Numerous authorities have argued convincingly that what have been termed "status offenses" should be removed from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Perhaps the most cogent rationale that has been advanced in this regard flows directly from the statutory and procedural inequity that is clearly demonstrated by this vaguely defined set of offenses. Unfortunately, many advocates of reform have gone on to argue that a substantial body of empirical research has shown that (1) status offenders are not a significant threat to society because they have not been and generally will not become involved in more serious offenses and (2) any movement toward more serious involvement stems more from the stig matizing consequences of formal legal processing than from any other source. Such assertions are based on insufficient or nonexistent empirical evidence. Indeed, this analysis, based on an examination of the offense histories of a large sample of juveniles who appeared before one of two urban juvenile courts on one or more occasions during a five-year period, shows that many juveniles charged with status offenses have previously been charged with other types of offenses, that juveniles whose first court appearance involved a status offense are more likely to recidivate than those first charged with a misdemeanor or a felony, and that there is little or no evidence to support the contention that legal processing is associated with subsequent involvement in more serious delinquency. '