A Comparison of Network Neutrality Approaches In: The U.S., Japan, and the European Union

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth R. Carter ◽  
Tomoaki Watanabe ◽  
Adam Peake ◽  
J. Scott Marcus
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Network Neutrality ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The U.S

Sensory Quality and Histamine Formation during Controlled Decomposition of Tuna (Thunnus thynnus)

1996 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
EMILIO I. LÓPEZ-SABATER ◽  
JOSÉ J. RODRÍGUEZ-JEREZ ◽  
MANUELA HERNÁDEZ-HERRERO ◽  
ARTUR X. ROIG-SAGUÉS ◽  
MARIA T. MORA-VENTURA
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Shelf Life ◽  
Sensory Quality ◽  
Health Hazard ◽  
Human Consumption ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Histamine Production ◽  
Histamine Formation ◽  
Hazard Levels ◽  
The U.S

Histamine production was studied during controlled tunafish decomposition at 0, 8, and 20°C. The influence of the location of the anatomic section on the amount of histamine formed and the incidence of histidine decarboxylating bacteria were also considered. By the time of sensory rejection, histamine levels in tunafish sections stored at 0 and 20°C were still below the hazard levels and the allowable levels established by both the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the European Union. Toxic amounts were only formed after the tunafish was considered organoleptically unsuitable for human consumption. However, at 8°C, levels of histamine between 100 and 200 mg/l00 g of fish were found before tuna reached the rejection point. Hence, physical appearance was not a good criterion for estimating the shelf life and especially the histamine-related health hazard when tuna was stored at 8°C, a common temperature in many home refrigerators.

Trump Administration Recertifies Iranian Compliance with JCPOA Notwithstanding Increasing Concern with Iranian Behavior

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (4) ◽  
pp. 1056-1062
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The Other ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Comprehensive Plan ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Ongoing Concern ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Trump Administration

In July 2015, Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and the European Union adopted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Pursuant to that agreement, Iran committed to limiting the scope and content of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from various nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the other signatories. By law, the U.S. State Department is required to certify Iran's compliance with the agreement every ninety days. The Trump administration first certified Iran's compliance with the agreement in April 2017, albeit reluctantly. In its first certification, the Trump administration expressed ongoing concern about Iran's sponsorship of terrorism, and repeated previous criticism of the JCPOA as “fail[ing] to achieve the objective of a non-nuclear Iran.”

Tiptoeing the Line Between National Security and Protectionism: A Comparative Approach to Foreign Direct Investment Screening in the United States and European Union

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (02) ◽  
pp. 105-117
Author(s):  
Jason Jacobs
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
Foreign Direct Investment ◽  
National Security ◽  
Direct Investment ◽  
The United States ◽  
Comparative Approach ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
The U.S

AbstractWeaponization of state-backed, foreign investments by China is an emerging national security threat in the United States and the European Union. The U.S. and E.U. have espoused similar policy goals—to address the threat without closing their markets to foreign direct investment—while fostering increased cooperation between allied partners in screening transactions.On the surface, the recent, China-specific measures taken by the U.S. and the investment screening framework adopted by the E.U. appear reflective of an alignment of those policy goals. Indeed, many commentators have suggested that is exactly what is happening. However, closer examination reveals a stark divergence. The U.S. has a robust screening mechanism that has evolved into a weapon of economic warfare. The E.U. meanwhile, remains a patchwork of conflicting—or nonexistent—national regulations overlaid by a comparatively toothless investment screening framework.There is a tendency to attribute this divergence to structural differences between the United States and European Union. This in-depth comparison of U.S. and E.U. investment screening mechanisms exposes a split that goes beyond application and into actual policy. This revelation should temper expectations that the E.U. is equipping itself to block transactions that are of concern to the U.S.

scholarly journals A Weaponized Court of Justice in Schrems II

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Jeffery Atik ◽  
Xavier Groussot
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
National Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
General Data Protection Regulation ◽  
Legal Development ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
General Data ◽  
The U.S

