scholarly journals Takeovers Under Asymmetric Information: Block Trades and Tender Offers in Equilibrium

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergey Stepanov
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Tender Offers ◽  
Information Block ◽  
Block Trades

The role of toeholds on asymmetric information in mergers and acquisitions

2017 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 260-280
Author(s):  
Sebouh Aintablian ◽  
Wissam El Khoury ◽  
Zouhaier M’Chirgui
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Intangible Assets ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Multinomial Logit Model ◽  
Target Firm ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Tender Offers ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information

Purpose This paper aims to examine empirically the role of toeholds in reducing asymmetric information in mergers and acquisitions by establishing a relationship between the toehold and some relevant characteristics of the acquiring and the target firm. Design/methodology/approach A regression analysis is conducted to examine the relation between the dependent variable (the toehold) and a set of independent variables. A multinomial logit model is used to test for the occurrence of toeholds. A probit selection model and two-step Heckman correction tests are used to correct the data and to check for robustness of the results. Findings The regression results for acquisitions with prior toeholds are consistent with the studied hypotheses that asymmetric information is more observed in foreign acquisitions, in different industries, with tender offers and with higher levels of intangible assets. A negative relationship is found between toehold size and the number of competing bidders. Originality/value Consistent with previous literature, the study finds that majority of bidders abstain from purchasing a toehold before entering a bid contest. The study also emphasizes the role of intangible assets in assessing the efficacy of toeholds under asymmetric information. The ratio of target intangible assets to target total serves as a proxy for asymmetric information. Regression results are consistent with the hypotheses that asymmetry of information is observed when the acquiring and the target firm operate in different countries and industries.

scholarly journals Tender Offers versus Block Trades: Empirical Evidence

2012 ◽  
Vol 33 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 511-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Holmén ◽  
Eugene Nivorozhkin
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Tender Offers ◽  
Block Trades ◽  
Versus Block

Unique equilibrium in a model of takeovers involving block trades and tender offers

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 208-214
Author(s):  
Frederick Dongchuhl Oh ◽  
Sangkyu Baek
Keyword(s):  
Unique Equilibrium ◽  
Tender Offers ◽  
Block Trades

scholarly journals Asymmetric information and monitoring behaviour in block trades: An empirical analysis for Spain

2004 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Belén Díaz Díaz ◽  
Myriam García-Olalla
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Value Creation ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Block Trades ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Information Advantage

The aim of our study is to analyse if the purchase of share blocks in the Spanish capital market is due to any of the two factors that have justified block transactions in financial literature: monitoring or information advantage. Our results show that the control group, institutional investors and insiders have a higher probability to buy a block when an increase in value creation is expected due to the higher monitoring of managers carried out by these investors. A higher probability of purchase, only by insiders, is also observed when there is more asymmetric information and therefore the acquirers can benefit from their position of better informed investors.

Asymmetric Information Weighting in Belief Updating and the Effect on Mid-Sequence Evaluation

1996 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gal Zauberman ◽  
Dan Ariely
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Belief Updating

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

Do Institutions Receive Comparable Execution in the NYSE and Nasdaq Markets? A Transaction Study of Block Trades

CFA Digest ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 48-49
Author(s):  
Johann deVilliers
Keyword(s):  
Block Trades
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