scholarly journals European Commission Opinions to National Courts in Antitrust Cases: Consistent Application and the Judicial-Administrative Relationship

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathryn Wright
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Consistent Application

A New Era for Private Antitrust Litigation in Germany? A Critical Appraisal of the Modernized Law against Restraints of Competition

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (8) ◽  
pp. 1173-1189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Wurmnest
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Critical Appraisal ◽  
German Law ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
New Era ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Injunctive Relief ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules

On July 1st, 2005, the 7th Amendment to the Law against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – GWB) became effective. The modernization of the GWB was indispensable in bringing German law in line with Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003. Regulation 1/2003 decentralized the enforcement of EC competition rules and aimed to pave the way for effective private antitrust litigation in Europe. Thus far, private parties have invoked Art. 81 and 82 EC Treaty primarily as shield by arguing that certain agreements were void. Only in very few instances were those rules used as sword to sue infringers for injunctive relief or damages. To stimulate private enforcement, Regulation 1/2003 inter alia abolished the European Commission's exclusive power to exempt practices which are prohibited pursuant to Art. 81 (1) EC Treaty and entitled national competition authorities and courts to apply Art. 81 (3) EC Treaty. Moreover, it empowered the European Commission to make written submissions in antitrust cases pending before national courts. In line with the new European approach, the German legislature has overhauled the hitherto existing rules of German competition law considerably. This article will briefly describe the general changes brought by the reform and take a closer look at the amended rules relating to private antitrust litigation before German courts.

scholarly journals Piecemeal Harmonisation Through the Damages Directive? Remarks on What Received Too Little Attention in Relation to Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 79-98
Author(s):  
Anna Piszcz
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Approach ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Eu

On 11 June 2013, the European Commission adopted a package of measures to tackle the lack of an efficient and coherent private enforcement system of EU competition law in its Member States. In particular, a draft Damages Directive was proposed in order to meet the need for a sound European approach to private enforcement of EU competition law in damages actions. The Damages Directive was ultimately adopted on 26 November 2014. This paper explores some aspects of private antitrust enforcement which have not received sufficient attention from the EU decision-makers during the long preparatory and legislative works preceding the Directive. The paper discusses also some of the remedies that have not been harmonised, and shows how these ‘gaps’ in harmonisation may limit the Directive’s expected influence on both the thinking and practice of private antitrust enforcement in Europe. It is argued in conclusion that further harmonisation may be needed in order to actually transform private enforcement of EU competition law before national courts

Fiscal State Aid: On Tax Exemptions and Reimbursement of Taxes

2007 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 481-505
Author(s):  
Philipp Werner
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
State Aid ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Tax Exemptions ◽  
Fiscal State

Fiscal state aid is an important aspect of state aid law. Aid granted though fiscal measures accounted for more than 40 per cent of aid granted in 2003–5. According to a recent study, allegations that fiscal measures constitute illegal aid account for more than 50 per cent of state aid cases before national courts. The European Commission and European as well as national courts are thus increasingly being called upon to consider the extent to which state aid rules apply to fiscal measures.

Part III Outcomes of an Investigation, 10 Handling and Rejecting Complaints

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dawes Anthony ◽  
Rousseva Ekaterina
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Limited Resources ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Administrative Body ◽  
The Eu

This chapter explores the grounds for, and the process of, rejecting complaints, and outlines complainants’ rights. Complaints are crucial for effective antitrust enforcement. They are a tool to trigger cases and help the European Commission to focus on markets and practices that matter to EU citizens. The Commission therefore encourages the submission of complaints. At the same time, the Commission, as any administrative body, has limited resources. To this effect, the EU Courts have on many occasions acknowledged the Commission’s discretion to give differing degrees of priority to the examination of complaints and to choose the criteria for rejecting complaints. The EU competition rules take into account the fact that complaints are better dealt with by the competition authority which is closer to the facts. Moreover, once an allegedly anticompetitive practice is being reviewed or has been already reviewed by a competition authority, Article 13 of Regulation 1/2003 provides that other competition authorities can rely on this review to reject the same allegations if brought to their attention. The approach to complaints also takes into account that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are directly applicable and that persons affected by allegedly anticompetitive practices may seek redress before national courts.

8. EU competition law: Article 101 and 102 TFEU

2020 ◽  
pp. 170-204
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Business Practices ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Abusive Behaviour

Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibit anti-competitive business practices. The European Commission, national competition authorities, and national courts enforce Articles 101 and 102 under powers conferred by Regulation 1/2003. From time to time, the European Commission issues non-binding notices providing clarification of the competition rules. This chapter begins with an outline of Articles 101 and 102 and the rules on enforcement. It then looks at the two Treaty provisions in detail. In broad terms, Article 101 prohibits business agreements or arrangements which prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the internal market and affect trade between Member States whilst Article 102 prohibits, as incompatible with the internal market, any abuse by undertakings in a dominant position within the internal market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States. It should be noted at the outset that ‘dominance’ itself is not prohibited, but only when such dominance is accompanied with abusive behaviour that may affect trade.