The U.S.-EU conflict over the application of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) to U.S.-based digital platform companies is marked by a startling legal development: the insertion of a constitutional court squarely into the heart of the dispute. The engagement of the EU’s top court - the Court of Justice (CJEU) - in the Schrems I and Schrems II cases - has significantly inflamed the dispute. The CJEU has now twice struck down GDPR accommodations reached between the United States and the European Union. In doing so, the Court has rebuked both U.S. and EU officials. By transfiguring provisions of the GDPR with constitutional (that is, treaty-based) and human rights values, the Court has placed out of reach any accommodation that does not involve significant reform of U.S. privacy and national security provisions. Heated trans-Atlantic disputes involving assertions of extraterritorial extensions of regulatory power is an inappropriate place for a constitutional court like the CJEU to throw its declarative weight around. 

scholarly journals Managed Trade

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (251) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugenio Cerutti ◽  
Shan Chen ◽  
Pragyan Deb ◽  
Albe Gjonbalaj ◽  
Swarnali Hannan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Bilateral Trade ◽  
International System ◽  
Trade Diversion ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Domestic Demand ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The World ◽  
Managed Trade ◽  
The U.S

The trade discussions between the U.S. and China are on-going. Not much is known about the shape and nature of a potential agreement, but it seems possible that it would include elements of managed trade. This paper attempts to examine the direct, first-round spillover effects for the rest of the world from managed trade using three approaches. The results suggest that, in the absence of a meaningful boost in China’s domestic demand and imports, bilateral purchase commitments are likely to generate substantial trade diversion effects for other countries. For example, the European Union, Japan, and Korea are likely to have significant export diversion in a potential deal that includes substantial purchases of U.S. vehicles, machinery, and electronics by China. At the same time, a deal that puts greater emphasis on commodities would put small commodity exporters at a risk. This points to the advantages of a comprehensive agreement that supports the international system and avoids managed bilateral trade arrangements.

DOES MERGER POLICY CONVERGE AFTER THE 2004 EUROPEAN UNION REFORM?

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 664-689 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mats A Bergman ◽  
Malcolm B Coate ◽  
Anh T V Mai ◽  
Shawn W Ulrick
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Merger Policy ◽  
Logit Models ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Effective Competition ◽  
Eu Policy ◽  
Unilateral Effects ◽  
Before And After ◽  
The U.S ◽  
The Eu

ABSTRACT The European Union (EU) formally changed its merger policy in 2004, moving from a dominance standard to one based on a significant impediment of effective competition, which appears more closely aligned with the U.S. substantial lessening of competition standard. We use data from both before and after this reform to explore whether EU policy has converged toward the U.S. standard. We start by identifying changes in the EU regime and detect a softer EU policy for unilateral effects. We model the outcomes of EU and U.S. investigations with logit models and use their predictions in decompositions and other exercises to show policy convergence for unilateral effects cases.

A Comparative Analysis of E-Collaboration Research Funding in the European Union and the United States

2009 ◽  
pp. 40-48
Author(s):  
Ned Kock ◽  
Pedro Antunes
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Government Funding ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Government Investment ◽  
Research Tradition ◽  
Steady Growth ◽  
The U.S ◽  
The Eu

Much of the funding for research and development initiatives in the area of e-collaboration comes from government agencies in various countries. Government funding of e-collaboration research in the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.), in particular, seems to be experiencing steady growth in recent years. In the EU, a key initiative to promote governmental investment in e-collaboration research is the Collaboration@Work initiative. This initiative is one of the EU’s Information Society Technologies Directorate General’s main priorities. In the U.S., government investment in e-collaboration research is channeled through several government branches and organizations, notably the National Science Foundation. There are key differences in the approaches used for government funding of e-collaboration research in the EU and U.S. Among other differences, the EU model appears to foster research that is aligned with the action research tradition, whereas the U.S. model places emphasis on research that is better aligned with the experimental research tradition.

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