Part III Outcomes of an Investigation, 10 Handling and Rejecting Complaints

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dawes Anthony ◽  
Rousseva Ekaterina
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Limited Resources ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Administrative Body ◽  
The Eu

This chapter explores the grounds for, and the process of, rejecting complaints, and outlines complainants’ rights. Complaints are crucial for effective antitrust enforcement. They are a tool to trigger cases and help the European Commission to focus on markets and practices that matter to EU citizens. The Commission therefore encourages the submission of complaints. At the same time, the Commission, as any administrative body, has limited resources. To this effect, the EU Courts have on many occasions acknowledged the Commission’s discretion to give differing degrees of priority to the examination of complaints and to choose the criteria for rejecting complaints. The EU competition rules take into account the fact that complaints are better dealt with by the competition authority which is closer to the facts. Moreover, once an allegedly anticompetitive practice is being reviewed or has been already reviewed by a competition authority, Article 13 of Regulation 1/2003 provides that other competition authorities can rely on this review to reject the same allegations if brought to their attention. The approach to complaints also takes into account that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are directly applicable and that persons affected by allegedly anticompetitive practices may seek redress before national courts.

Part VIII Cooperation in Antirust Enforcement, 19 Cooperation Within the ECN and Strengthening of National Competition Authorities

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arsenidou Elisavet ◽  
Capiau Jeroen ◽  
Sinclair Ailsa ◽  
Stanciute Jurga
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
Mutual Assistance ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Close Cooperation ◽  
Decentralised System ◽  
The Eu

This chapter assesses the cooperation between the European Commission and national competition authorities (NCAs) in a decentralised system of antitrust enforcement. The recent adoption of a Directive to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers (ECN+ Directive) aims at ensuring more effective enforcement and mutual assistance among NCAs throughout the EU by putting in place minimum guarantees and powers to detect and tackle infringements. The chapter then explains the role of the European Competition Network (ECN), how it is organised and governed. The ECN was created in conjunction with the adoption of Regulation 1/2003. It consists of the NCAs and the Commission forming together a network of public authorities applying the EU competition rules in close cooperation.

scholarly journals Piecemeal Harmonisation Through the Damages Directive? Remarks on What Received Too Little Attention in Relation to Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 79-98
Author(s):  
Anna Piszcz
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Approach ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Eu

On 11 June 2013, the European Commission adopted a package of measures to tackle the lack of an efficient and coherent private enforcement system of EU competition law in its Member States. In particular, a draft Damages Directive was proposed in order to meet the need for a sound European approach to private enforcement of EU competition law in damages actions. The Damages Directive was ultimately adopted on 26 November 2014. This paper explores some aspects of private antitrust enforcement which have not received sufficient attention from the EU decision-makers during the long preparatory and legislative works preceding the Directive. The paper discusses also some of the remedies that have not been harmonised, and shows how these ‘gaps’ in harmonisation may limit the Directive’s expected influence on both the thinking and practice of private antitrust enforcement in Europe. It is argued in conclusion that further harmonisation may be needed in order to actually transform private enforcement of EU competition law before national courts

Part VIII Cooperation in Antirust Enforcement, 22 International Cooperation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Smijter Eddy De ◽  
Gasparon Philipp ◽  
Berghe Pascal
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
International Dimension ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Exchange Of Information ◽  
The U.S ◽  
The Eu

This chapter studies the cooperation between the European Commission and competition authorities and courts outside the EU, at both bilateral and multilateral level, and highlights the importance of that cooperation in the context of proliferation of competition regimes and the continual increase in cross-border business activities. In more than half of its enforcement activities, the Commission cooperates with one or more foreign jurisdictions, obviously with varying degrees of intensity. The bulk of this international cooperation, in the fields of both merger control and anticompetitive practices, is with the U.S. and the Canadian competition authorities. The chapter then sets out the legal framework for international cooperation and explains the principles determining the Commission’s jurisdiction in cases having an international dimension. It also considers cooperation in antitrust enforcement, with particular attention given to the exchange of information and disclosure of evidence.

Abuse of Dominance: How Far are the EU and the US?

