La teoría política normativa y el arte del manejo del Estado en Legalismo (1964) de Judith Shklar (Normative Political Theory and Statecraft in Judith Shklar´s Legalism (1964))

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcelo F. Ponce

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. e1176
Author(s):  
Marcelo Santos

Based on the main contributions of normative political theory on global justice and migration ethics, this article assesses the global Compacts on refugees and migration, approved by the United Nations General Assembly in December 2018. The set of conclusions indicates that the Compacts constitute an important advance in global moral and political projects and commitments. However, the application of their predicted terms can bring about problems, distortions, and impasses in the sharing of responsibilities.



Author(s):  
Andre Santos Campos

Historical analyses of the relations between political theory and time often hinge on two claims. The first is that political theorists have until recently put less emphasis on the future than the past when debating political legitimacy and obligation. The second is that the history of political theory draws a fundamental distinction between theories that invoke time to legitimate political structures and theories that reject temporal considerations in favor of timeless principles. This chapter disputes these two claims by maintaining that competing languages of legitimacy harbor different and interrelated conceptions of temporality. A survey of time conceptions in the history of political philosophy shows that normative political theory is inherently multitemporal, involving double regard for the past and the future. And, since even tenseless principles of legitimacy often depend on temporally related forms of formulation and application, considerations about time seem inescapable in normative political theory.



1995 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-199
Author(s):  
Mark Hulliung

For three decades Judith Shklar (1928-1992) was one of the dominant figures in the world of political theory. Not many minds can feel their way into romanticism and then coolly turn round to examine legal philosophy, its very opposite, but she did so with exceptional success. After diagnosing the decline of political philosophy, she surprised many onlookers by making herself a major force behind its revitalization. Writing on Montaigne, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Hegel, she both offered striking historical interpretations of their meaning and demonstrated how their outlooks could be lifted from their original contexts and pressed into service by the living.



2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 591-620 ◽  
Author(s):  
KATRINA FORRESTER

Current interpretations of the political theory of Judith Shklar focus to a disabling extent on her short, late article “The Liberalism of Fear” (1989); commentators take this late essay as representative of her work as a whole and thus characterize her as an anti-totalitarian, Cold War liberal. Other interpretations situate her political thought alongside followers of John Rawls and liberal political philosophy. Challenging the centrality of fear in Shklar's thought, this essay examines her writings on utopian and normative thought, the role of history in political thinking and her notions of ordinary cruelty and injustice. In particular, it shifts emphasis away from an exclusive focus on her late writings in order to consider works published throughout her long career at Harvard University, from 1950 until her death in 1992. By surveying the range of Shklar's critical standpoints and concerns, it suggests that postwar American liberalism was not as monolithic as many interpreters have assumed. Through an examination of her attitudes towards her forebears and contemporaries, it shows why the dominant interpretations of Shklar—as anti-totalitarian émigré thinker, or normative liberal theorist—are flawed. In fact, Shklar moved restlessly between these two categories, and drew from each tradition. By thinking about both hope and memory, she bridged the gap between two distinct strands of postwar American liberalism.



Author(s):  
Santana Khanikar

If the state in democracies like India engages in violence, then is this state still accepted by the people? The conception of legitimacy in this study is about observable behaviour, about if and why people accept power holders as authority, and not about whether it is the ideal way to engage with violent power holders within the discourses of normative political theory. And what we see in both the field-sites of this study, is acceptance, though it may be slow and appear flickering or contextual at time. The specific vision that the nation-state is, marked by geographical boundaries and internal sovereignty often needs to use violence to legitimize its existence. Such use of violence does not appear to be leading to a dis-illusionment with the form or the institutions of the state.







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