John Finnis’ Natural Law Theory and a Critique of His Argument for the Incommensurable Nature of Basic Goods

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex E. Wallin
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Basic Goods ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
John Finnis

scholarly journals The relation between reason and goodness in John Finnis

2020 ◽  
pp. 65-101
Author(s):  
Douglas Flippen
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
The Will ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
John Finnis ◽  
First Time

John Finnis joins Grisez in providing a new foundation for Thomistic natural law theory. To accomplish this, they closely associate good as perfection with good as to be pursued and have both senses grasped together by the practical intellect independently of the speculative intellect. The practical intellect then presents good to the will and motivates it to act for the first time. Since good as perfection is inherently speculative and since the intellect becomes practical only depending on the will, their notion of the practical intellect is incoherent and their new foundation is deeply flawed.

PERSONS PURSUING GOODS

Legal Theory ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 13 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 285-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven D. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
Legal Authority ◽  
Basic Goods ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
Law And Morality ◽  
Basic Good ◽  
Theory Of Law

John Finnis's powerfully and deservedly influential modern classic, Natural Law and Natural Rights, expounds a theory of law and morality that is based on a picture of “persons” using practical reason to pursue certain “basic goods.” While devoting much attention to practical reason and to the goods, however, Finnis says little about the nature of personhood. This relative inattention to what “persons” are creates a risk—one that Finnis himself notices—of assuming or importing an inadequate anthropology. This essay suggests that the “new natural law” developed by Finnis suffers in places from the inadvertent adoption of (or, more likely, acquiescence in) a flawed anthropology—an anthropology under the thrall of modern individualistic commitments. To explain this suspicion, this article discusses three difficulties (or so they seem to me) in his natural law theory: difficulties in accounting for the basic good of friendship, for obligations we owe to others, and for legal authority. These difficulties may seem disconnected, but this article suggests that they may all reflect an inadequate anthropology—one that Finnis does not exactly embrace (in fact, I suspect that he would reject it) but that is pervasive today and that in places may affect his theorizing.

scholarly journals Crítica a la teoría del conocimiento práctico de Grisez & Finnis

2020 ◽  
pp. 39-64
Author(s):  
Diego Poole-Derqui
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
John Finnis

El presente trabajo es una valoración crítica de la teoría de la ley natural de Germain Grisez y John Finnis, máximos exponentes de la New Natural Law Theory (NNLT), en contraste con la doctrina de Santo Tomás. Está dividido en tres partes. En la primera se compara la ontología del iusnaturalismo de la NNLT con el iusnaturalismo tomista. La segunda parte trata sobre el conocimiento de la ley natural, prestando especial atención a la naturaleza del conocimiento práctico según el Aquinate, para mostrar la diferencia que le separa de la NNLT. En el último capítulo, titulado Marginación de las virtudes en el conocimiento de la ley natural. La «kantianización» de Grisez y Finnis, se argumenta por qué la teoría del conocimiento práctico de la NNLT está más próxima a Kant que a Aristóteles o Santo Tomás.

Rescuing the New Natural Law Theory: From Absolute Values to a Theory of Autonomy

2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 451-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua D. Goldstein
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Personal Autonomy ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Moral Autonomy ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Unique Mode ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
Sexual Ethic ◽  
John Finnis

Abstract. The new natural theory developed by Germain Grisez, John Finnis, Robert George and other new natural lawyers is presented by both its friends and its liberal critics as more concerned with absolute values than theorizing human freedom. This concern is seemingly borne out by the new natural lawyers' narrow and exclusionary sexual ethic. However, this article suggests that the new natural law theory might be rescued from both these groups and shown to contain a robust and attractive account of freedom. Through a reconstruction of the new natural law theory's unique mode of arriving at moral action, this article suggests the new natural law theory integrates three distinct dimensions of autonomy which are often kept separate: a Kantian moral autonomy, a Rawlsian personal autonomy and a Hegelian ethical autonomy. The result is a new natural law theory—and a sexual ethic—more liberating than either the friends or critics of the new natural law theory would seem to allow.Résumé. La nouvelle théorie de la loi naturelle, développée par Germain Grisez, John Finnis, Robert George et plusieurs autres défenseurs de la nouvelle loi naturelle, est présentée par ses défenseurs et critiques libéraux comme étant plus concernée par les valeurs absolues que par la théorisation de la liberté humaine. Cette préoccupation semble être née de la conception étroite et exclusive que font les théoriciens de la nouvelle loi naturelle de l'éthique sexuelle. Par contre, cet article suggère que la nouvelle théorie de la loi naturelle peut être secourue de ces deux groupes et démontre que la nouvelle loi naturelle contient une description robuste et intéressante du concept de liberté. À travers une reconstruction du mode d'arrivée à l'action morale unique à la nouvelle théorie de la loi naturelle, cet article suggère que la nouvelle théorie de la loi naturelle intègre trois dimensions distinctes de l'autonomie qui sont souvent gardées séparer: l'autonomie morale kantienne, l'autonomie personnelle rawlsienne et l'autonomie éthique hégélienne. Le résultat est une nouvelle théorie de la loi naturelle, et une éthique sexuelle, plus libérée que ce que les défenseurs et critiques de la nouvelle théorie de la loi naturelle semblent permettre.

