Cater to Thy Client: Analyst Responsiveness to Institutional Investor Attention

Author(s):  
Peng-Chia Chiu ◽  
Ben Lourie ◽  
Alexander Nekrasov ◽  
Siew Hong Teoh
2020 ◽  
Vol 95 (6) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inna Abramova ◽  
John E. Core ◽  
Andrew Sutherland

ABSTRACT We study how short-term changes in institutional owner attention affect managers' disclosure choices. Holding institutional ownership constant and controlling for industry-quarter effects, we find that managers respond to attention by increasing the number of forecasts and 8-K filings. Rather than alter the decision of whether to forecast or to provide more informative disclosures, attention causes minor disclosure adjustments. This variation in disclosure is primarily driven by passive investors. Although attention explains significant variation in the quantity of disclosure, we find little change in abnormal volume and volatility, the bid-ask spread, or depth. Overall, our evidence suggests that management responds to temporary institutional investor attention by making disclosures that have little effect on information quality or liquidity. JEL Classifications: G23; G32; G34; G12; G14.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (9) ◽  
pp. 3009-3047 ◽  
Author(s):  
Azi Ben-Rephael ◽  
Zhi Da ◽  
Ryan D. Israelsen

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peng-Chia Chiu ◽  
Ben Lourie ◽  
Alexander Nekrasov ◽  
Siew Hong Teoh

We study how institutional investor attention to a firm affects the timeliness of analysts’ forecasts for that firm. We measure abnormal institutional attention (AIA) using Bloomberg news search activity for the firm on earnings announcement days. We find that analysts issue more timely forecasts when AIA is high on the earnings announcement day. Analyst responsiveness to AIA is stronger when analysts have more resources and experience and weaker when the AIA of other covered firms is high. Analysts who respond more to AIA are more likely to be named all-star analysts and less likely to be demoted to a smaller brokerage. We address endogeneity concerns using a measure of expected AIA that is unaffected by concurrent information. Our findings suggest that responsiveness to institutional attention influences the production of analyst research and analysts’ career outcomes. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 63-72
Author(s):  
Shuke Shi

This paper used the A-shares listed companies in China as samples, constructed a comprehensive indicator of investor attention, and conducted an empirical analysis on the correlations among investor attention, analyst optimism, and stock price crash risk. The results indicated that investor attention aggravates the stock price crash risk and has a positive effect on analyst optimism. Meanwhile, the analyst optimism plays a mediating role in the positive correlation between investor attention and stock price crash risk. In addition to that, institutional investor attention also has direct and indirect effects on the crash risk.


2000 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Boris Kasolowsky

Durch das Stimmrecht in der Hauptversammlung üben die Aktionäre ihr Recht aus, über die Geschicke der Gesellschaft mitzuentscheiden. Das englische Gesellschaftsrecht gibt nun einem anderen Organ der Gesellschaft, dem Board of Directors, die Befugnis, das Stimmrecht der Aktionäre und dessen Ausübung zu modifizieren. Gesetz, Richtenecht, Anordnungen der Regulierungsbehörden und Verlautbarungen von Organen der Selbstregulierung versuchen, diese Befugnis der Directors zu beschränken. Derartige Beschränkungen sollen in diesem Aufsatz dargestellt und kommentiert werden. Dabei wird aufgezeigt, daß die „Institutional Investor Guidelines", veifaßt und veröffentlicht von Organisationen der Privatwirtschaft, sachgerecht und effizient unerwünschte Manipulationen der Aktionärsstimmrechte durch die Directors verhindern können, und zwar auch im Vergleich zur staatlichen Regulierung durch Rechtsregeln und Verwaltungsanordnungen. Diese in England gewonnene Erfahrung könnte nützlich sein bei der Implementierung des Zusammenschlusses der Londoner und der Frankfurter Börse.


2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 177-219
Author(s):  
Yongsuk Yun ◽  
Seung-Weon Yoo

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