European Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation as a Tool Against Forum-Shopping

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Philippe Maslin
Author(s):  
Reinhard Bork ◽  
Renato Mangano

This book provides a distilled and accessible analysis of the European cross-border insolvency law. With reference to the amended Insolvency Regulation (EIR) and related sources it examines the issues involved in intra-member state cross-border insolvency. The book analyses in depth the main areas of change brought about by the EIR such as the restatement of the meaning of 'centre of main interest' (COMI) and the rules on international jurisdiction, the new specific measures for multi-national enterprises, and the move towards co-operation between insolvency practitioners and courts. The EIR represents a very significant development in European insolvency law which will have an impact on all insolvencies with an international element involving a European state. All practitioners advising on the area need a clear grasp of the implications of the changes and this book aims to deliver just that.


Legal Studies ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 126-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerard McCormack

This paper critically examines the European Insolvency Regulation. It suggests the Regulation contains a fatal flaw at its heart; namely the ‘centre of main interests’ or COMI test governing the exercise of universal insolvency jurisdiction. The paper argues for greater jurisdictional flexibility to replace the COMI test and defends this proposal against charges that it will contribute to an excess of ‘forum shopping’ and encourage a ‘race to the bottom’. The American experience with bankruptcy court competition is considered in this connection.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-74
Author(s):  
Oscar Couwenberg ◽  
Grietje T. de Jong

This contribution focuses on the interaction between three phenomena: corporate restructuring, choice of law, and transaction avoidance. In this context, scholars have criticised Art. 13 of the European Insolvency Regulation for providing a possibility for forum shopping. This article enables firms to declare the law of the eu Member State where the provisions on transaction avoidance allow for the most freedom to take restructuring measures applicable to contracts. Literature on company restructuring shows that a combination of restructuring measures – usually additional credit for additional conditions and/or collateral - helps companies overcome financial distress. We argue that rules on transaction avoidance should take this balance into account when voidance is demanded. Using the example of Dutch and German rules on transaction avoidance, we argue that the German rules are more accommodative than the Dutch rules. Therefore, firms may benefit using the German rules on transaction avoidance rather than the Dutch rules.


Author(s):  
Primrose E.R. Kurasha

In this investigation, I will compare and contrast the UNCITRAL model law on cross-border insolvency law (hereafter referred to as ‘UNCITRAL model law’) with the EU Insolvency Regulation against the backdrop of various sources or dispensations of cross-border insolvency law. In this comparison, I will highlight the similarities and differences between the two, as well as discuss the other sources in depth, as they largely inform my research. My main aim in including the other sources in this comparative study is to provide deeper insight into these two sources of international cross-border insolvency law, as provided for by academics and sages in the field of insolvency law. These other sources include legislation, common law, treaties and regional dispensations.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Sergeevna Rassokhina ◽  

Author(s):  
Wagner Henri

This chapter examines the most common features of set-off (compensation) in Luxembourg and how the rights of set-off are affected by insolvency proceedings. It first provides an overview of set-off between solvent parties and set-off against insolvent parties before discussing cross-border issues relating to right of set-off. In particular, it considers cross-border set-off between solvent parties in cases where the Rome I Regulation or the Rome Convention applies and in cases where neither one applies. It also explains cross-border set-off against insolvent parties, focusing on situations where the Insolvency Regulation or the Recast Insolvency Regulation, as applicable, or another sector specific European insolvency legislation applies or does not apply.


Author(s):  
Federica Pasquariello

In response to cross-border insolvencies, conflicts of law and jurisdiction may arise and they cannot be resolved in a strictly Territorial approach. In fact, in an era of globalized and interconnected economies, an insolvency proceeding on a narrow national basis, which coexists with at least one other local proceeding may leadto unexpected outcomes. Actually, under Territorialism, each Country seizes the debtor’s assets which are located within its borders and conducts a separate bankruptcy proceeding to divide those assets among local creditors according to local law, while no proceeding affects each other. This causes a sharp fragmentation of the active and passive masses, and produces disappointing effects both on the level of creditors’ recovery, and on the front of an increase of costs as well.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 11-32
Author(s):  
Silvia Pais

It will be argued in this article that the EU Recommendation on common principles for collective redress might have limited impact on the field of competition law due to: several uncertainties regarding the legal standing in class actions; difficulties in their funding; and the risk of forum shopping with cross-border actions. Nevertheless, Belgium and Great Britain have recently introduced class actions into their national legal systems and addressed some of the difficulties which other Member States were experiencing already. It will also be suggested that the Portuguese model – the ‘Popular Action’ – and recent Portuguese practice may be considered an interesting example to follow in order to overcome some of the identified obstacles to private antitrust enforcement.


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