scholarly journals Natural Law and Ethical Non-Naturalism

2020 ◽  
pp. 095394682096289
Author(s):  
John D. O’Connor
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Fundamental Importance ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Natural Law Ethics ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
John Finnis ◽  
Secular Terms

There is a lack of clarity in the literature about what constitutes the natural law approach to ethics and what is incompatible with it. The standard, and largely historical, way of understanding the natural law approach risks overlooking theoretical differences of fundamental importance regarding what the natural law approach is usually taken to uphold. Against Craig Paterson, I argue that a necessary condition for an ethical account to uphold fully the natural law approach is that it does not contain any dependence upon the metaethical category of non-naturalism understood in non-supernaturalist (secular) terms. Using the ‘new natural law’ theory of John Finnis to illustrate my case, I also argue that an ethical theory can be largely in keeping with the natural law approach but nonetheless contain elements at odds with it: the issue is more complex than a simple binary. This is an under-explored possibility in natural law ethics.

David Hume and the eighteenth-century conception of natural law

Legal Studies ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Milton
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Philosophical Thinking ◽  
Modern Writer ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
John Finnis

Natural law is discussed by almost every modern writer on jurisprudence; but with a few exceptions - of which John Finnis' Natural Law and Natural Rights is the most substantial - the impression given is that it is of historical interest only, that it has in some way been discredited, or at least superseded, by legal positivism. The implicit idea - and here legal positivism borrows from Comte - is that natural law represented some earlier ‘metaphysical’ stage which was then followed by ‘scientific’ legal positivism. This account requires the existence of a natural law theory that dominated juristic and philosophical thinking until the eighteenth century, when it was overthrown by Hume and Bentham. Hume, the story goes, found the decisive argument against the natural law theory; while Bentham created the new theory oflegal positivism. The argument Hume discovered was that ought cannot be derived from is; and this, it is widely supposed, is fatal to all varieties of natural law.

scholarly journals Same-sex marriage: a defense based on foundations of natural law

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 1044-1066
Author(s):  
Pablo Antonio Lago
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Human Sexuality ◽  
First Principle ◽  
Gay Couples ◽  
Lesbian And Gay ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
Traditional Marriage ◽  
John Finnis ◽  
The One

Abstract Laymen in general associate natural law theories to conservative moral conceptions, like traditional marriage of a man and a woman. That makes sense when we notice Catholic Church's position about matrimony or even academic marriage conceptions as the one claimed by John Finnis. But would be possible to defend the so called “marriage equality” in natural law grounds? This paper aims to answer this question affirmatively. Departing from a critical analysis of Finnis’ natural law theory and his marriage conception, I argue that a better matrimony conception needs to be grounded on a wide vision of human sexuality, which encompasses lesbian and gay couples. Instead of procreation (which is one of the marriage points in Finnis’ conception), human experience shows that sex is not limited to breeding - it is a way people can achieve pleasure and high levels of intimacy, regardless their sexual orientation. I conclude that this way of conceptualizing human sexuality is “far more evident” than the one suggested by Finnis and is also consistent with Germain Grisez's interpretation of Aquinas’ first principle of practical reason - with which Finnis himself agrees.

scholarly journals Natural law as a way to achieve the common good: an interpretation of Thomas Aquinas and John Finnis arguments

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 609-617
Author(s):  
Anton Didikin
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Instrumental Approach ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Decent Life ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
The Common ◽  
John Finnis ◽  
Conceptual Foundations

The paper interprets the arguments of Thomas Aquinas on natural law as a way to achieve the common good, which had a significant impact on John Finnis’ natural law theory. The author reveals the conceptual foundations of J. Finnis’ understanding the morally justified actions of people in the community aimed at the obtaining of basic benefits, and the debatable issues of his theory in modern philosophical and legal research. The author arrives to the conclusion that the reinterpretation of J. Finnis analysis of the grounds for ethically significant actions leads him to formulate an instrumental approach to natural law as a rational way to implement a decent life.

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