Citizens United, States Divided: Evidence of Elasticity in Independent Expenditures

Author(s):  
Douglas M. Spencer ◽  
Abby K. Wood
Author(s):  
MARTIN GILENS ◽  
SHAWN PATTERSON ◽  
PAVIELLE HAINES

Abstract Despite a century of efforts to constrain money in American elections, there is little consensus on whether campaign finance regulations make any appreciable difference. Here we take advantage of a change in the campaign finance regulations of half of the U.S. states mandated by the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision. This exogenously imposed change in the regulation of independent expenditures provides an advance over the identification strategies used in most previous studies. Using a generalized synthetic control method, we find that after Citizens United, states that had previously banned independent corporate expenditures (and thus were “treated” by the decision) adopted more “corporate-friendly” policies on issues with broad effects on corporations’ welfare; we find no evidence of shifts on policies with little or no effect on corporate welfare. We conclude that even relatively narrow changes in campaign finance regulations can have a substantively meaningful influence on government policy making.


2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (5) ◽  
pp. 951-969
Author(s):  
Todd Donovan ◽  
Shaun Bowler

We model attitudes about Congress as structured by perceptions of campaign finance. Attitudes about unlimited corporate and union spending are modeled as structured by knowledge about Congress. We find people with more factual knowledge of Congress were more likely to view unlimited independent corporate and union spending as having improper influence. We also found that people made some distinctions about sources of campaign finance. Knowledgeable people viewed unlimited independent expenditures as improper influence, but were less likely to perceive direct contributions from individuals to candidates as corrupt. When attitudes about Congress are estimated as a function of perceptions about financier influence, we find that perceptions about unlimited independent spending predicted negative views of representation and Congress, whereas perceptions of limited individual donations did not. People who knew the most about Congress were substantially more likely to find unlimited independent spending—the sort allowed by Citizens United—to be troubling.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajesh K. Aggarwal ◽  
Felix Meschke ◽  
Tracy Yue Wang

We examine corporate donations to political candidates for federal offices in the United States from 1991 to 2004. Firms that donate have operating characteristics consistent with the existence of a free cash flow problem, and donations are negatively correlated with returns. A $10,000 increase in donations is associated with a reduction in annual excess returns of 7.4 basis points. Worse corporate governance is associated with larger donations. Even after controlling for corporate governance, donations are associated with lower returns. Donating firms engage in more acquisitions and their acquisitions have significantly lower cumulative abnormal announcement returns than non-donating firms. We find virtually no support for the hypothesis that donations represent an investment in political capital. Instead, political donations are symptomatic of agency problems within firms. Our results are particularly useful in light of the Citizens United ruling, which is likely to greatly increase the use of corporate funds for political donations.


Crackup ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Samuel L. Popkin

In 2016, a businessman so discredited that he could no longer get a casino license or borrow money from an American bank was elected president of the United States of America. How did this happen? It is easy to mock and ridicule Donald Trump as if he is the problem. In fact, he is a symptom of a much larger issue that has been bedeviling the GOP for nearly two decades: an intraparty crackup of massive proportions. “Crackup” here refers to a breakdown of the fragile alliances between coalitions within a party that prevents its leaders from developing goals they can deliver on when they control the White House and majorities in the House and Senate. This introductory chapter explains why party crackups are inevitable in a federal system with national money and local primaries. But this is the first time—for either party—that no group within the party could create a synthesis of old orthodoxies and new realities that altered the party’s direction enough to build a new consensus. The straw that broke the elephant’s back is the unintended—yet predictable—consequence of changes in campaign finance (popularly known as the McCain-Feingold bill) and the Supreme Court’s Citizens United ruling. These changes limited the party of legislative leaders to reach intraparty consensus and bargain with the other party. The combination has stripped the parties of most of their power to enforce any collective responsibility on their legislative colleagues, or upon a president from their own party.


Author(s):  
Fritz Heimann

Corruption has been a persistent issue in American history. This chapter begins with a discussion of the colonial period, in which gifts from the British Crown played an important role, so that corruption was debated heavily when the US Constitution was being enacted. The chapter then moves further forward in history to discuss the Yazoo land rights controversy, and the role of bribery and other corruption in construction of the Panama Canal. It ends with the Watergate scandal, enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and involvement with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Citizens United case.


The Forum ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-267
Author(s):  
Neilan S. Chaturvedi ◽  
Coleen Holloway

Abstract In 2010, the Supreme Court’s decision on Citizens United v. FEC, fueled public outcry about the growth of the cost of the political campaign and the influx of outside money in the form of independent expenditures. President Barack Obama seemed to agree with this speculation calling independent expenditures, “dark money” that “pulls our politics into the gutter” [Obama, Barack. 2015. “The Citizens United Decision was Wrong.” (Press Release). Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/21/statement-president.]. Indeed, signs pointing to the increase in the cost of campaigns are correct, as 2014 saw the most expensive congressional elections in history. In this paper, we examine the effects of outside group spending on Senate races in 2010, 2012, and 2014. We find that outside group spending does play a significant, though small role in determining the vote share of a candidate. We also find that outside group spending in support of a candidate is generally more effective than outside group spending against a candidate, especially for the incumbent. Still, outside group expenditures pale in comparison to campaign expenditures for the challenger in terms of overall effect.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 203-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabine Weber

There are many factors that influence political elections, among them, money may be the most important one. The starting point of this Article is the judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. After this decision is described, the approaches of the United States and Germany in regulating political speech by campaign finance laws will be discussed, focusing on the role of companies. This Article will outline the status quo of federal American campaign finance laws (Part B). Regarding the German approach, this Article will outline the Parteiengesetz (Political Parties Act, hereinafter: Part G) and decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Constitutional Court, hereinafter: BVerfG) (Part C). European regulations are not the subject of this Article. Both approaches will be compared and future prospects will be given as a conclusion (Part D).


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