Purpose
– The purpose of this paper is to examine the moderating effect of media pressure on external directors in relation to disclosure of information on corporate social responsibility (CSR).
Design/methodology/approach
– The paper adopts a multilevel approach, integrating the institutional, organisational and individual levels of analysis in a whole model that explains corporate transparency. The paper uses a sample composed of 98 non-financial listed Spanish companies for the period 2004-2010,
Findings
– The results show heterogeneity between external board members. Proprietary directors, representing shareholders, tend to promote adoption of the Global Reporting Initiative guidelines in order to increase value for shareholders. On the contrary, independent directors are risk adverse in relation to the effect that CSR information disclosure could have on their professional reputations.
Research limitations/implications
– The sample could be improved, including companies from different countries and more years for the analysis, since the period studied comprises a particular economic setting (2008-2010), a global financial crisis.
Practical implications
– Although these results from the Spanish context, the authors recommend that regulatory bodies incorporate provisions into good governance codes that guarantee the existence of quality and comparable CSR information that favours stakeholders’ decision taking.
Originality/value
– The image that society has about a company comes from the opinions created from the mass media. The arguments proposed by agenda-setting theory can be managed by companies as a strategic mechanism to respond to society expectations. At present, two of the most studied aspects are the ethical and sustainable behaviours of organisations. These aspects are related to the characteristics of boards of directors, especially to external directors. Independent directors may disagree with disclosing information about CSR practices because they fear that this information would affect their professional reputations, since they are not specialised in these topics. However, proprietary directors favour the disclosure of this information in an attempt to reduce the cost of capital and risk perceived by investors, especially in more sustainable companies.
Administrative Reform and the Quest for Openness: A Popperian Review of Open Government