scholarly journals Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in the United States and Europe

Author(s):  
Roberta S. Karmel
Author(s):  
Wulf A. Kaal ◽  
Dale A. Oesterle

The hedge fund industry in the United States has evolved from a niche market participant in the early 1950s to a major industry operating in international financial markets today. Hedge funds in the United States began as privately held and privately managed investment funds, unregistered and exempt from federal securities regulation. An increasing investor demand for hedge funds and substantial growth of the hedge fund industry resulted in a tectonic shift in the regulatory framework applicable to the industry via the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act. This chapter summarizes the evolution of the regulatory framework governing the hedge fund industry. It focuses on the registration and disclosure provisions added by the Dodd-Frank Act and several other regulatory innovations, including the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act and proposals for tax reform of the private investment fund industry.


Author(s):  
Jordan Cally

This chapter evaluates securities regulation in the United States. For a variety of reasons, domestic US securities regulation has served as a model to the world, either directly or through its influence in international standard setting. The parallel system, however, has not been exported and so remains a somewhat unique aspect of US law, and based on the concept of the foreign private issuer (FPI), appears firmly entrenched. Going forward, it is possible that the domestic and international aspects of US markets may become more integrated, or at least coordinated. Calls for greater EU-style deference to home country regulation for non-US issuers and market participants would certainly simplify, and perhaps undermine, the US parallel system. There is no doubt as to the decline of US hegemony in regulation of international capital markets. Within the United States, level playing field arguments continue to surface, sometimes in surprising ways.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Marc I. Steinberg

This chapter explains the need for the “rethinking” of the federal securities laws, with particular emphasis on the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Recognizing the historical preeminence of the U.S. securities law framework, the chapter first highlights key attributes that facilitate the effectuation of this achievement. Thereafter, the chapter addresses problematic characteristics of U.S. securities regulation. As set forth therein, the framework of securities regulation that exists today in the United States is comprised of piecemeal federal legislation, judicial decisions, SEC action, state securities (blue sky) activity, and self-regulatory organization oversight. As a consequence, the presence of consistent and logical regulation all too often is absent. With frequency, in both transactional and litigation settings, mandates apply that are erratic and antithetical to sound public policy. Setting the stage, in a preliminary manner, the chapter identifies several of the key problematic areas, succinctly explains their deficiencies, and suggests corrective measures that should be implemented.


Author(s):  
S.M. Solaiman

The United States introduced federal securities regulation by adopting the Disclosure-Based Regulation (DBR) in 1933 resembling the doctrine of caveat venditor (DCV) as a substitute for the doctrine of caveat emptor (DCE) in the securities market. The overarching objective of the DBR was to protect investors by enabling them to make ‘informed decisions’. Although the change aimed to protect investors, the causes of the GFC suggest that the DCV exists only in theory, while issuers of securities are still enjoying the benefits of the DCE in practice. Financial innovations that intend to camouflage the risks inherent in the complex derivative products should be strictly regulated through a merit regulation which should be applied to only public offers, and the DBR should still remain in force for other securities. It concludes that the DBR has now emerged as more a ‘Pandora’s box’ than a panacea.


Author(s):  
Md. Rezaul Karim Miajee

Introduction Corporate governance (CG) has recently been extensively discussed, intensely debated and variously defined in the United States. For the purposes of this chapter, CG shall mean the internal arrangements within a corporation intended to provide reasonable assurances that corporate directors and officers make and implement decisions in accordance with their duties of care and loyalty to their corporations. CG in the United States is often associated with the recent initiatives taken in the wake of corporate scandals such as Enron and MCI. While the recent initiatives are undoubtedly important, their significance can best be understood in the context of the existing frameworks under corporate and securities law. The current initiatives in the United States (i.e. the recently adopted CG provisions in the listing requirements for the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) – and the provisions of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 – often called “Sarbanes– Oxley”) in important ways simply add to the governance measures already in place pursuant to corporate law and securities regulation in the United States. Only after understanding foundations in corporate law and securities regulation in the United States is it possible to understand the significance, and the limitations, of the recently adopted NYSE listing requirements and of Sarbanes–Oxley. In general, the recent NYSE initiatives attempt to improve the degree of independence among directors of corporations listed there so that they are better able – and more likely – to meet the performance standards currently applicable to directors under corporate law (i.e. duties of care and loyalty), but the NYSE does not change those standards. Unfortunately, the NYSE listing requirements do not have the force of law. Sarbanes–Oxley, on the other hand, in general, attempts to improve the independence of external auditors and corporate directors so that they are better able – and more likely – to prepare public disclosures in form and substance required by US securities regulations. There are also provisions intended to enhance the care with which corporate officers prepare required public disclosures. Unfortunately, Sarbanes–Oxley applies only to disclosure requirements under US securities regulations. With limited exceptions, Sarbanes–Oxley is not specifically intended to apply to directors’ or officers’ broader obligations to their corporations or the standards applicable to their performance of those obligations.


2020 ◽  
pp. 175
Author(s):  
Marco Dell'Erba

This Article analyzes the way the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has enforced securities laws with regard to Initial Coin Offerings (“ICOs”). In a speech held in 2016, the U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) Chairman Christopher Giancarlo emphasized the similarities between the advent of the blockchain technology and the Internet era. He offered the “do no harm” approach as the best way to regulate blockchain technology. The Clinton administration implemented the “do no harm” approach at the beginning of the Internet Era in the 1990s when regulators sought to support technological innovations without stifling them with burdensome rules. This Article suggests that the SEC adopted a “do no harm approach” and successfully pursued two of its fundamental institutional goals when enforcing securities laws in the context of ICOs: investor protection and preservation of capital formation. After providing a brief description of the basics of ICOs and the way they have evolved in the last two years, this Article examines the transition into a new phase of full enforcement action implemented by the SEC. This shift from inactivity to enforcement was gradual, characterized by clearly identifiable steps. Data on ICOs demonstrates that this rigorous enforcement of securities laws has not damaged the industry in the United States and may suggest that entrepreneurs have adapted to this enforcement approach. By contrast, a lack of enforcement would have probably increased uncertainty to the detriment of investors and entrepreneurs and put the UNITED STATES at a disadvantage in the international arena. Furthermore, this paper emphasizes the importance of pursuing specific goals in the short-to-medium term, particularly in order to make securities regulation uniform and avoid differences at the state and federal levels, as well as to encourage industry authorities such as Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) to develop high standards for self-regulation.


Author(s):  
A. Hakam ◽  
J.T. Gau ◽  
M.L. Grove ◽  
B.A. Evans ◽  
M. Shuman ◽  
...  

Prostate adenocarcinoma is the most common malignant tumor of men in the United States and is the third leading cause of death in men. Despite attempts at early detection, there will be 244,000 new cases and 44,000 deaths from the disease in the United States in 1995. Therapeutic progress against this disease is hindered by an incomplete understanding of prostate epithelial cell biology, the availability of human tissues for in vitro experimentation, slow dissemination of information between prostate cancer research teams and the increasing pressure to “ stretch” research dollars at the same time staff reductions are occurring.To meet these challenges, we have used the correlative microscopy (CM) and client/server (C/S) computing to increase productivity while decreasing costs. Critical elements of our program are as follows:1) Establishing the Western Pennsylvania Genitourinary (GU) Tissue Bank which includes >100 prostates from patients with prostate adenocarcinoma as well as >20 normal prostates from transplant organ donors.


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