Keynes Always Adhered to His Logical, Objective Probability Relation, Defined As P(a/H) Equals a Rational Degree of Belief, α: Logical Probability Always Remained the Guide to Life for J M Keynes

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Emmett Brady

1978 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Tautu ◽  
G. Wagner

This paper is an analysis of the most important mathematical aspects of medical diagnosis: logical probability, rationality and decision theory, gambling models, pattern analysis, hazy and fuzzy subsets theory and, finally, the stochastic inquiry process.



Author(s):  
Jens Beckert ◽  
Richard Bronk

This chapter provides a theoretical framework for considering how imaginaries and narratives interact with calculative devices to structure expectations and beliefs in the economy. It analyses the nature of uncertainty in innovative market economies and examines how economic actors use imaginaries, narratives, models, and calculative practices to coordinate and legitimize action, determine value, and establish sufficient conviction to act despite the uncertainty they face. Placing the themes of the volume in the context of broader trends in economics and sociology, the chapter argues that, in conditions of widespread radical uncertainty, there is no uniquely rational set of expectations, and there are no optimal strategies or objective probability functions; instead, expectations are often structured by contingent narratives or socially constructed imaginaries. Moreover, since expectations are not anchored in a pre-existing future reality but have an important role in creating the future, they become legitimate objects of political debate and crucial instruments of power in markets and societies.



2014 ◽  
Vol 1070-1072 ◽  
pp. 1021-1028
Author(s):  
De Hua Cai ◽  
Xi Yang ◽  
Rui Chuang Wang ◽  
Cheng Zhi Ma ◽  
Jin Cheng ◽  
...  

Transformers health index calculation method based on cloud model and fuzzy evidential reasoning is proposed. According to the multi-level and multifactor of evaluation index information of power transformers, a layered evaluation index model is established. In order to deal with the ambiguity and uncertainty information of evaluation index, a normal cloud model is introduced, inferred the fuzzy degree of belief in the health state of evaluation index. Then use the fuzzy evidential reasoning method merge information of evaluation Index, inferred the degree of belief in the health state-level of transformer, calculated the health index of transformer. The results of an example analysis test its rationality and effectiveness.



2006 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
P.A.V.B. SWAMY ◽  
GEORGE S. TAVLAS

Under certain interpretations of its coefficients, a specified econometric model is an exact representation of the “true” model, defining the “objective” probability distribution. This note enumerates these interpretations. In the absence of the conditions implied by these interpretations, the econometric model is misspecified. The note shows that model misspecifications prevent the satisfaction of a necessary and sufficient condition for individual expectations to be rational in Muth's sense. Whereas restrictive forms of econometric models can give very inaccurate predictions, this note describes the conditions under which the predictions generated from time-varying coefficient models coincide with the predictions generated from the relevant economic theory.



2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-191
Author(s):  
Jonas Karge ◽  

How strongly an agent beliefs in a proposition can be represented by her degree of belief in that proposition. According to the orthodox Bayesian picture, an agent's degree of belief is best represented by a single probability function. On an alternative account, an agent’s beliefs are modeled based on a set of probability functions, called imprecise probabilities. Recently, however, imprecise probabilities have come under attack. Adam Elga claims that there is no adequate account of the way they can be manifested in decision-making. In response to Elga, more elaborate accounts of the imprecise framework have been developed. One of them is based on supervaluationism, originally, a semantic approach to vague predicates. Still, Seamus Bradley shows that some of those accounts that solve Elga’s problem, have a more severe defect: they undermine a central motivation for introducing imprecise probabilities in the first place. In this paper, I modify the supervaluationist approach in such a way that it accounts for both Elga’s and Bradley’s challenges to the imprecise framework.



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