7. EU competition law: introduction and Article 101 TFEU

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Business Practices ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules

Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibit anti-competitive business practices. The European Commission, national competition authorities, and national courts enforce Articles 101 and 102 under powers conferred by Regulation 1/2003. From time to time, the European Commission issues non-binding notices providing clarification of the competition rules. This chapter focuses on Article 101, but begins with an outline of Articles 101 and 102 and the rules on enforcement. In broad terms, Article 101 prohibits business agreements or arrangements which prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the internal market and affect trade between Member States.

Hold-Out After the CJEU Huawei Decision

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 57-75
Author(s):  
Marie Barani
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice

This article describes how the Court of Justice of the European Union, with its Huawei v ZTE ruling in July 2015, has attempted to prevent abuses from SEP-holders (hold-ups) and implementers (hold-outs) by balancing the interests of both sides. This decision establishes a contractual negotiation framework both parties must comply with. However, it leaves some questions open. This article makes a review of hold-out risks under the Samsung and Motorola decisions from the European Commission and hold-out remedies under the Huawei decision and how national courts in Europe have applied it. It also examines potential improvements of competition law and the application of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to deal with a holding-out company in Europe.

Application of European Environmental Law by National Courts

elni Review ◽  
2008 ◽  
pp. 78-80
Author(s):  
Luc Lavrysen
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Environmental Law ◽  
National Level ◽  
Training Programme ◽  
Member States ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Set Up

In this article, the author describes the situation of National Courts applying European Environmental Law. The article shows that not in all Member States the issue is being addressed as it should be. Therefore, the author strongly supports the initiative taken by the European Commission to set up, in the light of Communication COM(2007)502 of September 2007, a large-scale training programme for members of the judiciary on the national level.

La corrupción en el seno de las instituciones de la Unión Europea: responsabilidades, investigación administrativa y control judicial

2016 ◽  
pp. 237-266
Author(s):  
David ORDÓÑEZ SOLÍS
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Lisbon Treaty ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Disciplinary Actions ◽  
National Courts ◽  
European Institutions ◽  
European Public ◽  
Financial Interests ◽  
Set Up

LABURPENA: Europako Batasunaren erakundeetan ere ustelkeria dagoela egiaztatu da. Bruselako politikariak eta funtzionarioak politika, diziplina eta, jakina, zigor kontroleko prozeduren mende daude. 1999an, eta Europako Batzordean detektatutako ustelkeria dela eta, Europako erakundeak hartutako erabakiari esker, martxan jarri zen Iruzurraren aurkako Borrokatzeko Europako Bulegoa (OLAF), ustelkeria eta ez-betetze larriak ikertzeko. 2009an, Lisboako Tratatuan Europako fiskaltza eratzea proposatu zen, Europako mailan egindako delituen —bereziki, Euro¬pako Batasunaren finantza interesetan eragina duten delituak— ikerketa judizialak egiteko. Kasu bietan, ikerketen ondorioz, diziplina eta zigor neurriak ezar daitezke. Eremu horretan, epaimahaiek xede berezia dute, alegia: politika eta diziplina erantzukizuna badago, justizia auzitegiak du legalitatearen kontrola; aldiz, nazioko zigor epaileek baino ezin dizkiete ezarri zigor zehapenak Europako Batasuneko politikariei eta funtzionarioei. RESUMEN: En el seno de las instituciones de la Unión Europea también se ha comprobado la existencia de corrupción. Los políticos y los funcionarios de Bruselas están sometidos a procedimientos de control político, disciplinario y, desde luego, penal. En 1999 y a raíz de la corrupción detectada en la Comisión Europea se puso en marcha la Oficina Europea de Lucha contra el Fraude (OLAF) en virtud de un acuerdo de las instituciones europeas con el fin de investigar la corrupción y los incumplimientos graves. En 2009 el Tratado de Lisboa ha previsto el establecimiento de una Fiscalía Europea que impulse las investigaciones judiciales relacionadas con los delitos europeos, en particular los que afectan a los intereses financieros de la Unión. En ambos casos las investigaciones pueden concluir con la imposición de medidas disciplinarias y penales. En este ámbito los tribunales tienen una misión esencial: en el caso de la responsabilidad política y disciplinaria el control de la legalidad corresponde al Tribunal de Justicia; en cambio, las sanciones penales a los políticos y funcionarios de la Unión Europea solo pueden imponerlas los jueces penales nacionales. ABSTRACT: Corruption also lives within the institutions of the European Union. Members and officials of the European institutions are responsible and submitted to political, disciplinary and criminal actions. As a consequence of the corruption unveiled in the European Commission in 1999, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) was set up by the agreement of the European institutions in order to investigate frauds and serious misconducts. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty has foreseen the setting up of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office whose mandate is to investigate, prosecute and bring to judgment the perpetrators ofoffences against the Union’s financial interests. These organisms allow performing administrative and criminal inquiries regarding European officials. Tribunals, both European and National, are committed to control the disciplinary actions (European Courts) and criminal lawsuits (National Courts) against European politicians and officials.

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