Preparing HR Leaders for a New Era of Regulation & Compliance: Executive Compensation and a Renewed Pay-for-Performance Mandate

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sumtotal Systems
2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abby Swanson Kazley ◽  
Eric W. Ford ◽  
Mark Diana ◽  
Nir Menachemi

Patient satisfaction is an important dimension of care that has been linked to improved clinical outcomes and increased compliance as well as organizational success. The passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act included rules that incentivize hospitals to improve patient satisfaction by offering increased reimbursements. In this analysis, three data sets are used to retrospectively examine the relationship between environmental market factors and patient satisfaction. We find that per capita income within the hospital’s catchment area, competition, metro status, and availability of general and specialty practitioners are significantly associated with hospitals’ patient satisfaction levels. In a new era of pay-for-performance and increased competition for scarce resources, hospitals must closely monitor and respond to external forces. One strategy for overcoming a turbulent external environment may be to focus on patient satisfaction.


2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (12) ◽  
pp. 1777-1804 ◽  
Author(s):  
James McConvill

As a result of a series of high-profile corporate collapses worldwide, along with regular reporting of shareholder money being spent on corporate jets, executive golf days and increasingly excessive executive compensation arrangements, the common perception is that the executives of our largest corporations are driven by self-interest with little regard for what is best for the corporation. Due to this negative perception, there has been an exponential increase in the amount of laws, rules and guidelines setting in place a heightened standard of corporate governance best practice. Without such regulation, it is believed, another collapse or scandal is inevitable. In this article, I dispute this reasoning. In my view if we embrace “positive corporate governance”, in which the positive strengths and virtues of company executives are emphasised, we can move towards an environment in which heavy regulation is replaced by positive corporate norms inside the corporation. I then apply my approach of positive corporate governance to address one of the most significant issues confronting corporate regulation at present- how to deal with the rapid increase in executive compensation in our largest corporations. I suggest that the dominant methodology of pay for performance is ultimately flawed.


2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 193-205
Author(s):  
Tung-Hsiao Yang

This paper examines the pay-for-performance, corporate governance, and their connection by analyzing the change of executive compensation when the stock market changes from upturn to downturn. We provide the evidence to support the managerial power explanation for the change in executive compensation. We find the asymmetric pay-for-performance and corporate governance in different market conditions and different firm’s market performance. In addition, the outperformed firms reward CEO with more cash-based compensation and less stock-based compensation in the market downturn. Therefore, we conclude that the CEOs of outperformed firms have stronger managerial power than those of underperformed firms. We also find supportive evidence of our conclusion that the firms with lower debt ratio, smaller number of board meetings, and the presence of interlocked relationship have higher probability to be the outperformed firms. This evidence is consistent with the prediction of managerial power approach


2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 36-40
Author(s):  
Marc Hodak

Widespread criticism of CEO pay packages have spurred directors to engage in a diligent search for best practices. This vigilance is transforming the process of executive compensation design, administration and oversight at many major public companies. But have all these process changes improved the compensation plans? We conducted empirical research on the way various compensation structures work for or against shareholder value creation. We looked at S&P 500 executive compensation plan data, supplemented by conversations with hundreds of executives and consultants. Against this standard, the evidence indicates that certain practices prove out favorably; some with plausible rationales have questionable value, at best, and some are clearly counter productive.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 165
Author(s):  
Herman Sahni ◽  
Christian Nsiah

This study examines the effect of firm financial efficiency on executive compensation with an emphasis on the US apparel industry. We find that both annual efficiency levels and cumulative efficiency changes obtained from the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) are positively associated with CEO pay. The effect is stronger for technological changes and changes in scale efficiency. Our results seem to support the pay-for-efficiency paradigm, a stricter version of the pay-for-performance framework under the efficient contracting explanation for CEO pay.


2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Weiss

ABSTRACT The executive compensation literature has explored the executive pay-for-performance relation in various contexts and reported mixed findings. As a result, the question of whether executive incentives, and particularly stock options, are effective continues to pose a puzzle to researchers. Gong (2011) uses a long window to examine effectiveness of executive compensation. This note discusses several broad aspects of pay-for-performance studies and their potential manifestation in this line of research and in Gong's study. Specifically, I elaborate on measurement issues and on each of the following aspects: (1) the underlying paradigm: arm's-length contracting versus managerial power; (2) the distinction between the pay-for-performance relationship and CEO overpay; (3) market efficiency; and (4) the settling-up problem.


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