2007 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-52
Author(s):  
Alberto Heimler
Keyword(s):  
Economic Analysis ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Discussion Paper ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
The Eu

Abstract In recent years economic analysis has become more and more important in antitrust enforcement in Europe. First in merger control, then in vertical agreements the case by case approach based on a substantive appreciation of the restrictions of competition is becoming more and more prevalent. On abuse of dominance the difference between the US and the EU is still relevant. However, especially after the December 2005 publication by the European Commission of the Discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses the gap has been reduced, at least in terms of the general approach to abuse cases. In practice, even though the role of economic analysis is much more refined and relevant than in the past, the European Commission continues to be more interventionist than US antitrust enforcers. This outcome depends very much on the widespread use of presumptions and truncated analysis on both sides of die Atlantic. A number of examples are provided on predation, discounts, refusal to deal, tying and bundling.

A New Era for Private Antitrust Litigation in Germany? A Critical Appraisal of the Modernized Law against Restraints of Competition

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (8) ◽  
pp. 1173-1189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Wurmnest
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Critical Appraisal ◽  
German Law ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
New Era ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Injunctive Relief ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules

On July 1st, 2005, the 7th Amendment to the Law against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – GWB) became effective. The modernization of the GWB was indispensable in bringing German law in line with Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003. Regulation 1/2003 decentralized the enforcement of EC competition rules and aimed to pave the way for effective private antitrust litigation in Europe. Thus far, private parties have invoked Art. 81 and 82 EC Treaty primarily as shield by arguing that certain agreements were void. Only in very few instances were those rules used as sword to sue infringers for injunctive relief or damages. To stimulate private enforcement, Regulation 1/2003 inter alia abolished the European Commission's exclusive power to exempt practices which are prohibited pursuant to Art. 81 (1) EC Treaty and entitled national competition authorities and courts to apply Art. 81 (3) EC Treaty. Moreover, it empowered the European Commission to make written submissions in antitrust cases pending before national courts. In line with the new European approach, the German legislature has overhauled the hitherto existing rules of German competition law considerably. This article will briefly describe the general changes brought by the reform and take a closer look at the amended rules relating to private antitrust litigation before German courts.

8. EU competition law: Article 101 and 102 TFEU

2020 ◽  
pp. 170-204
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Business Practices ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Abusive Behaviour

Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibit anti-competitive business practices. The European Commission, national competition authorities, and national courts enforce Articles 101 and 102 under powers conferred by Regulation 1/2003. From time to time, the European Commission issues non-binding notices providing clarification of the competition rules. This chapter begins with an outline of Articles 101 and 102 and the rules on enforcement. It then looks at the two Treaty provisions in detail. In broad terms, Article 101 prohibits business agreements or arrangements which prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the internal market and affect trade between Member States whilst Article 102 prohibits, as incompatible with the internal market, any abuse by undertakings in a dominant position within the internal market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States. It should be noted at the outset that ‘dominance’ itself is not prohibited, but only when such dominance is accompanied with abusive behaviour that may affect trade.

7. EU competition law: introduction and Article 101 TFEU

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Business Practices ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules

Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibit anti-competitive business practices. The European Commission, national competition authorities, and national courts enforce Articles 101 and 102 under powers conferred by Regulation 1/2003. From time to time, the European Commission issues non-binding notices providing clarification of the competition rules. This chapter focuses on Article 101, but begins with an outline of Articles 101 and 102 and the rules on enforcement. In broad terms, Article 101 prohibits business agreements or arrangements which prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the internal market and affect trade between Member States.

Decentralization and law enforcement in EC competition law

Legal Studies ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 128-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jo Shaw
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
General Interest ◽  
Administrative Authority ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Ec Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Take All

In a Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission published in early 1993, the European Commission made the following policy pronouncements about its future role in the enforcement of the competition rules contained in the EC Treaty:‘As the administrative authority responsible for the Community's competition policy, the Commission must serve the Community's general interest. The administrative resources at the Commission's disposal to perform its task are necessarily limited and cannot be used to deal with all the cases brought to its attention. The Commission is therefore obliged, in general, to take all organizational measures necessary for the performance of its task and, in particular to establish priorities.’

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document