To Be or Not to Be Jewish: The UK Supreme Court Answers the Question

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanna Mancini
2020 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-414
Author(s):  
Stephen Laing

De Jure ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Steliyana Zlateva ◽  
◽  
◽  

The Judgement of the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court in the long Micula v. Romania investment treaty dispute confirmed that the arbitral awards of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), rendered by tribunals established under intra-EU BITs, could be enforced in the UK. The Micula case concerns the interplay between the obligations under the ICSID Convention and EU law. In particular, it addresses the question of whether the award obtained by the Micula brothers against Romania constitutes state aid prohibited by EU law, as well as the enforcement obligations under the ICSID Convention in view of the EU duty of sincere cooperation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-302
Author(s):  
Roger Masterman

It is often claimed that the constitutional role of the UK’s apex court is enriched as a result of the experiences of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as interpreter of constitutions within its overseas jurisdiction. This paper considers the relationship between the House of Lords/UK Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee and its effect on the importation of external influences into the UK’s legal system(s), further seeking to assess how far the jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee has influenced constitutional decision-making in the UK apex court. While ad hoc citation of Privy Council authorities in House of Lords/Supreme Court decisions is relatively commonplace, a post-1998 enthusiasm for reliance on Judicial Committee authority – relating to (i) a ‘generous and purposive’ approach to constitutional interpretation and (ii) supporting the developing domestic test for proportionality – quickly faded. Both areas are illustrative of a diminishing reliance on Judicial Committee authority, but reveal divergent approaches to constitutional borrowing as the UK apex court has incrementally mapped the contours of an autochthonous constitutionalism while simultaneously recognising the trans-jurisdictional qualities of the proportionality test.


Public Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 300-332
Author(s):  
Andrew Le Sueur ◽  
Maurice Sunkin ◽  
Jo Eric Khushal Murkens

This chapter examines the meaning and the continuing significance of prerogative powers. Prerogative powers are those that were originally exercised by the Monarch before the modern parliamentary system was established. While most prerogative powers have now been replaced by statutory powers, prerogative powers remain important in some contexts, especially in relation to the conduct of the United Kingdom’s foreign affairs. In this context the decision of the UK Supreme Court in R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union is of particular importance. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the various legal foundations on which central government ministers may base their actions and compares prerogative and statutory powers. Section 3 examines prerogative power—a source of power possessed only by ministers in UK government and the monarch—in more detail. Section 4 considers the progress towards the reform of ministerial prerogatives.


Legal Studies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosemary Hunter ◽  
Erika Rackley

AbstractThis paper examines judicial leadership on the UK Supreme Court. It does not confine itself to the formal roles of the President and Deputy President. Rather, building on existing categories of judicial leadership, including administrative, jurisprudential and community leadership, it considers the contributions of all 12 Justices. In so doing, it provides a significant compilation of quantitative data on the activities of the Justices of the Supreme Court both on and off the bench from the the Court's inception in 2009 to the end of the 2014-2015 legal year. From this, we suggest that while a number of the Justices engaged in one or two broad forms of leadership – with Lady Hale in particular demonstrating a substantial degree of leadership across all three dimensions – at the other end of the spectrum, at least on the measures used in this paper, a significant minority did not. In the light of this, and the significant number of recent and forthcoming retirements from the Court, the paper concludes by considering the implications of our findings for the future of the Court. We argue that these retirements will result in gaps in both formal and informal judicial leadership, and it is vital that these gaps are filled by appointees who are capable of, and prepared to step up to, diverse and varied forms of judicial leadership.


2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-386
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Hill

Abstract In Bostock v Clayton County (2020) Gorsuch J holds that direct discrimination because of sexual orientation is a form of direct discrimination because of sex. I argue that the same is true under the Equality Act 2010. I consider the arguments of (Finnis, in: Finnis (ed) Intention and identity: collected essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) and (Gardner in Oxf J Leg Stud 18(1):167–187, 1998) that “because of”, “on grounds of”, and similar phrases in UK discrimination legislation invoke the state of mind of the discriminator. I apply this point to Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013] arguing that (i) the UK Supreme Court was wrong to find direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, while, (ii), nevertheless, under the Equality Act 2010, that case and similar cases actually involve direct discrimination because of sex, not because of sexual orientation. I conclude by considering some objections, precedents, and implications.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document