From the European Commission to National Courts: A UK Perspective on Decentralisation of Enforcement of the EC Competition Rules

1998 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-357
Author(s):  
Christopher Rhone
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Competition Rules

A New Era for Private Antitrust Litigation in Germany? A Critical Appraisal of the Modernized Law against Restraints of Competition

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (8) ◽  
pp. 1173-1189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Wurmnest
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Critical Appraisal ◽  
German Law ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
New Era ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Injunctive Relief ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules

On July 1st, 2005, the 7th Amendment to the Law against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – GWB) became effective. The modernization of the GWB was indispensable in bringing German law in line with Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003. Regulation 1/2003 decentralized the enforcement of EC competition rules and aimed to pave the way for effective private antitrust litigation in Europe. Thus far, private parties have invoked Art. 81 and 82 EC Treaty primarily as shield by arguing that certain agreements were void. Only in very few instances were those rules used as sword to sue infringers for injunctive relief or damages. To stimulate private enforcement, Regulation 1/2003 inter alia abolished the European Commission's exclusive power to exempt practices which are prohibited pursuant to Art. 81 (1) EC Treaty and entitled national competition authorities and courts to apply Art. 81 (3) EC Treaty. Moreover, it empowered the European Commission to make written submissions in antitrust cases pending before national courts. In line with the new European approach, the German legislature has overhauled the hitherto existing rules of German competition law considerably. This article will briefly describe the general changes brought by the reform and take a closer look at the amended rules relating to private antitrust litigation before German courts.

Part III Outcomes of an Investigation, 10 Handling and Rejecting Complaints

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dawes Anthony ◽  
Rousseva Ekaterina
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Limited Resources ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Administrative Body ◽  
The Eu

This chapter explores the grounds for, and the process of, rejecting complaints, and outlines complainants’ rights. Complaints are crucial for effective antitrust enforcement. They are a tool to trigger cases and help the European Commission to focus on markets and practices that matter to EU citizens. The Commission therefore encourages the submission of complaints. At the same time, the Commission, as any administrative body, has limited resources. To this effect, the EU Courts have on many occasions acknowledged the Commission’s discretion to give differing degrees of priority to the examination of complaints and to choose the criteria for rejecting complaints. The EU competition rules take into account the fact that complaints are better dealt with by the competition authority which is closer to the facts. Moreover, once an allegedly anticompetitive practice is being reviewed or has been already reviewed by a competition authority, Article 13 of Regulation 1/2003 provides that other competition authorities can rely on this review to reject the same allegations if brought to their attention. The approach to complaints also takes into account that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are directly applicable and that persons affected by allegedly anticompetitive practices may seek redress before national courts.

8. EU competition law: Article 101 and 102 TFEU

2020 ◽  
pp. 170-204
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Business Practices ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Abusive Behaviour

Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibit anti-competitive business practices. The European Commission, national competition authorities, and national courts enforce Articles 101 and 102 under powers conferred by Regulation 1/2003. From time to time, the European Commission issues non-binding notices providing clarification of the competition rules. This chapter begins with an outline of Articles 101 and 102 and the rules on enforcement. It then looks at the two Treaty provisions in detail. In broad terms, Article 101 prohibits business agreements or arrangements which prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the internal market and affect trade between Member States whilst Article 102 prohibits, as incompatible with the internal market, any abuse by undertakings in a dominant position within the internal market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States. It should be noted at the outset that ‘dominance’ itself is not prohibited, but only when such dominance is accompanied with abusive behaviour that may affect trade.

7. EU competition law: introduction and Article 101 TFEU

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Business Practices ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules

Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibit anti-competitive business practices. The European Commission, national competition authorities, and national courts enforce Articles 101 and 102 under powers conferred by Regulation 1/2003. From time to time, the European Commission issues non-binding notices providing clarification of the competition rules. This chapter focuses on Article 101, but begins with an outline of Articles 101 and 102 and the rules on enforcement. In broad terms, Article 101 prohibits business agreements or arrangements which prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the internal market and affect trade between Member States.

Decentralization and law enforcement in EC competition law

Legal Studies ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 128-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jo Shaw
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
General Interest ◽  
Administrative Authority ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Ec Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Take All

In a Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission published in early 1993, the European Commission made the following policy pronouncements about its future role in the enforcement of the competition rules contained in the EC Treaty:‘As the administrative authority responsible for the Community's competition policy, the Commission must serve the Community's general interest. The administrative resources at the Commission's disposal to perform its task are necessarily limited and cannot be used to deal with all the cases brought to its attention. The Commission is therefore obliged, in general, to take all organizational measures necessary for the performance of its task and, in particular to establish priorities.’

5 Enforcement, Institutions, and Procedure

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules

This chapter discusses the enforcement of EU competition law. EU competition law is primarily enforced through a system of ‘public enforcement’, where specialized administrative institutions initiate, decide, and terminate cases. Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are enforced by competition authorities at both the European—by the Commission—and national levels—by national competition authorities (NCAs). Since the adoption of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission and the NCAs form a ‘network’ of competition authorities called the European Competition Network (ECN). A set of specific legal mechanisms have been adopted to ensure a harmonious and effective enforcement of EU competition rules amongst the ECN. In addition, national courts also offer a remedial avenue for plaintiffs seeking to invoke EU competition rules. The chapter then looks at how the Commission and NCAs process competition cases. In general, a competition case goes through four stages: detection, investigation, evaluation, and decision.

scholarly journals Tying on the mobile apps market and competition rules

Ekonomia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 43-54
Author(s):  
Daria Kostecka-Jurczyk
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Mobile Apps ◽  
End Users ◽  
Competitive Behavior ◽  
Market Position ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Android System ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Dynamic Growth ◽  
Google Play

Tying on the mobile apps market and competition rulesThe dynamic growth of digital markets is conducive to the use of anti-competitive practices by companies in order to maintain or strengthen their market position. One example of such practices is the abuse of the dominant position occupied by Google, including by tying Android with applications available on Google Play. This tying means that Google imposes on the smartphone manufacturers a “set of applications” necessary to be installed, even if they were not interested in pre-installing some of them. The study analyzes the anti-competitive practices that the European Commission accuses Google of in the decision of 18 August 2018. The purpose of the article is to examine whether tying a specific set of applications with the Android system meets the conditions for abuse of Art. 102 TFEU. This requires, first of all, an examination of whether Android is a binding product for applications available in Google Play and, if so, of whether the conditions of abuse in the form of sales binding are met. As a result, it has been shown that on digital markets, where there is dynamic competition, it is difficult to make an unambiguous assessment of anti-competitive behavior and one of the important arguments that may prejudge the abuse is the harm to end users.

Part VIII Cooperation in Antirust Enforcement, 19 Cooperation Within the ECN and Strengthening of National Competition Authorities

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arsenidou Elisavet ◽  
Capiau Jeroen ◽  
Sinclair Ailsa ◽  
Stanciute Jurga
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
Mutual Assistance ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Close Cooperation ◽  
Decentralised System ◽  
The Eu

This chapter assesses the cooperation between the European Commission and national competition authorities (NCAs) in a decentralised system of antitrust enforcement. The recent adoption of a Directive to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers (ECN+ Directive) aims at ensuring more effective enforcement and mutual assistance among NCAs throughout the EU by putting in place minimum guarantees and powers to detect and tackle infringements. The chapter then explains the role of the European Competition Network (ECN), how it is organised and governed. The ECN was created in conjunction with the adoption of Regulation 1/2003. It consists of the NCAs and the Commission forming together a network of public authorities applying the EU competition rules in close cooperation.

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