple model that allows each measure to be a driver of only the next perspective in the BSC hierarchy. We also find differences in the relations among performance measures when firms implement a performance measurement system that contains both financial and nonfinancial measures versus one that relies solely on financial measures.



2001 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. J. McNair ◽  
Lidija Polutnik ◽  
Riccardo Silvi


2001 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-50
Author(s):  
C. J. McNair ◽  
Lidija Polutnik ◽  
Riccardo Silvi


2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 1309-1334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mirko S. Heinle ◽  
Christian Hofmann ◽  
Alexis H. Kunz

ABSTRACT We examine the impact of identity preferences on the interrelation between incentives and performance measurement. In our model, a manager identifies with an organization and loses utility to the extent that his actions conflict with effort-standards issued by the principal. Contrary to prior arguments in the literature, we find conditions under which a manager who identifies strongly with the organization receives stronger incentives and faces more performance evaluation reports than a manager who does not identify with the organization. Our theory predicts that managers who experience events that boost their identification with the firm can decrease their effort in short-term value creation. We also find that firms are more likely to employ less precise but more congruent performance measures, such as stock prices, when contracting with managers who identify little with the organization. In contrast, they use more precise but less congruent measures, such as accounting earnings, when contracting with managers who identify strongly with the firm.



2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 (1) ◽  
pp. 17227
Author(s):  
Andreas Pazi Raharso ◽  
Shakifur Rahman Chowdhury
Keyword(s):  


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