Stability and the Immediate Acceptance Rule When School Priorities are Weak

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wonki Jo Cho ◽  
Battal Dogan
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
John L. Pollock

I have urged that nomic probability be analyzed in terms of its conceptual role. The conceptual role analysis of nomic probability has four parts: (1) an account of statistical induction; (2) an account of the computational principles that allow some nomic probabilities to be derived from others; (3) an account of acceptance rules; and (4) an account of direct inference. The purpose of the present chapter is to develop and defend the acceptance rules that will play a central role in the theory of nomic probability. The theories of direct inference and statistical induction will then be derived from the acceptance rules and the computational principles defended in the last chapter. Although some of the computational principles are novel, they still amount to little more than an embellishment of the classical probability calculus. The main philosophical weight of the theory of nomic probability will be borne by the acceptance rules. A simple acceptance rule will be described and defended in section 2. The epistemological framework presupposed by the rule will be discussed and refined in section 3. Sections 4 and 5 will demonstrate that more powerful rules can be derived from the simple acceptance rule described in section 2. The philosophical literature contains numerous proposals for probabilistic acceptance rules. For instance, the following “Simple Rule” has had a number of proponents: . . . Belief in P is justified iff P is probable. . . . Note, however, that this rule is formulated in terms of definite probabilities. This is true of most candidate acceptance rules. However, nomic probability is an indefinite probability. It would make no sense to propose a rule like the Simple Rule for nomic probability. Nevertheless, there is an obvious candidate for an acceptance rule formulated in terms of nomic probability. This is the Statistical Syllogism, whose traditional formulation is something like the following: . . . Most A’s are B’s. This is an A./ Therefore, this is a E. . . . It seems clear that we often reason in roughly this way. For instance, on what basis do I believe what I read in the newspaper?


Author(s):  
John L. Pollock

There once was a man who wrote a book. He was very careful in his reasoning, and was confident of each claim that he made. With some display of pride, he showed the book to a friend (who happened to be a probability theorist). He was dismayed when the friend observed that any book that long and that interesting was almost certain to contain at least one falsehood. Thus it was not reasonable to believe that all of the claims made in the book were true. If it were reasonable to believe each claim then it would be reasonable to believe that the book contained no falsehoods, so it could not be reasonable to believe each claim. Furthermore, because there was no way to pick out some of the claims as being more problematic than others, there could be no reasonable way of withholding assent to some but not others. “Therefore,” concluded his friend, “you are not justified in believing anything you asserted in the book.” This is the paradox of the preface (so named because in the original version the author confesses in the preface that his book probably contains a falsehood). The paradox of the preface is more than a curiosity. It has been used by some philosophers to argue that the set of one's warranted beliefs need not be deductively consistent, and by others to argue that you should not befriend probability theorists. If (Al) is to be a correct acceptance rule it must be capable of explaining what is involved in the paradox of the preface. The lottery paradox and the paradox of the preface seem superficially similar, so it might be supposed that a resolution of one will automatically generate a resolution of the other in some trivial manner. But in fact, the opposite is true. It is the principle of collective defeat that makes possible the resolution of the lottery paradox, but it is the principle of collective defeat that is responsible for the creation of the paradox of the preface.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 483-500
Author(s):  
Visa Pitkänen ◽  
Signe Jauhiainen ◽  
Ismo Linnosmaa

AbstractWe study physiotherapy providers’ prices in repeated competitive biddings where multiple providers are accepted in geographical districts. Historically, only very few districts have rejected any providers. We show that this practice increased prices and analyze the effects the risk of rejection has on prices. Our data are derived from three subsequent competitive biddings. The results show that rejecting at least one provider decreased prices by more than 5% in the next procurement round. The results also indicate that providers have learned to calculate their optimal bids, which has also increased prices. Further, we perform counterfactual policy analysis of a capacity-rule of acceptance. The analysis shows that implementing a systematic acceptance rule results in a trade-off between direct cost savings and service continuity at patients’ usual providers.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alkın Yurtkuran ◽  
Erdal Emel

The artificial bee colony (ABC) algorithm is a popular swarm based technique, which is inspired from the intelligent foraging behavior of honeybee swarms. This paper proposes a new variant of ABC algorithm, namely, enhanced ABC with solution acceptance rule and probabilistic multisearch (ABC-SA) to address global optimization problems. A new solution acceptance rule is proposed where, instead of greedy selection between old solution and new candidate solution, worse candidate solutions have a probability to be accepted. Additionally, the acceptance probability of worse candidates is nonlinearly decreased throughout the search process adaptively. Moreover, in order to improve the performance of the ABC and balance the intensification and diversification, a probabilistic multisearch strategy is presented. Three different search equations with distinctive characters are employed using predetermined search probabilities. By implementing a new solution acceptance rule and a probabilistic multisearch approach, the intensification and diversification performance of the ABC algorithm is improved. The proposed algorithm has been tested on well-known benchmark functions of varying dimensions by comparing against novel ABC variants, as well as several recent state-of-the-art algorithms. Computational results show that the proposed ABC-SA outperforms other ABC variants and is superior to state-of-the-art algorithms proposed in the literature.


2010 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Wright

This short article explains why merchants accept expensive payment cards when merchants are Cournot competitors. The same acceptance rule as the Hotelling price competition model of Rochet and Tirole (2002) is derived. Unlike the models used in the existing literature, in the Cournot setting without free entry of merchants, payment card acceptance expands merchant output and increases merchant profit in equilibrium. With free entry, payment card acceptance increases the number of merchants in the industry and industry output.


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