Why Do Short Selling Bans Increase Adverse Selection?

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Dixon
2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 408-421 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Chen ◽  
Alireza Tourani-Rad ◽  
Ronghua Yi

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of short selling and margin trading on the price discovery and price informativeness of cross-listed firms, using a sample of Chinese firms listed on the China and Hong Kong stock exchanges. Design/methodology/approach – The sample consists of 67 Chinese cross-listed firms on A-share and H-share markets out of which 18 firms are allowed to be sold short/ traded on margin since March 2010. Using pre- and post-event period, the authors compare and contrast various market microstructure variables. The contributions of the home (A-share) and overseas (H-share) markets to the incorporation of new information into prices are calculated following the permanent-transitory approach of Gonzalo and Granger (1995) as well as the adverse selection component of Lin et al. (1995). Findings – The findings indicate that for the group of Chinese cross-listed firms that are not allowed to be sold short or bought on margin, the home (A-share) market contributes more to the price discovery process over time. However, for the group of cross-listed firms that are eligible for short selling and margin trading, the authors observe no significant difference in the contribution of either A- or H-share markets to the price discovery. The contribution of home market for these firms is even lower around the announcement of major events. The authors further find that while the short sale activities appears to be informative, measured by the adverse selection (AS) component of spread, on the whole they have not led the A-share markets to be more informative. Research limitations/implications – The sample of cross-listed Chinese firms that are allowed to be sold short or bought on margin are rather limited. Hence, the results should be read with some caution. Practical implications – The removal of short selling constraints appears to improve the contribution of the respective markets to the process price discovery, in the case for larger cross-listed firms. Originality/value – The authors shed new lights on how the introduction of short selling and margin trading impacts on the price discovery of the Chinese cross-listed firms. A further contribution of the study is the use of high frequency data, while most of the previous studies on the Chinese markets use daily data.


Author(s):  
Peter N Dixon

Abstract When short selling is costly, owners of an asset have greater incentive to become informed than nonowners because trading on negative information is easier for them. Thus, information acquisition concentrates among investors owning the asset. A short selling ban restricts selling to only the relatively more informed investors who own the asset, increasing adverse selection but only on the sell side of the market. Price efficiency declines due to less overall information acquisition because a ban magnifies the disincentive to gather information for investors not owning the asset. Empirical evidence from the 2008 U.S. short selling ban is consistent with these theoretical predictions. (JEL G10, G14, G18)


ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (361) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daisuke Ikeda ◽  

CFA Magazine ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 19 (6) ◽  
pp. 14-14
Author(s):  
James Allen
Keyword(s):  

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